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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates the associations between financial restatements and 
characteristics of the parties responsible for preventing and detecting unintentional errors, i.e., 
boards (through their audit committees), management (through chief financial officers (CFOs)), 
and auditors. To conduct this investigation, I developed a theoretical model of restatement 
determinants that is more complete than models used in previous archival research as it includes 
characteristics of all three parties and the moderating effects of chief financial officers’ financial 
expertise and influence on the disruptive effects of organizational change. To identify 
restatements that correct unintentional error, I conducted automated text searches of over 10,000 
restatement disclosures for language asserting or implying lack of intent. This language-based 
proxy is automated, direct, transparent, easily replicable, scalable, and classifies as error-
correcting a smaller proportion of restatements as error-correcting than other proxies. I validated 
this proxy by contrasting the characteristics of the unintentional error restatements against other 
restatements based on theory-derived expectations. I find that annual financial statements 
restated to correct unintentional error(s) for years with Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
Section 404 auditor’s opinions exhibit less net income smoothing, less earnings persistence, and 
less positive accruals than such firm-years of other restatements. Finally, I tested the theoretical 
model using logistic regressions and data from financial statements, proxy statements, and 
auditor’s SOX 404 opinions of 346 companies (i.e., 121 companies that restate to correct 
unintentional error; 121 companies without restatement matched by year, industry, and company 
size; and 104 companies with other restatements that proxy for restatements of intentional 
misstatement).  
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Results show that of the three parties responsible for financial reporting quality, the CFO 
plays the major role with respect to unintentional error: The likelihood of restatement to correct 
unintentional error is decreasing in CFO financial expertise and influence, but only when 
companies are undergoing organizational change. Results also show that CFOs’ (audit 
committees’) financial expertise is more strongly associated with restatements that correct 
unintentional error (intentional misstatement) than intentional misstatement (unintentional error). 
However, I find no evidence of significant associations between auditor quality and either 
restatements that correct unintentional error or intentional misstatement.  
This research contributes to the emerging literature that examines variation in 
associations between type or severity of restatements and the influence of parties responsible for 
financial reporting quality. The new language-based proxy for restatements that correct 
unintentional error developed in this thesis will facilitate future research that uses type of 
restatement to proxy for constructs of interest.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
In this dissertation I develop and test a theoretical model of the determinants of 
unintentional error in audited financial statements of public companies. Inadvertent errors are not 
caused by management motivated to meet or beat benchmarks for personal gain or investor 
wellbeing. Hence, management is unlikely to resist correcting unintentional errors detected by 
auditors. Accordingly, a study in an unintentional error setting reflects on the competence and 
effort, rather than reporting incentives, of those responsible for financial statement preparation 
and audit. Caskey et al.’s (2010) theoretical paper warns that research designs common in 
empirical research bias estimates when management and audit effects are investigated separately. 
The model that I develop and test is more complete than the models used in most audit research. 
It includes characteristics of management, audit committees, and auditors. The purpose of this 
research is to shed more light on the roles played by those responsible for preventing and 
detecting unintentional error in audited financial statements. 
Measures of unintentional error and intentional misstatement in audited financial 
statements are required to test the theoretical model developed in this study. Restatements (other 
than technical restatements such as those following mergers) provide direct evidence of low 
audit quality and the breakdown of internal control (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991, Francis et 
al. 2013, Kinney 2000, Kinney and McDaniel 1989, Palmrose et al. 2004, PCAOB Office of 
Research and Analysis 2013a, Public Oversight Board 2000). The number of restatements rose 
rapidly after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) (Hennes et al. 2008, Whalen 
et al. 2013). So too did the number of restatement studies. Dechow et al. (2010, 374) in their 
 2 
 
review of determinants and consequences of earnings quality proxies call for studies that 
partition restatements based on management intent because the “[g]enerally weak and mixed 
evidence across the determinants of restatements suggests that they are not a reliable indicator of 
intentional misstatements”. The proportion of restatements that do not correct fraud or 
irregularities increased dramatically post-SOX (Burks 2010, Hennes et al. 2008) making 
empirical study of restatements that correct unintentional error feasible. Prior research uses 
refined proxies for restatements that correct intentional misstatement and partitions restatements 
based on various measures of restatement severity1. However, restatement literature lacks a 
directly determined proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error.  
Chapter 2 further discusses the need for a directly determined proxy for restatements that 
correct unintentional error and describes the construction and validation of such a proxy. To date, 
restatements that correct error have been identified indirectly. For example, researchers treat a 
restatement as correcting error if the restatement is not associated with negative market reaction 
or SEC, Department of Justice, or other investigations. I take a more direct, language-based 
approach to the identification of restatements that correct unintentional error. In short, I conduct 
automated text searches of restatement announcements for language asserting or implying lack of 
management intent to identify restatements that correct unintentional error. As management 
intent is unobservable, such a language-based proxy is subject to measurement error. Even when 
management does not initially seek to deceive, overconfident management may optimistically 
bias earnings estimates and start down a “slippery slope” to intentional misreporting upon 
discovery that future earnings are not sufficient to cover income correction (Schrand and 
Zechman 2012, 312). What begins as “doing nothing more than legitimately managing earnings, 
                                                   
1
 Files et al. 2009, Hennes et al. 2013, and Huang and Scholz 2012 discuss severity measures including market 
reaction to restatement announcement and the direction of net income correction. 
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merely exploiting ambiguities in the accounting rules” may lead to management concealment 
schemes (Public Oversight Board 2000 Section 3.24). Given the measurement error associated 
with this language-based proxy, I validate the proxy using several tests suggested by restatement 
and earnings quality research (Dechow et al. 2010, Plumlee and Yohn 2010). I find for firm-
years with auditor’s SOX Section 404 opinions that restatements identified as correcting 
unintentional error are associated with less net income smoothing, less earnings persistence, and 
less positive accruals than other restatements. This new language-based proxy classifies less than 
one third of restatements as correcting unintentional error, in contrast to current proxies (e.g., 
Hennes et al. 2008, Plumlee and Yohn 2010) that classify over half of restatements as error 
correcting. 
Chapter 3 reviews literature and develops and tests hypotheses to investigate the 
associations between restatements and auditor quality, audit committee expertise and chief 
financial officer (CFO) expertise and influence. In this chapter I argue for selecting for 
hypotheses development only these few characteristics of the players responsible for preventing 
and detecting unintentional error. To my knowledge the joint effects of auditor, audit committee, 
and management characteristics on restatements that correct unintentional error have not yet 
been studied. I find that associations between restatements and CFO and audit committee 
characteristics differ. CFO financial expertise and influence are associated with restatements that 
correct unintentional error, whereas audit committee financial expertise is associated with 
restatements that correct intentional misstatement. Furthermore, the associations between CFO 
financial expertise and influence depend on whether or not companies are undergoing 
organizational change. In periods of major organizational change restatements are decreasing in 
CFO financial expertise and influence while, consistent with CFOs turning their attention to 
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more strategic responsibilities in periods when financial reporting systems are not disrupted, 
restatements that correct unintentional error are increasing in CFO financial expertise and 
influence. Moreover, in a model that includes these interactions between restatements and CFO 
and audit committee characteristics, there is no support for predictions that either restatements 
that correct unintentional error or restatements that correct intentional misstatement are 
decreasing in auditor quality.   
I draw more heavily on recent research to develop my hypotheses. The U.S. audit market 
has changed radically following the accounting scandals at the turn of the century. For example, 
PCAOB oversight has replaced auditor self-regulation, client acceptance processes have 
changed, and the market share of non-Big 4 auditors has increased (see Cassell et al. 2012, 
DeFond and Francis 2005, and DeFond and Zhang 2014 for a discussion of audit market 
changes). Further, audit committee composition and roles also changed dramatically following 
the accounting scandals. SOX Section 301 requires all members of audit committees to be 
independent and makes audit committees responsible for auditor appointment and compensation 
(Caskey et al. 2010, SEC 2003b, SOX Section 301 2002). Also, compensation penalties for 
CFOs following restatement and the reporting of internal control weaknesses became more 
severe (Collins et al. 2009, Li et al. 2010, Wang 2010) and the proportion of management 
compensation comprised of stock option grants decreased (Cohen et al. 2008). In addition, firms 
have increasingly adopted real earnings management techniques instead of accrual-based 
earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008). Moreover, the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 changed auditor liability rules from joint-and-several to 
proportionate liability and capped plaintiff damage claims: these changes have reduced the 
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frequency of frivolous lawsuits against non-culpable auditors with “deep pockets” (Lee and 
Mande 2003).  
Chapter 4 summarizes findings of Chapters 2 and 3 and discusses this study’s limitations, 
contributions, and opportunities for future research. A limitation of this research is that the 
language-based proxy used to identify restatements that correct unintentional error may be no 
better than existing proxies. In spite of this limitation this study makes several important 
contributions. First, it develops and tests a theoretical model of the determinants of unintentional 
error in audited financial statements which is more complete than models used in prior research. 
Second, in spite of proxy limitations, tests using this model extend prior research by showing 
that the association between unintentional error and CFO financial expertise and influence 
depends on whether or not companies are undergoing major organizational change. Third, this 
study also extends prior research by examining which characteristics of those responsible for 
financial reporting quality are more strongly associated with restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement versus restatement that correct unintentional error in a more complete model of 
financial reporting quality. Finally, this study contributes a new, direct method of proxy 
construction of restatements that correct unintentional error that is automated and hence, 
replicable, scalable, and transparent.  
One useful extension of this study would be to determine whether or not this language-
based proxy classifies restatements more accurately than prior proxies. Another extension would 
be to investigate whether or not the differences in strengths of associations between the 
characteristics of those responsible for financial reporting and restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement versus restatements that correct unintentional error observed in this 
study are found when the sample is expanded to include non-accelerated filers. Even though 
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prior research finds market reaction to error restatement is smaller than to fraud and irregularity 
misstatement (Hennes et al. 2008, Palmrose et al. 2004), understanding the determinants of 
unintentional error in audited financial statements is important. Unintentional errors in audited 
financial statements may reflect the presence of errors in internal management reports used by 
managers for day-to-day operational decisions (Feng et al. 2009) and deficiencies in internal 
controls that affect both financial reporting and operations (Feng et al. forthcoming). 
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Chapter 2 - Identifying Unintentional Errors in Restatement 
Disclosures 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Public Company Accounting Office Oversight Board (PCAOB) made identifying 
audit quality indicators a priority project for 2013 (Hanson 2013, PCAOB 2012b). In a 
background paper prepared for the project, the PCAOB’s Office of Research and Analysis 
observes that “[r]estatements that correct misstatements are a relatively solid indicator of audit 
quality” (PCAOB Office of Research and Analysis 2013, 23) 2, 3. The background paper does not 
address whether restatements are a better indicator of an auditor’s error detection ability or an 
auditor’s ability to detect earnings management attempts. It is rare to find an archival research 
design (an exception being Keune and Johnstone 2012) that supports conclusions about whether 
an auditor quality measure is associated more strongly with detection ability or with the ability to 
resolve detected misstatements4. Since management has little reason to resist correction of 
auditor detected unintentional error, research designs that test the relationship between auditor 
quality indicators (e.g., auditor size, auditor industry experience, and PCAOB inspection 
outcomes) and restatements that correct only unintentional error would better support 
conclusions about auditor detection abilities. Similarly, testing associations between restatements 
                                                   
2
 The PCAOB states in its 2012-2013 strategic plan that “[i]nitiating a project to identify audit quality measures, 
with a longer-term goal of tracking such measures with respect to domestic global network firms and reporting 
collective measures over time” is a “priority project” for 2013 (PCAOB 2012b, 5).  
3
 The background paper includes an Appendix summarizing work done related to audit quality indicators by the 
United States Department of the Treasury’s Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession, the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, The United Kingdom’s Financial Reporting Council, and the PCAOB’s 
Investor Advisory and Standing Advisory Groups. 
4
 Knechel et al. (2013) overview literature on associations between restatements and audit quality. 
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that correct unintentional error and management and audit committee expertise and incentives 
may lead to a more nuanced understanding of internal control and governance mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, while restatement research has developed refined proxies for restatements that 
correct intentional misstatement (Dechow et al. 2011, Hennes et al. 2008, Plumlee and Yohn 
2010), a direct method to construct a proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error is 
not available.  
Some restatement announcements directly assert, or otherwise imply, that the errors 
corrected by the restatements are unintentional. Although text search and content analysis 
methodologies are increasingly being used in accounting research (Fisher et al. 2010), such 
analysis of the language used in restatement announcements has not been applied to classify 
restatements. Instead, restatement studies either presume that all restatements correct intentional 
misstatements (Dechow et al. 2010 p. 374, Hennes et al. 2008 p. 1488) or identify error 
correcting restatements as the restatements that remain after restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement are subtracted from all restatements. For example, Hennes et al. (2008) subtract 
restatements that are attributed to fraud or irregularities from all 8-Ks announcing restatements to 
correct misapplications of GAAP (filed from 2002 through 2005) and label the remaining three 
quarters of restatements as restatements that correct error.  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop and validate a language-based proxy for 
restatements that correct unintentional error in annual financial statements. To begin, I developed 
a list of words and phrases that are indicators of unintentional error in restatement 
announcements. I prepared this list by reading several hundred restatements announced after 
2002 (the year of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enactment) and coded by AuditAnalytics as “errors: 
accounting and clerical applications”. Then, using this list of words and phrases, I conducted 
 9 
 
automated text searches5 of the 10,623 restatement announcements in the AuditAnalytics 
database that were disclosed post-2002. Based on the results of these text searches, I coded 
approximately one fifth of the restatement announcements as corrections of unintentional error. 
Next, I coded restatements as intentional misstatements based on my review of all U.S. Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) 
released after December 31, 2002. After coding the restatements as correcting unintentional 
error, intentional misstatements, both, or neither (i.e., the unclassified restatements), I 
downloaded financial data for all available years from the COMPUSTAT Unrestated Quarterly 
(“As First Reported”) – US database, and matched the coded restatement data with financial 
data, matching on the earliest fiscal year when the restated period extends beyond a single fiscal 
year. Finally, I dropped restatements lacking financial data (4,388), quarterly restatements 
(1,649), multiple instances of firm-year restatements (93), and foreign business and holding 
company restatement firm-years (786).  
Three samples drawn from the remaining 3,707 restatements (751 unintentional error 
corrections, 127 intentional misstatement corrections, and 2,829 unclassified restatements that 
are not identified by the restatement announcements and AAERs searches), are used in proxy 
validation tests. The 751 unintentional error corrections (UE) and the 127 intentional 
misstatement corrections (IM) comprise one sample (the UEvsIM sample). Two other samples, 
comprised of restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports issued in the earliest year in the 
restatement period, are also used in validation tests. These two samples are validated because 
internal control quality is a variable of interest in my dissertation research and SOX 404 opinions 
are a frequently used proxy for internal control quality. One of these samples (the UEvsUN 
                                                   
5
 I conducted the search in November, 2012. 
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sample) is comprised of 243 unintentional error correcting (UE) and 588 unclassified (UN) 
restatements with auditor SOX 404 opinions. The final sample (the UEvsOther sample) consists 
of this UEvsUN sample plus the 17 restatements that correct intentional misstatement firm-years 
that have auditor’s SOX 404 reports. There are currently an insufficient number of intentional 
misstatement restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports identified by AAER searches (17) to 
construct the internal control quality proxies needed for Chapter 3 tests. Hence, unclassified 
restatements in the UEvsOther sample (or a subset of such restatements) are also used in Chapter 
3 tests to proxy for restatements that correct intentional misstatements.    
I developed tests based on prior restatement and earnings quality research to validate the 
new proxy. I predicted, relative to restatements that correct intentional misstatement, that 
unintentional error restatements will correct proportionately fewer revenue recognition issues (as 
coded by AuditAnalytics) and change net income less frequently. I also predicted that, relative to 
firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement, unintentional error firm-years will also be 
characterized by less income persistence, less income smoothing, less positive accruals, and a 
lower likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ income forecasts by a small amount.  
I find in validation tests using the UEvsIM sample (i.e., the sample of firm-years without 
auditor’s SOX 404 reports) that, in relation to restatements that correct intentional misstatements, 
the error-correcting restatements are associated with proportionately fewer revenue recognition 
issues, less positive accruals, and a lower likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ income 
forecasts. Further, I find in validation tests using the UEvsUN sample (i.e., the sample of firm-
years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports) that, in relation to unclassified restatements, restatements 
that correct unintentional error are associated with less net income smoothing, less income 
persistence, and less positive accruals. Moreover, these UEvsUN sample results are the same for 
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the UEvsOther sample (i.e., the UEvsUN sample plus the 17 restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement firm-years with SOX 404 reports). Thus, I conclude that my method of directly 
identifying error correcting restatements based on the language in restatement announcements 
constructs a valid proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error when auditor’s SOX 404 
reports are available for at least the first year of the restated period. 
This language-based proxy construction method contributes to the restatement literature. 
Constructing the new proxy uses publicly available information, the language in restatement 
announcements that asserts or implies lack of management intent. This information has been 
largely ignored in classifying restatements to date. Since automated text searches are used, proxy 
construction may be easily replicated6 and scaled to search a greater number of restatements at 
little additional cost as more restatements become available. This proxy classifies less than one 
third of restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports filed for the first restated year as correcting 
unintentional error. In contrast, Hennes et al. (2008) classify three quarters of their 8K-based 
sample as error restatements. Plumlee and Yohn (2010) classify over half of restatements -- 
restatements not attributed to manipulation, transaction complexity, lack of clarity in accounting 
standard, or the use of judgment in applying a standard -- as correcting “internal errors”. A 
limitation of automated text search is the sensitivity of search results to the choice of the words 
and phrases used to conduct the search (Kuechler 2007). In this study, validation test results are 
robust to using both a longer and shorter list of search words and phrases. A further potential 
limitation is reliance on management assertions in restatement announcements. If management 
misrepresent their intent, or are “optimistically biased” and let what begins as unintentional error 
become intentional misstatement (Schrand and Zechman 2012), language in restatement 
                                                   
6
 Appendix A lists the words/phrases used in the automated searches. 
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announcements may mischaracterize the nature of the restatement correction7. These potential 
limitations aside, the proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error developed in this 
paper may enhance the power of tests used to study associations between unintentional error and 
the expertise and incentives of CFOs, audit committees, and auditors. While I conclude that my 
automated search of restatement announcements for words and phrases indicating lack of intent 
results in a valid proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error, I leave to future research 
the study of research settings for which this language-based proxy is best suited and the effects 
of proxy choice on research findings. In particular, an extension of this research might be to 
investigate differences in the descriptive statistics and consequences of restatements classified by 
searching for words and phrases asserting or implying lack of intent rather than focusing on 
market reaction, indicators of fraud, irregularities, complexity and standards’ issues as done in 
prior research (e.g. Files et al. 2009, Hennes et al. 2008, Plumlee and Yohn 2010). 
2.2 Background 
Given that “[t]he basic recordkeeping function embodied in the modern journal entry lies 
at the core of all accounting systems” (Basu and Waymire 2006, 202), and recordkeeping 
requirements are embodied in statute and professional guidance (e.g., PCAOB Auditing Standard 
No. 5, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13b2 [SEC 2005], and Canadian Business 
Corporations Act of 1985), it is surprising that there is virtually no archival research on 
unintentional errors. Some of these errors are never identified but some are discovered and, if 
material, can lead to restatements. In comparison with intentional misstatements, unintentional 
errors (1) are associated with market reaction of a smaller magnitude (Hennes et al. 2008; 
                                                   
7
 In addition to the search of AAERs undertaken in this study, future research could also search court rulings and the 
business press for indicators of intentional misstatements.  
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Palmrose et al. 2004), (2) are more likely to be associated with weak internal controls 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), (3) occur more frequently (Plumlee and Yohn 2010), (4) affect a 
broader range of accounts (Plumlee and Yohn 2010), and (5) are as likely to lead to auditor 
turnover if restatement occurs (Hennes et al. 2014).  
External users and audit committee members may be able to rationally infer the presence 
of intentional misstatements made when management is motivated to manage earnings or 
commit fraud to meet certain objectives (Dechow et al. 2010). However, unintentional errors are 
less transparent and hence, may be more likely to result in decision errors. Furthermore, 
unintentional errors may reflect the competence rather than the integrity of management and 
auditors. Whereas intentional misstatements may be partially attributed to management 
incentives8, unintentional errors indicate either management is less able (Demerjian et al. 2013) 
or less incented to implement and maintain effective controls over financial reporting (Balsam et 
al. 2014, Hoitash et al. 2012). Management is likely to react differently to auditor detection of 
intentional vs. unintentional misapplications of GAAP. Management motivated by concerns such 
as shareholder reaction to missing analysts’ forecasts, the effects of unexpected financial results 
on merger negotiations, and the labour market penalties for poor financial results is more likely 
to resist correcting intentional misstatement. Since unintentional error is unlikely to be associated 
with such incentives, management should be less resistant to correcting material, auditor 
detected, unintentional errors. Accordingly, restatements that correct unintentional error indicate 
not only that management has failed to implement and maintain effective controls over financial 
reporting but also that the auditor lacks the requisite skills to plan and conduct an effective audit. 
                                                   
8
 Armstrong et al. (2010) overview the literature investigating associations between executives’ equity incentives 
and accounting irregularities.  
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A broad range of research over the past thirty years shows that unintentional errors in 
published financial statements may occur more frequently than intentional misstatements. As 
Scott A. Taub, Acting Chief Accountant of the SEC, observed, over half of all restatements by 
accelerated filers during the early years of SOX reporting were caused by “ordinary books and 
records deficiencies or by simple misapplications of the accounting standards”.9 Eilifsen and 
Messier (2000) summarize the results of six pre-SOX studies of auditor detected differences 
before the issuance of financial statements and find that judgment error led to less than one-third 
of the errors, whereas over half related to personnel issues, lack of accounting knowledge, and 
mechanical error/routine clerical errors. Bell et al. (1998), using auditor-supplied data, find that 
audit differences relate more frequently to incorrect data capture and manual computation than to 
management judgment and that computerized processes are associated with more unintentional 
errors than non-computerized processes.10  
Some restatement announcements include managements’ explanations for the 
misreporting. For example, The AES Corporation filed a Form 8-K on July 27, 2005 that 
includes this restatement explanation:  
On July 27, 2005, the Company announced via press release that it is reviewing certain 
accounting practices and previously reported financial statements as a result of possible errors 
discovered by management of the Company.  
As a result of the continuing evaluation of the Company’s deferred income tax accounting and 
reconciliation controls process disclosed in the Company’s 2004 Form 10-K, the Company 
announced that it would restate its 2002, 2003, 2004 and first quarter 2005 financial statements. 
                                                   
9
 Scott A. Taub, Acting Chief Accountant of the SEC, in his speech at the Financial Executive International Meeting 
on November 17, 2006 (http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch111706sat.htm) which was cited by Hennes et 
al. (2008). 
 
10
 Bell et al. (1998) attributed this finding to automation’s magnification of previously existing personnel and other 
control weaknesses. Many organizations depend on fragmented financial reporting systems that combine new 
technologies with legacy systems (Wagner and Dittmar 2006). Consequently, both automated and non-automated 
processes co-exist (e.g., in many period end and close processes) in even the most sophisticated systems today. 
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The adjustments requiring restatement primarily relate to the accounting treatment for deferred 
taxes associated with certain acquisitions completed prior to 2001…. These adjustments 
primarily impact deferred tax balances, fixed assets and the other comprehensive income portion 
of stockholder’s equity as well as income tax expense, depreciation expense and foreign currency 
gains and losses on the remeasurement of deferred taxes.  
In addition, accounting calculation errors were identified related to our subsidiary in Cameroon 
resulting in adjustments that primarily will impact the balance sheet fixed asset and currency 
translation accounts.  
Based on management’s review, it believes that all errors were inadvertent and unintentional. 
The Company has not completed its analysis and has not yet determined the final amount and 
nature of the adjustments.  
The previously issued financial statements and report of the Company’s independent registered 
public accounting firm, Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., should no longer be relied upon. The Company 
will file an amended 2004 Form 10-K and an amended first quarter 2005 Form 10-Q reflecting 
the restated amounts as soon as practicable. The decision to restate prior financial statements 
was made on July 26, 2005 by the Audit Committee of AES’s Board of Directors, upon the 
recommendation of management and has been discussed with Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. 
  
The above example shows that restatement disclosure language (e.g., “unintentional” and 
“inadvertent”) may indicate a lack of intent. However, when Plumlee and Yohn (2010) read 
restatement announcements to classify restatements they looked for indications of manipulation, 
complexity, clarity of standard, and use of judgment in applying a standard rather than looking 
for language disclosing lack of intent. They labeled restatements without such indications, i.e., 
restatements that were “left over” from their classification process, as “internal error” 
restatements. Based on their hand-coding of 3,744 restatements filed from 2003 through 2006, 
Plumlee and Yohn (2010) attribute 3% of restatements to manipulation, 3% to transaction 
complexity, 37% to lack of clarity in accounting standard or to the use of judgment in applying a 
standard, and 57% to basic internal company errors. Their internal company error category 
includes not only “books or records deficiency and simple misapplication of generally accepted 
accounting standards”, but also disclosures that include “no discussion that suggests these errors 
were intentional” (Plumlee and Yohn 2010, 46).  
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I argue that it may be possible both to automate the restatement classification process 
with respect to unintentional errors and to refine the classification by conducting automated 
searches for words and phrases such as “unintentional” and “inadvertent” in restatement 
announcements. However, it is not sufficient to show there are words and phrases indicating lack 
of intent in restatement disclosures. It is also necessary to show that such language has 
discriminatory power to differentiate restatements that correct unintentional error from both 
restatements that correct intentional misstatements and unclassified restatements. It would also 
be desirable to show that the resulting classification is superior to alternative approaches, but this 
is beyond the scope of this study.  
2.3 Proxy Validation Tests Development 
In this section I develop six validation tests to examine differences between restatements 
that correct unintentional error and restatements that correct intentional misstatement. The first 
two tests are based on Plumlee and Yohn’s (2010) detailed analysis of restatement reasons and 
income effects. An additional four validation tests are based on Dechow et al.’s (2010) 
discussion of four earnings quality proxies: earnings persistence, accrual quality, income 
smoothness, and benchmarks (observations at or slightly above targets).  
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Plumlee and Yohn (2010) identify revenue recognition issues as a cause of 53% of the 
intentional manipulation restatements (3% of their restatement sample). Dechow et al. (2011) 
report a similar proportion (59.5%) of intentional misstatements in AAERs. In contrast, Plumlee 
and Yohn (2010) find revenue recognition issues are disclosed in only 8% of the internal error 
restatements that comprise 57% of their restatement sample. These findings suggest the first 
validation test: 
V1: Intentional misstatement restatements have a greater proportion of revenue 
recognition issues than unintentional error restatements. 
My second prediction is based on the intuition that companies that opportunistically 
misstate are more likely to bias income reporting than companies making unintentional errors. 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and Leuz et al. (2003) review literature that concludes management 
frequently engages in income smoothing that leads to both income overstatements and 
understatements. Plumlee and Yohn (2010) find that the proportion of restatements that corrects 
intentional manipulation and restates income is greater than the proportion of intentional 
manipulation restatements that has no income effect. While unintentional error may also distort 
income upwards and downwards, Plumlee and Yohn (2010) find that the proportion of 
restatements that corrects “internal error” without changing income is greater than the proportion 
of “internal error” restatements that changes income. The intuition that intentional misstatement 
is more likely to bias income reporting than unintentional error, combined with these prior 
research findings, leads to my second validation test: 
V2: Proportionately more intentional misstatement restatements than unintentional error 
restatements correct net income as originally reported.  
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 “Persistence may be achieved in the short run by engaging in earnings management” 
(Dechow et al. 2010, 351). I expect the motivations of management to manage earnings will lead 
to more persistent earnings for firms with restatements that correct intentional misstatement than 
for firms with restatements that correct unintentional error. I also expect staffing or system 
limitations that lead to unintentional error will hamper any earnings management attempts. 
Management relies on accurate, reliable records of unmanaged earnings for managing earnings 
towards desired amounts. Inaccurate records contribute to overshooting and undershooting 
targets. Accordingly, as record-keeping errors come to light in subsequent periods, I expect 
record-keeping corrections and estimation adjustments to be reflected in less persistent earnings 
trends, leading to my third validation test: 
V3: Intentional misstatement restatements are associated with greater income 
persistence than unintentional error restatements. 
If, as intuition suggests, intentional misstatement biases income upwards more than 
downwards, unintentional error restatements may be associated with less positive accruals than 
intentional misstatement restatements. Consistent with this intuition, Plumlee and Yohn (2010) 
find that restatements that correct manipulations are more likely to correct overstated income. 
Further, many prior research studies conclude that greater discretionary accruals are also 
associated with earnings management. For example, Dechow et al. (2011) find that 1979-2002 
firm-years with AAER-alleged GAAP violations which overstate income, have more positive 
accruals than firm-years without such violations. Dechow et al. (2011, 18) conclude that, 
“manipulating firms have more ability to change and adjust assumptions to influence short-term 
earnings”. Prior research also finds greater accrual magnitude (absolute value) is associated with 
intentional manipulation. However, lower accrual quality is also associated with internal control 
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weaknesses such as understaffing and/or poorly designed and maintained systems (e.g., 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008, Doyle et al. 2007a). I do not predict absolute accrual magnitude 
will differ between intentional misstatement and unintentional error restatements but rather that 
“internal control weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentional errors that add noise to 
accruals than intentional misstatements that bias earnings upwards” (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2008, 217). Thus, my fourth validation test is:   
V4: Unintentional error restatements are associated with less positive accruals than 
intentional misstatement restatements.   
The fifth validation test draws from income smoothing research. While many earnings 
management studies begin with the premise that earnings are managed to mislead, Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) conclude income is smoothed to improve informativeness. Using analogous 
arguments to those presented in developing V3, the persistence validation test, I argue errors 
caused by books and records deficiencies and inadequately trained or resourced accounting 
personnel make it more difficult to predict future earnings and hamper management’s income 
smoothing attempts. This reasoning leads to my fifth validation test:  
V5: Intentional misstatement restatements are associated with greater income smoothing 
than unintentional error restatements.  
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Arguments for my final prediction parallel those made for my income persistence and 
income smoothing predictions. Management motivated to manage earnings to benchmarks, such 
as a previous year’s earnings per share or analysts’ forecasts, may be less successful in doing so 
if record-keeping weaknesses lead to unintentional error. Feng et al. (2009) find that firms 
reporting ineffective internal controls provide less accurate management guidance. This 
reasoning leads to my last validation test: 
V6: Meeting or beating a benchmark by a small amount is associated proportionately 
more frequently with intentional misstatement restatements than unintentional 
error restatements. 
2.4 Method and Sample Selection 
2.4.1 Unintentional error identification 
I used automated text searches to identify restatements likely to correct unintentional 
error in a sample comprised of the 10,623 restatements in the AuditAnalytics database11 disclosed 
after 2002 (the year of SOX enactment). To identify error-correcting restatements I used 
AuditAnalytics’ text search tool and a list of error indicators (i.e., words and phrases) that I 
believe are likely to be associated with the disclosure of restatements that correct unintentional 
error. For example, The AES Corporation restatement announcement extract presented in the 
background section of this chapter would be coded as an unintentional error as it contains the 
words “inadvertent” and “unintentional”. Appendix A describes in detail the method that I used 
to create the list and includes the complete list of error indicator words and phrases used in the 
text searches. In summary, to create the list I began by reading over 200 restatement 
                                                   
11
 Scholtz (2008) in a report on restatements between 1997 and 2006 prepared for the US Treasury, finds Audit 
Analytics includes “nearly all restatements captured in the GAO lists and Lexis-Nexis searches, and some that are 
not identified through these methods”. 
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announcements that AuditAnalytics manually coded as “Errors: accounting and clerical 
applications” looking for error indicators – language indicating lack of intent - and concluded by 
grouping into nine groups for exposition purposes all the error indicators in these 200 
restatement announcements. The nine groups, together with the number of post-2002 restatement 
announcements identified by text search for one or more of the group’s error indicators and 
examples of indicator words and phrases (see Appendix A for a complete list of error indicators), 
are as follows: calculation (579 – e.g., error in the calculation, incorrectly calculated, and 
computational error); unintentional error - explicitly stated (357 – e.g., inadvertent, mistake, and 
unintentional); information system (203 – e.g., accounting system, spreadsheet, and 
bookkeeping); immaterial (202 – e.g., immaterial error, immaterial correction of an error, and 
miscellaneous corrections); clerical (196 – e.g., clerical error, typographical error, and filing 
error); reconciliation (51 – e.g., account reconciliation and reconciliation errors); and 
administrative (18 – e.g., administrative error and administrative oversight); recording (790 - 
e.g., not recorded, error in recording, posting, and recorded twice); and classification (1,582 – 
e.g., classification, reclassified). 
In total, 2,048 restatements of the 10,623 restatements (approximately one fifth of 
restatements) disclosed after 2002 are coded as correcting unintentional errors. These 2,048 
error-correcting restatements are identified by searching restatement announcements for all error 
indicators shown in Appendix A except those in the classification group. Validation tests results 
for the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, and UEvsOther samples are robust when text searches for error-
correcting restatements include (exclude) classification group error indicators (the reporting 
group and classification group error indicators).  
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Restatements that correct both intentional misstatement and unintentional error present a 
classification challenge. By reviewing post-2002 AAERs (a review that is described in more 
detail below), I find 56 of the 2,048 error-correction restatements also correct intentional 
misstatement. I chose to code these 56 restatements as correcting unintentional error, thus 
ensuring that each restatement is included in only one classification and that anyone using this 
language-based proxy for restatement that correct unintentional error in the future could do so 
without considering SEC AAER allegations. An alternative approach to constructing a language-
based proxy for restatements that correct unintentional errors would be to deduct from error-
correcting restatements any restatements that also correct intentional misstatement. My 
classification of these 56 restatements as error-correcting biases against finding predicted 
validation test results for the UEvsIM sample. Similarly, any restatements classified as error-
correcting that also correct intentional misstatements that do not come to light by a review of 
SEC AAERs will bias against finding predicted validation test results for the UEvsUN sample. 
Results of validation tests for the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, UEvsOther samples are robust to either 
coding these 56 restatements that correct both error and misstatement as intentional 
misstatements, or to excluding these 56 restatements from analyses.  
Type I and II identification errors of all automated text search strategies are affected not 
only by subjectivity in the choice of words/phrases in the search dictionary (i.e., the list in 
Appendix A) but also by the choice of the search tool. I decided to use a simple text search 
strategy and AuditAnalytics’ text search tool instead of more complex search logic and 
specialized content analysis software. This decision, while a limitation, permits others to 
replicate the identification process without importing restatement announcements into 
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specialized content analysis software. Appendix A presents the list of error indicators formatted 
for use with AuditAnalytics’ text search tool. 
2.4.2 Intentional misstatement identification 
I visually scanned all AAERs issued after December 31, 2002 included in the Securities 
and Exchange Commission website (www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml) to 
determine if the AAER referenced a company for a time period matching any of the 
restatements. I found 357 AAERs that include the name of the restating company where the time 
period for the AAER allegations of auditing or accounting misconduct overlaps the restatement 
time period. Upon reading these 357 AAERs for allegations of senior management fraud, 
violation of anti-fraud provisions or language implying senior management intent (e.g., words 
such as “scheme”, “manipulated and concealed”, and “knew or should have known”), I coded 
276 of the matched restatements as correcting intentional misstatements. 12 Fifty six of these 
restatements are also identified as correcting unintentional error. As discussed above, results of 
validation tests using the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, and UEvsOther samples are robust to both 
excluding these 56 restatements and classifying them as either intentional misstatements or 
unintentional error restatements.  
2.4.3 Financial data source and sample creation 
Financial data required for variables was obtained from the COMPUSTAT Unrestated 
Quarterly (“As First Reported”) – US database, a database reflecting “what investors see and 
                                                   
12
 I do not code as intentional misstatements 81 restatements matched to AAERs which allege foreign corrupt 
practices by subsidiaries, employee fraud, and/or stock option backdating, or misleading representations without 
other allegations of senior management fraud or intent. Results are robust to including these restatement-matched 
AAERs as restatements that correct intentional misstatements in the main statistical analyses.  
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react to on the SEC filing date, untainted by restatements” (Callen et al. 2006, 1025). Financial 
data, available from 1987 onwards, was merged with restatements, matching financial data for 
the earliest fiscal year in the restated period when restatements spanned more than one fiscal 
year. As shown in Table 1, fourth quarter Total Asset data and four quarters of both unrestated 
and restated quarterly Net Income data13 is unavailable from the Unrestated Quarterly database 
for 4,38814 of the 10,623 restatements.  
Appendix B illustrates sample selection decisions when a company’s restatement 
announcements include quarterly restatements or multiple restatements that correct the same 
firm-year. Only restatements that correct annual statements are retained in the UEvsIM, 
UEvsUN, and UEvsOther samples. Restatements that correct annual filings were identified by 
checking that the restated period spans the month COMPUSTAT codes as the month of the fiscal 
year end. Lobo and Zhao (2013) find that including restatements of unaudited quarterly reports 
confounds study of the relation between audit effort and subsequent restatements. The UEvsIM, 
UEvsUN, and UEvsOther samples include only one restatement per firm-year. When more than 
one restatement corrects a firm-year, the restatement retained is selected by considering the type 
of misreporting corrected, the “begin date” of the restated period, and the restatements disclosure 
date as explained in Appendix B. 
Table 1 summarizes the method used to arrive at a sample of 3,707 restatements for firm-
years from 1987 through 2012 (i.e., 751 unintentional error restatements, 127 intentional 
misstatements restatements, and 2,829 unclassified restatements) and the subsample of 848 
                                                   
13
 Net income data is required for four of the six validation tests and asset data is required as a control in multivariate 
analyses used in three validation tests. Only the revenue recognition validation test could be conducted without net 
income or asset data.  
14
 The AuditAnalytics database includes restatements for over the counter and non-US issuers. 
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restatements for firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports (i.e., 243 unintentional error 
restatements, 17 intentional misstatements restatements, and 588 unclassified restatements). The 
UEvsIM sample is comprised of the 751 unintentional error restatements and the 127 intentional 
misstatement restatements as described in Table 1 (footnote h). The UEvsUN sample is 
comprised of the 243 unintentional error restatements and the 588 unclassified restatements as 
described in Table 1 (footnote i). The UEvsUN sample includes only restatements with auditor’s 
SOX 404 reports for at least the first year of the restated period. The UEvsOther sample is 
comprised of the UEvsUN sample plus the 17 restatements that correct intentional misstatement 
in firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports. 
The UEvsUN sample is required for this study because auditor’s SOX 404 reports are 
needed to construct internal control quality proxies to test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 
3. As discussed in Chapter 1, following SOX enactment, the relative frequency of error-related 
restatements increased dramatically as the number of “innocuous” restatements increased (Burks 
2010, Hennes et al. 2008), “labour market penalties for former CFOs of restating firms” became 
more severe (Collins et al. 2009, 1), and auditing dramatically changed from being a self-
regulating profession to being overseen by the PCAOB (e.g., Defond and Francis 2005). In 
particular, SOX 404b requires that an auditor opine on the effectiveness of internal controls over 
financial reporting for accelerated filers (companies with more than $75 million in market 
capitalization). Differences in the audits of accelerated and non-accelerated filers stemming from 
SOX 404b, one of the reasons for the 2007 change from Auditing Standard 2 to Auditing 
Standard No. 515, may be reflected in restatement differences. However, there are too few (17) 
                                                   
15
 The SEC announcement of the PCAOB approval of Auditing Standard No. 5 discusses the reduction in the 
number of mandatory requirements from Auditing Standard No. 2 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-
144.htm. 
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restatements that correct intentional misstatements with corresponding SOX 404 auditor’s 
reports to conclude on the statistical significance of validation test results for a sample comprised 
of restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports that correct intentional misstatements (17) and 
unintentional errors (243). Since unclassified restatements correct a mix of intentional 
misstatement and unintentional error, significant differences in validation tests between 
unclassified restatements and restatements that correct unintentional error also validates using a 
language-based proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error.  
2.5 Variable Definitions 
Table 2 describes the variables used in tests and their construction. The choices of 
variables used in tests are discussed in the results section.   
2.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the three samples used in validation tests. The 
UEvsIM sample is comprised of the 751 restatements that correct unintentional error and the 127 
restatements that correct intentional misstatements in the 1987 – 2012 time period. The UEvsUN 
sample is comprised of restatements for firm-years with SOX 404 auditor’s reports that correct 
unintentional error (243) and unclassified restatements (588). The UEvsOther sample is the 
UEvsUN sample plus the 17 restatements for firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports that 
correct intentional misstatements.  
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2.6.1 Financial statement comparisons  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics derived from amounts reported in financial 
statements and compares the means (t-test), medians (Wilcoxon ranksum test) and distributions 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) of unintentional error firm-years to intentional misstatement firm-
years (1987–2012) using the UEvsIM sample and, for firm-years with SOX 404 auditor’s 
reports, to unclassified restatements using the UEvsUN sample and to unclassified restatements 
and intentional misstatements using the UEvsOther sample. Panel A reports comparisons for the 
unintentional error restatements and the intentional misstatement restatements in the UEvsIM 
sample. Panel A’s Wilcoxon ranksum tests show that, relative to intentional misstatement firms, 
unintentional error firms are smaller, slower growing, and less profitable, i.e., unintentional error 
firm-years are characterized by smaller total assets, receivables, inventories, market 
capitalization, sales, sales growth, and income (p<0.05) in the 1987 through 2012 time period. In 
contrast, Panel B of Table 3 shows for the firm-years in the UEvsUN sample, that the 
unintentional error and unclassified firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports are the same 
(p>0.05) on all of the 15 reported median measures with one exception: the median return on 
assets is lower for restatements that correct unintentional error than for unclassified restatements. 
T-tests and Wilcoxon ranksum tests results of comparisons using the UEvsOther sample (Panel 
C) are consistent with the results shown in Table 3 for the UEvsUN sample (Panel B).     
2.6.2 Market capitalization, restatement year, and industry differences 
Table 4 examines the differences in market capitalization, restatement year and industry 
between unintentional error and intentional misstatement firm-years. The table is modeled after 
Dechow et al.’s (2011) Table 2 which, in turn, attributes the industry classification (detailed in 
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the footnote to Table 4) to Frankel et al. (2002). Panel A shows that over half (54.2%) of the 
intentional misstatement firm-year sample are in the top three market capitalization deciles, 
deciles where pressure to meet market expectations may be the greatest. In contrast, 
approximately one third of unintentional error firm-years and unclassified restatement firm-years 
are in these top three deciles. Panel B shows that for the UEvsIM comparison that the majority 
(74.0%) of intentional misstatement firm-years are in the pre-SOX 404 years (1987 – 2003) 
whereas the majority of unintentional error firm-years (62.6%) are years in which SOX 404 
reporting requirements are in effect (2004 - 2012). The UEvsUN (UEvsOther) post-SOX 
comparisons reveal no consistent pattern of differences between restatements that correct 
unintentional error and unclassified restatements (unclassified plus intentional misstatement 
restatements). Panel C shows 29.9% of intentional misstatement firm-years vs. less than 15% of 
unintentional error and unclassified firm-years are in the computer industry, the industry for 
which Dechow et al. (2011) report the most misstatements. This difference is the reason that 
restatements in five of the twelve industries (i.e., the durable manufacturers, computer, banks and 
insurance, services, and retail industries) account for approximately 80% of the intentional 
misstatements vs. approximately 64% of the unintentional error restatements in the 1987 – 2012 
time period. In the post-SOX time period, relative to other restatements, restatements that correct 
unintentional error are proportionately more (less) frequent in the mining and construction and 
durable manufacturers industries (banking and insurance) industries (p<0.11 not in tables). 
Overall, Table 4 shows the need to control for company size, industry, and restatement year in 
multivariate validation tests conducted using the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, and UEvsOther samples. 
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2.7 Results – Proxy Validation Tests 
2.7.1 Accounts corrected by restatements  
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement 
Table 5 compares the proportion of accounts (as coded by Audit Analytics with some 
codes combined for table conciseness) corrected by unintentional error vs. intentional 
misstatement restatements (the UEvsIM sample), for unintentional error vs. unclassified 
restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports (the UEvsUN sample), and for unintentional error 
vs. other restatements (both intentional misstatements and unclassified restatements) with SOX 
404 auditor’s reports (the UEvsOther sample). Overall, the reasons for unintentional error 
restatements are wide-spread. Supporting V1, revenue recognition issues (the issue Plumlee and 
Yohn (2010) identify as a restatement cause of 53% of manipulation restatements and Dechow et 
al. (2011) identify as an issue in 59.5% of misstatements) affect 44.1% of intentional 
misstatement firm-years vs. 18.4% of unintentional error firm-years (p<0.001) in the UEvsIM 
sample comparisons.  
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements 
On the other hand, when the UEvsUN (UEvsOther) sample is used in comparisons of the 
accounts corrected by restatement, there is no difference (p>0.05) in the proportion of revenue 
recognition issues for error-correcting restatement firm-years vs. unclassified restatement 
(unclassified plus intentional misstatement restatement) firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 
reports.  
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In summary, when using the UEvsIM sample (UEvsUN sample) the revenue recognition 
test results support (do not support) V1. Even when unclassified restatements with auditor’s SOX 
404 reports are combined with the 17 firm-years that restate intentional misstatements with 
auditor’s SOX 404 reports in the UEvsOther sample, the proportion of revenue recognition 
issues does not differ (p>0.8 not in tables) between restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports 
that correct unintentional errors and the other restatements.     
2.7.2 Restatement income correction  
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement 
Table 6 compares the correction of net income, income before extraordinary items and 
operating income for unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement restatements (the UEvsIM 
sample), for unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports (the 
UEvsUN sample), and for unintentional error vs. other restatements (both intentional 
misstatements and unclassified restatements) with SOX 404 auditor’s reports (the UEvsOther 
sample). Panel A of Table 6 reports the results for the UEvsIM comparisons and shows weak 
support for V2. The proportion of unintentional error restatements in the UEvsIM sample that 
does not correct net income is greater (67.7%) than the proportion of intentional misstatement 
restatements that does not correct net income (57.5%) (p<0.05). While similar comparisons for 
the income before extraordinary items and operating income measures show directional 
differences consistent with that shown for net income, the differences are not significant at 
conventional levels (p>0.05). Income overstatement and understatement corrections do not differ 
proportionately between unintentional error and intentional misstatement groups on any of the 
three income measures. While Table 6 shows that unintentional error restatements change net 
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income less frequently than intentional misstatement restatements, Panel B shows that 
unintentional error restatements and intentional misstatement restatements correct similar 
amounts of income (relative to company size) (p>0.05) in the 1987 – 2012 time period. 
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements  
Panels A of Table 6 shows corrections of net income, income before extraordinary items 
and operating income are the same (p>0.05) in the UEvsUN (UEvsOther) sample for unclassified 
restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports (unclassified restatements plus intentional 
misstatement restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports) and unintentional error restatements 
with SOX 404 auditor’s reports. Furthermore, the insignificant results in Panel A for the 
UEvsUN (UEvsOther) sample are not in the direction predicted for the validation test, i.e., 
unintentional error restatements correct income proportionately more, but not significantly more 
(p>0.05), than unclassified restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports (unclassified 
restatements plus intentional misstatement restatements with SOX 404 auditor’s reports). Panel 
B shows in tests using the UEvsUN (UEvsOther) sample that unintentional error restatements for 
firm-years with SOX 404 auditor’s reports correct lesser amounts of absolute net income and 
absolute income before extraordinary items (relative to company size) than unclassified 
restatements (unclassified plus intentional misstatement restatements) (p>0.05). There is no 
difference in the average amount of operating income before depreciation (relative to company 
size) corrected by unintentional error restatements for firm-years with SOX 404 auditor’s reports 
in comparison with unintentional error restatements (UEvsUN) and unintentional error 
restatements plus intentional misstatement restatements (UEvsOther).  
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Overall, Table 6 shows mixed support for V2, i.e., that proportionately more intentional 
misstatement restatements than unintentional error restatements correct net income. Results of 
comparisons of unintentional error restatements to intentional misstatement restatements 
(unclassified restatements) using the UEvsIM (UEvsUN) sample support (do not support) V2.  
2.7.3 Earnings persistence 
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement  
Table 7 reports the results of tests of V3, the persistence validation test. The OLS models 
in Table 7 regress return on assets (measured by earnings before extraordinary items scaled by 
average assets) on lagged return on assets, an indicator variable for unintentional error, the 
interaction of lagged return on assets and the indicator variable for unintentional error, and 
control variables shown by prior research to be associated with earnings persistence16. A 
significant negative coefficient on the interaction between lagged return on assets and the 
indicator of unintentional error restatements and a significant F-test showing the negative total of 
the main and interactive effect of the lagged return on assets differs from zero supports V3. 
Model 1 of Table 7 shows the interaction term, while in the predicted direction, is not significant 
(t = -0.92) when the UEvsIM sample is used in the regression. However, when the subsample of 
                                                   
16
 Lev (1983) finds the type of product, industry barriers-to-entry, capital intensity and firm size are associated with 
earnings persistence. I use industry dummies (for industries shown in Table 4 panel C) to control for product type 
and barriers-to-entry. I control for capital intensity using the ratio of depreciation, amortization and interest to sales, 
following Lev (1983) and for company size using logged total assets. Dechow et al. (2010) overview literature that 
shows growth is also associated with persistence. I use the percentage change in total sales to proxy for growth. 
These control variables are defined in Table 2. Capital intensity and growth are not significantly correlated (p>0.05) 
with lagged return on assets, the unintentional error indicator variable, the interaction term, and each other (|r|<0.1). 
Company size is significantly associated (p<0.001) with lagged return on assets, the unintentional error indicator, 
and the interaction of return on assets with the unintentional error indicator and the capital intensity and growth 
control variables (|r|<0.3). The post-regression test of variance inflation factors indicates correlations are unlikely to 
affect interpretation of results (VIFs< 9 for main variables). 
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the UEvsIM sample with auditor’s SOX 404 reports is used in Model 2, the significant negative 
coefficient on the interaction term (p<0.01 one-sided), combined with the significant F-test 
(F=12.41) showing the total negative effect of the interaction and main effect of the 
unintentional error interaction term differs from zero, supports V3.     
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements 
Model 3 reports results of the earnings persistence validation test for the UEvsUN 
sample. Supporting V3, Model 3 results show a significant negative coefficient for the interaction 
of lagged return on assets with the indicator variable for unintentional error restatements and a 
negative sum of the coefficients of the main and interactive effects of the unintentional indicator 
variable that differs significantly from zero (p<0.01 one-sided).  
Together, the results for samples restricted to restated firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 
reports i.e., the subsample of the UEvsIM sample with auditor’s SOX 404 reports (Model 2) and 
the UEvsUN sample (Model 3) support V3. Consistent with these findings, the significant 
(p<0.01 one-sided) interaction and F-test reported for Model 4, the earnings persistence test with 
the UEvsOther sample, supports V3 and shows earnings of firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 
reports restated to correct unintentional error are less persistent than earnings of other restated 
firm-years with auditor’s SOX 404 reports.   
2.7.4 Accrual measures 
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement  
Table 8 reports V4 test results, logistic regressions of an indicator variable for restatement 
type on various accrual measures and control variables using the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, and 
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UEvsOther samples. Four accrual metrics are tested: total accruals (Accruals); working capital 
accruals (WC_acc); Kothari et al.’s (2005) performance matched residual from the modified 
Jones discretionary accrual model, estimated cross-sectionally (pmatch); and the studentized 
residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, estimated cross-sectionally (sresid)17. 
Appendix C describes in more detail than Table 2 how I computed the four accrual measures. 
While the performance matched discretionary accrual measure (pmatch) is used frequently in 
financial quality research, Jones et al. (2008, 500) find that “only the accrual estimation errors 
estimated from cross-sectional models of working capital changes on past, present, and future 
cash flows… have explanatory power for fraud beyond total accruals”. I chose control variables 
(total assets, return on assets, leverage and an indicator variable 1 if a Big 4/5/6/8 auditor and 0 
otherwise) following Jones et al.’s (2008) logistic regression study of the association between a 
fraud indicator variable and eleven measures of discretionary accruals. 
Supporting V4, Table 8 Panel A shows that positive accrual measures are less likely to be 
associated with restatements that correct unintentional errors than with restatements that correct 
intentional misstatements in the UEvsIM sample for three of the four accrual measures, WC_acc 
(Model 2), pmatch (Model 3), and sresid (Model 4) (p<0.01 one-tailed; pseudo R2>=0.14; 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test p>0.05, not in tables). These findings are consistent with 
univariate analyses (not in tables) that show the means of all four accrual measures (i.e., total 
accruals (Accruals), working capital accruals (WC_acc), performance matched discretionary 
accruals (pmatch), and studentized residuals (sresid)), winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate 
                                                   
17
 To check my computation of accruals measures, I compared my computation of median measures to medians 
reported in prior literature. Dechow et al. (2011) report three of the four measures using COMPUSTAT firm-years 
in the 1979-2002 time period. Using all unrestated quarterly data from 1987 (the start of the unrestated quarterly 
data) to 2002 and winsorized at 1% and 99% following Dechow et al. (2011), the comparison of median values 
(Dechow et al. 2011 in brackets) is as follows: WC_acc 0.005 (0.006); pmatch 0.000 (0.001); and sresid 0.008 
(0.015). I compute median total Accruals of -0.045 for 1987 – 1999. Dechow and Dichev (2002) report median total 
accruals of -0.044 for the same time period.  
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against outliers, are less positive for unintentional error firm-years than intentional misstatement 
firm-years (p<0.05 one-tailed for t-statistics computed using robust standard errors clustered on 
company). The untabulated median measures of all four accrual measures (i.e., total accruals 
(Accruals), working capital accruals (WC_acc), performance matched discretionary accruals 
(pmatch), and studentized residuals (sresid)) are also less positive for unintentional error firm-
years than intentional misstatement firm-years (p<0.05 one-tailed Wilcoxon ranksum z-
statistics). Taken together, the multivariate results and the additional untabulated univariate 
analyses support V4.   
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements 
Models 5 through 7 of Table 8 Panel B report the results for the UEvsUN sample. Models 
5 and 7 of Table 8 Panel B show that when the sample is restricted to companies filing auditor’s 
SOX 404 reports in the restated year, unclassified restatements are associated with more positive 
total accruals (Accruals) and studentized Dechow Dichev discretionary accruals (sresid) relative 
to restatements that correct unintentional error restatements, (p<0.05 one-tailed; pseudo 
R2>=0.05). These results are consistent with univariate results for these two accrual measures 
(not in tables). However, the results for the working capital accrual model (WC_acc) for 
companies with auditor’s SOX 404 reports in the restatement year (Model 6) were not significant 
(and in the direction opposite to the predicted direction) which is consistent with univariate t-test 
and Wilcoxon ranksum test results (not in tables). The unintentional error vs. unclassified 
misstatements pmatch accrual univariate t-test (Wilcoxon ranksum test) results are in the 
direction opposite to the predicted direction and significant (not significant) (not in tables). The 
pmatch accrual model results for the UEvsUN sample are not reported in Table 8 Panel B as the 
overall model fit is not significant (p>0.2).  
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In addition to tests with the UEvsIM and UEvsUN samples, I conducted tests of the 
accruals validity test using the UEvsOther sample (Models 8 -10) and find significant results for 
the UEvsUN sample are robust to including the 17 restatements with SOX 404 reports that 
correct intentional misstatement with the unclassified restatements with SOX 404 reports 
(univariate results not shown in tables p<0.05 one-tailed; multivariate results Models 8 and 10 
p<0.01 one-tailed). 
Table 8 shows overall that seven of ten multivariate tests of V4 (the accrual validation 
tests) with model fit required for statistical inference support V4. Of the three multivariate 
accrual validation tests shown in Table 8 that do not support V4, two show insignificant results 
directionally as predicted (Models 1 and 9). Only the test of the association with working capital 
accruals using the UEvsUN sample (Model 6) shows results (p>0.7 not in tables) directionally 
opposite to the prediction. Univariate results are consistent with multivariate results reported in 
Table 8. Together, the results support V4.   
2.7.5 Income smoothness  
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement 
Table 3 Panel A compares mean and median measures of net income smoothness 
(smooth_NI) and operating income smoothness (smooth_opinc) for the UEvsIM sample. I 
compute net income and operating income smoothness (Table 2) following Leuz et al. (2003)18 
as the median ratio of the standard deviation of income [respectively, total of four quarters of net 
income (niqr) and total of four quarters of operating income before depreciation (oibdpqr)] 
                                                   
18
 There is insufficient data to compute Tucker and Zarowin’s (2006) measure that ranks firms’ income smoothness 
within industry-year. 
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(scaled by lagged total assets) to the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (oancfqr) 
(scaled by lagged total assets) where there is complete data for the current and previous four 
years. A smaller smoothness measure indicates “smoother” income. There is sufficient data to 
calculate the income smoothness measures for less than half of the sample. I find income 
smoothness is the same (p>0.05) for unintentional error and intentional misstatement 
restatements when the two smoothness measures are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate 
against outliers (Table 3 Panel A). In median measure comparisons, results are directionally 
consistent (inconsistent), although not significant, with the prediction for net income (operating 
income) smoothness. Overall, V5 is not supported in tests using the UEvsIM sample. 
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements 
Contrary to the above comparisons of income smoothness between unintentional error 
and intentional misstatement groups, a univariate Wilcoxon ranksum test for the UEvsUN 
sample reported in Panel B of Table 3 shows unclassified restatement firm years with SOX 404 
auditor’s opinions are characterized by greater net income smoothness (z=1.76, p<0.05 one-
sided, p-value not shown in table) than unintentional errors firm-years. This is consistent with the 
multivariate results discussed above for the UEvsUN sample that show greater earnings 
persistence characterizes firm-years with unclassified restatement than firm-years with 
restatements that correct unintentional error for firm-years with SOX auditor’s reports. While the 
differences are not significant (p>0.4 not in tables) operating income smoothness is also less for 
unintentional error restatements than unclassified restatements in the UEvsUN sample.  
 When firm-years for the 17 restatements that correct intentional misstatement with 
auditor’s SOX 404 reports are combined with the UEvsUN sample in the UEvsOther sample 
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(Table 3 Panel C), results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum tests show firm-years for restatements that 
correct unintentional error with auditor’s SOX 404 reports, while having the same operating 
income smoothness, have less smooth net income reporting (z=1.17, p<0.05 one-tailed, p-value 
not shown in table).  
Overall, comparisons of net income smoothness using the UEvsUN and UEvsOther 
samples (the UEvsIM sample) validate (do not validate) V5.  
2.7.6 Managing to a benchmark  
unintentional error vs. intentional misstatement 
To test V6 I first compared the likelihood that the groups in the UEvsIM sample would 
“meet or beat” the latest analysts’ earnings forecasts by one penny per share or less. 19 Reichelt 
and Wang (2010, 672) overview literature that supports (1) using the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail 
file to gather both analysts’ forecasts and announcements of companies’ actual EPSs to ensure 
consistency and avoid the issues related to stock splits; (2) determining the latest forecast to be 
the “most recent EPS forecast prior to the date of the earnings announcement” (or the median of 
forecasts when more than one analysts’ forecasts are announced on the same last day); and (3) 
computing the standard deviation of forecasts, and the logarithm of the number of forecasts, 
using forecasts “no older than two months before the earnings announcement date” to avoid 
stale-dated forecasts. Forecasts within two months of the earnings announcement date are 
available for approximately one third of both the unintentional error and intentional misstatement 
restatements in the UEvsIM sample.  
                                                   
19
 An anonymous reviewer suggested comparing proportions of restatement classifications that meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts by a small amount.  
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The proportion (28.6%) of the 42 restatements that correct intentional misstatement that 
“meet or beat” the latest forecast by a penny per share or less is greater (p<0.05) relative to the 
proportion of the 223 restatements that correct unintentional errors (16.6%) (not in tables). Table 
9 reports the results of multivariate “meet or beat” validation tests that control for company size 
(size), being in a litigious industry (litigation), and other variables shown by Reichelt and Wang 
(2010) and prior research to be associated with a meet or beat test. When the binary meeting or 
beating by a penny variable used in the multivariate logistic regression test is computed 
following Reichelt and Wang (2010), regression results for the UEvsIM sample show only 95 
observations are used and overall model fit is not significant (Wald Chi-square p>0.1). Model 1 
of Table 9 relaxes the restriction that forecasts for the UEvsIM sample must be within two 
months of the earnings announcement date and includes observations with forecasts within six 
months of the earnings announcement date. Consistent with the univariate results (not in tables), 
Table 9 Model 1 results support V6.    
unintentional error vs. unclassified restatements 
Model 2 of Table 9 investigates V6 using the UEvsUN sample and examines differences 
in the likelihood of firm-years restating unintentional error vs. unclassified restatement firm-
years with SOX 404 auditor’s reports meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts by one penny. 
Forecasts within two months of the earnings announcement date are available for approximately 
one half of both the unintentional error and unclassified restatements in the UEvsUN sample. 
The results of Model 2, while not significant, are in the predicted direction.  
Model 3 of Table 9 reports results of the “meet or beat” validity test using the UEvsOther 
sample. Consistent with the results for the UEvsUN sample, Model 3 results, while not 
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significant, are in the predicted direction. In summary, when using the UEvsIM sample (the 
UEvsUN sample and the UEvsOther sample) the results of the “meet or beat analysts’ forecast 
by one penny” support (do not support) V6.  
2.7.7 Summary of proxy validation results  
Table 10 summarizes proxy validation test results for the UEvsIM (N=878), UEvsUN 
(N=831), and UEvsOther (N=848) samples as well as the results for a subsample of the 
UEvsOther sample (N=225) used for Chapter 3 tests (Table 11). Overall, the three left columns 
of Table 10 show that the majority of test results were directionally as predicted (22 of 28 tests 
with sufficient data to conduct the tests). Results of nine of ten tests comparing restatements that 
correct unintentional error to restatements that correct intentional misstatements – tests using the 
UEvsIM sample - were directionally as predicted, six significantly so (p<0.05 one-sided). 
Results of six (seven) of the nine tests comparing restatements that correct unintentional error to 
unclassified (unclassified plus intentional misstatement) restatements where data was sufficient 
and SOX 404 auditor’s reports were filed for the restated year – tests using the UEvsUN 
(UEvsOther) sample – were directionally as predicted, four significantly so (p<0.05 one-sided).  
On balance, these validation test results support using the language-based proxy for 
restatements that correct unintentional error when auditor’s SOX 404 reports are filed for the 
restated years.  
2.8 Restatement Proxies for Chapter 3 Tests 
Table 11 shows the criteria used to select a subsample of the UEvsOther sample for 
Chapter 3 tests. Chapter 3 tests include comparisons of associations between characteristics of 
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those responsible for financial reporting quality and restatements that correct unintentional error 
vs. restatements that correct intentional misstatement. As there are only 17 AAER search 
identified restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports, I also chose a subsample of unclassified 
restatements from the UEvsOther sample to proxy for restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement20. First, to reduce the time required to hand-collect data from companies’ proxy 
statements, I retained only one restatement per company. Retaining only the earliest restatement 
per company reduced the sample by approximately one half to a subsample comprised of 484 
restatements including 339 unclassified restatements. Next, to further reduce collection time, I 
selected the 125 of these unclassified restatements with a scaled score greater than or equal to 0.5 
based on a scoring system (described in the next paragraph) constructed to assign higher scores 
to restatements that have more characteristics that I predicted would be associated with 
intentional misstatement than unintentional error.  
I scored the restatements (maximum 9) by scoring one if the restatement corrected a 
revenue recognition issue, one if the restatement corrects net income, one if the actual EPS meets 
or beats the latest analyst forecast by one penny or less, and one for each of the four accrual 
measures and two smoothness measures that exceed the median of the unclassified restatements 
with auditor’s SOX 404 reports. Total scores ranged from zero to seven with a median score of 
                                                   
20
 Hennes, Leone, and Miller make publically available (https://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/) a dataset of the 2,705 
restatements in the GAO database (1997-2006) which they code as either errors (1,990) or irregularities (715) 
following the method used in Hennes et al. (2008). Analysis of this database supports proxying restatements that 
correct intentional misstatement with unclassified restatements: The number of restatements that correct 
irregularities would be insufficient for Chapter 3 tests even if the intentional misstatement classification based on 
AAER presence (Table 1) were expanded to include restatements with disclosures referring to “fraud” and 
“irregularities” or when SEC, Department of Justice, and other independent investigations are undertaken (Hennes et 
al. 2008). Hennes, Leone, and Miller identify as correcting irregularities 291 restatements in the GAO database that 
have restated periods that begin after the effective date of SOX 404 Of these, 25 restatements for companies other 
than foreign and holding companies have a restatement period longer than 364 days. Of these 25 restatements - 
restatements likely to be annual restatements - 21 do not meet the data requirements for Chapter 3 tests, i.e., 11 are 
without an auditor’s SOX 404 report filing for the first year of the restated period and 10 are not the first restatement 
of the company. Two of the remaining four restatements are included in the sample used for Chapter 3 tests as 
determined in Section 2.8. 
 42 
 
three (M=2.77 SD=1.77). Since data was not available for all nine scoring criteria for all 
restatements, I scaled the total score of each restatement by the number of its non-missing scores. 
Scaled scores ranged from zero to one with a median scaled score of 0.38 (M=0.38 SD=0.23). Of 
the 588 unclassified restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports, 339 are companies’ first or 
only restatement and 12521 of these have scaled scores of 0.5 or greater. Table 11 shows proxy 
statements filed with the SEC contain the management and board data required for Chapter 3 
tests for 98 of these 125 unclassified restatements and for six of the seven (121 of the 138) 
restatements that correct intentional misstatement (unintentional error) which are a company’s 
first or only restatement.  
Table 10 (column 4) shows the results of validation tests using the subsample of the 
UEvsOther sample selected for Chapter 3 tests, a subsample comprised of 121 error-correcting 
restatements vs. 104 restatements that proxy for misstatement correcting restatements (i.e., 6 
AAER-identified restatements combined with 98 unclassified restatements). Not surprisingly, 
given the method used to select the unclassified restatements for the subsample, all of the seven 
tests where overall model fit permits interpretation of results, are directionally as predicted and 
six of the seven are significant (p<0.05 one-sided). Further, for the three multivariate tests with 
insignificant overall model fit, results of univariate Wilcoxon ranksum tests are as predicted and 
significant (p<0.1 one-sided not in tables).  
Prior research concludes that intentional misstatements are associated with more negative 
market reaction than other restatements (Hennes et al. 2008, Palmrose et al. 2004). I compared 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to restatement announcements for the two restatement 
                                                   
21
 Restatements in the top quartile; 69 of the 588 unclassified restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports had 
scaled scores of 0.5. 
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groups in the sample to be used in Chapter 3 tests22. It is noteworthy that I find no evidence that 
CARs differ between the two types of restatements. One explanation for this sameness of market 
reaction is that 59% (41%) of unintentional error (intentional misstatement) restatements were 
announced not in 8-Ks or press releases (where the restatement announcements would be 
separated from other news), but instead in other filings such 10-Ks, the so called “stealth” 
disclosures that are more common in recent years (Files et al. 2009) where restatement would not 
be the only trigger for market reaction. 
2.9 Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of the above findings using the UEvsIM, UEvsUN, and UEvsOther 
samples to different text searches, I repeated the validation tests when error-correcting 
restatements were identified using two different word lists. Under the more restrictive (narrow) 
definition of unintentional error I do not search for words/phrases in the “recording errors” group 
listed in Appendix A, reasoning that management may use phrases such as “recording error” to 
merely indicate the need to restate rather than to signify lack of intent. Consequently, under the 
more restrictive definition, only 546 of the 751 unintentional error firm-years are identified as 
unintentional error restatements. Under the less restrictive (wide) definition of unintentional error 
I also include restatements identified by text searches for classification error indicators listed in 
Appendix A, which increases sample size from 751 to 1298 unintentional error firm-years.  
                                                   
22
 I computed the CAR for each restatement announcement by summing the difference between the CRSP daily 
stock return (without dividends) and the predicted normal return over a three day window centered on the 
announcement date. To estimate predicted normal returns, I regressed actual returns on the CRSP equally weighted 
index (without dividends) for the restatements with auditor’s SOX 404 reports that have CRSP returns data for at 
least 30 trading days within a 360 trading day estimation window. A three day reaction window centered on the 
event date is frequently used in main tests or sensitivity analyses in restatement research (e.g., Palmrose et al. 2004, 
Files et al. 2009). 
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I find that the results showing predicted differences between unintentional error firm-
years and intentional misstatement firm-years for the UEvsIM sample (i.e. tests of V1, the 
proportion of restatements correcting revenue recognition issues; V3, income persistence; V4, 
less positive accruals; and V6, meet or beat analysts’ forecasts by a small amount) are robust to 
both a more restrictive definition of unintentional error and less restrictive definition of 
unintentional error23.The results showing predicted differences between unintentional error firm-
years and unclassified restatement firm-years with SOX 404 auditor’s reports for the UEvsUN 
and UEvsOther samples (i.e., tests of V3, income persistence, V4 less positive accruals, and V5 
net income smoothness) are robust to both the more and restrictive definitions of unintentional 
error. 
2.10 Summary 
2.10.1 Discussion of results 
Although accounting errors have been studied for decades (e.g., Kinney and McDaniel 
1989), archival studies of the reporting quality of financial statements filed with securities 
regulators acknowledge, but few investigate, unintentional errors. This research gap may exist 
because researchers believe: (1) unintentional errors either balance each other out by year end or 
have an immaterial effect on financial reporting24; (2) management will prevent, or detect and 
correct, unintentional errors that distort internal management reports upon which day-to-day 
                                                   
23 Under the more (less) restrictive definition 14.7% (35.0%) of the 3,707 restatements used in this study (Table 1) 
include words indicating lack of intent. To achieve a significant omnibus F, it was necessary to include an indicator 
variable for loss (equal to 1 if there is a loss in the restated or prior year and 0 otherwise) in the multivariate test of 
V3 when the sample with the less restrictive choice of error indicators was used.   
24
 As Brief (1965) observed, “a bookkeeping error and a decision-maker’s error are not the same. In order to attach 
economic significance to the idea of an accounting error one would have to show that some decision makers acted as 
if the erroneous information has been correct.” 
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decisions depend (Feng et al. 2009); (3) with an appropriate combination of controls, public 
companies of all sizes and complexity can prepare reliable financial statements that conform to 
generally accepted accounting principles (US GAO 2006 and PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5); 
(4) all public companies are required to maintain books and records that accurately and fairly 
reflect transactions and have an independent audit that will either prevent, deter or detect 
material unintentional errors; and (5) auditors, motivated by litigation and reputation concerns, 
increase their efforts to detect errors when control risk and/or inherent risk is high25. 
Alternatively, data collection considerations may be the reason researchers rarely consider 
differences in unintentional errors and intentional misstatements in research designs. This study 
addresses the last consideration by developing a language-based proxy for identifying 
restatements that correct unintentional error using text search.  
Using automated text searches, I identify a subset of restatements with language 
indicating that the restatement corrects unintentional error. Validity tests show, relative to AAER 
identified intentional misstatement firm-years, unintentional error firm-years have 
proportionately fewer revenue recognition issues, have proportionately fewer net income 
corrections, are characterized by less positive accruals, and are less likely to meet or beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts by a small amount. As observed by an anonymous reviewer, these 
results are perhaps not too surprising given that the intentional misstatement sample contained 
restatements that correct fraud and earnings management that is so egregious that it attracted 
SEC attention and sanctions. The unclassified restatements include intentional misstatements that 
have not attracted SEC sanctions. In the subsample where an auditor’s SOX 404 report is filed 
                                                   
25
 Hogan and Wilkins (2008) overview audit risk model literature and find audit fees, a proxy for audit effort, 
increase when control risk and inherent and/or information risk is high but do not rule out that higher audit fees 
reflect the litigation and reputation concerns. 
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for at least the first year of the restated period, validation tests show unintentional error firm-
years are characterized by significantly less positive accruals, less income persistence, and less 
net income smoothing than unclassified restatements that correct a mix of unintentional error and 
intentional misstatement. Overall, the results of the validation tests support my use in this study 
of a proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error that is constructed directly by 
searching restatement announcements for language asserting or implying lack of intent.  
2.10.2 Contributions, limitations, and future research opportunities 
The language-based method used in this chapter to construct a proxy for restatements that 
correct unintentional error differs from other proxies not only in the directness of proxy 
construction but also in its cost-effectiveness and in the proportion of restatements classified as 
error correcting. Other researchers wishing to identify restatements that correct unintentional 
errors may do so using the list of error indicators reported in Appendix A together with 
AuditAnalytics text search tool, i.e., proxy construction is automated and hence, replicable, 
scalable, and transparent. Automated text search is more cost effective than approaches such as 
Plumlee and Yohn’s (2010) that rely on researchers reading restatements in order to classify 
them, especially when the number of restatement announcements is large. This method also 
classifies less than one third of post-2002 annual restatements as restatements that correct 
unintentional error, whereas Hennes et al. (2008) classify three quarters of restatements in their 
sample as errors and Plumlee and Yohn (2010) classify over half the restatements in their sample 
as internal error. If this smaller proportion reflects a better identification of restatements of 
unintentional error, the proxy may improve the power of tests in studies of the determinants and 
consequences of unintentional error. A useful extension of this research would be to determine 
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whether or not this language-based proxy classifies restatements more accurately than prior 
proxies. 
As with all studies, this study is subject to limitations. One limitation of this study is the 
measurement error introduced by subjectivity in the choice of word(s) used to identify 
unintentional error restatements. I conducted robustness tests to test the sensitivity of validation 
test results to different choices of error indicators in text searches but it is not practical to test the 
robustness of results for all combinations of error indicators. Another limitation is the risk that 
variables omitted from multivariate analyses are biasing results. Although I tried to incorporate 
control variables shown to be significant in similar tests by prior research in multivariate 
analysis, differences in firm characteristics may explain my findings (Lawrence et al. 2011).  
To date, lack of a direct approach to construct a proxy for unintentional error has 
hindered research into the comparative determinants and consequences of unintentional error. 
Researchers using financial restatements in their studies have used an “error” proxy that is the 
leftover from a fraud classification process. Subdividing this group into restatements that correct 
unintentional error and restatements that are more likely to correct income smoothing and more 
benign earnings management (unclassified restatements) may enhance the power of tests of 
associations between unintentional error and the determinants of financial reporting quality in 
future restatement research. Prior archival audit research shows links between improved public 
company financial reporting quality and certain auditor characteristics, e.g., auditor size (e.g., 
DeAngelo 1981), industry specialization (e.g., Lim and Tan 2010, Reichelt and Wang 2010), 
supply chain specialization (Johnstone et al. 2014), and local engagement office size (e.g., Choi 
et al. 2010, Francis and Yu 2009, Francis et al. 2014). However, only tentative conclusions can 
be drawn by these studies as to whether the improvements result from enhancing audit detection 
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skills, improving auditors’ engagement acceptance decisions, or by bolstering auditors’ ability to 
resist management’s strategically motivated misreporting. Associations between financial 
reporting quality and management’s expertise, incentives, corporate governance, firm 
characteristics, and audit quality determinants have been extensively studied. The differential 
effects of such determinants on intentional misstatements and unintentional errors have not. The 
contribution of this proxy is not limited to future academic research. This new proxy may also be 
useful to the PCAOB and other regulatory bodies engaged in audit quality indicator projects.  
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Chapter 3 - Determinants of Unintentional Error in Restatement 
Disclosures 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews literature and develops and tests hypotheses to investigate the 
associations between restatements and the parties responsible for preventing, deterring and 
detecting unintentional error - boards (through their audit committees), management (through 
their chief financial officers (CFOs)) and auditors. Understanding these effects is important 
because restatements that correct unintentional errors reflect the presence of internal control 
weaknesses that may signal unintentional error in both external financial reports and internal 
management reports. Unintentional errors in internal management reports affect not only external 
party decisions but also day-to-day operational decisions (Feng et al. 2009, Feng et al. 
forthcoming). A better understanding of the determinants of unintentional error may not only 
help management reduce errors arising from books and records deficiencies but also may assist 
audit committees, auditors and standard setters to address control risk. 
Section 3.2 develops a theoretical model of determinants of unintentional error in audited 
financial statements of public companies. Effective internal control over financial reporting 
underpins financial statement reliability (PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5, US GAO 2006, SEC 
2003a). Organizational change has the potential to disrupt effective internal control. 
Management and the audit committee are responsible for overseeing the design and maintenance 
of internal controls to ensure control remains effective and that financial statements are free of 
both unintentional error and intentional misstatement. Auditors assess internal control and plan 
their audits to reduce “audit risk [a function of the risk of material misstatement and detection 
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risk] to an appropriately low level” (PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 8). Prior research finds 
management and auditor characteristics included in the theoretical model are associated with 
internal control quality and earnings quality. However, to my knowledge, the joint effects of 
auditor, audit committee, and management characteristics on restatements that correct 
unintentional error, and the comparative effects on restatements that correct unintentional error 
versus restatements that correct intentional misstatement, have not yet been studied. Such study 
may shed light on the characteristics of those responsible for financial statement preparation and 
audit that are associated with competence and effort, rather than reporting incentives. For 
example, auditors can explain their failure to detect intentional misstatements as the result of 
managements’ strategic actions to conceal such misstatements. However, such explanations 
would not apply to their failure to detect unintentional errors. Instead, the explanation would 
focus on failure to understand the entity and its environment so as to assess risks correctly or 
failure to design and execute effective detective procedures. 
Section 3.3 reviews literature and develops 13 hypotheses to study the joint effects of 
management, audit committee, and auditor characteristics on restatements. Four hypotheses test, 
with a more complete model than used in prior research, whether or not previous research 
findings on the associations between internal control quality and organizational change, CFO 
financial expertise, CFO influence, and audit committee financial expertise hold in the post-SOX 
period. Two hypotheses test whether the effects of organizational change on internal control 
quality depend on the financial expertise and influence of the CFO, dependencies not yet studied. 
Four hypotheses test associations between restatements that correct unintentional error and CFO 
financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise, and auditor quality. 
Three hypotheses compare associations between CFO influence, audit committee financial 
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expertise, and auditor quality and reductions in the likelihood of restatements that correct 
unintentional error versus restatements that correct intentional misstatement.  
Section 3.4 describes the samples used in tests and presents the variable definitions and 
research design. Logistic models test the association between the expertise and incentives of 
those responsible for financial reporting quality and the likelihood of restatement and reporting 
internal control weaknesses. The research design includes tests of the mediating effect of internal 
control quality. 
Section 3.5 presents test results. I do not find support for my predictions that error-
correcting restatements are decreasing in auditor quality and that, relative to restatements that 
correct error, restatements that correct intentional misstatement are more strongly associated with 
auditor quality (proxied by auditor size measured at both the firm and engagement office level). 
On the other hand, I do find that the likelihood of unintentional error restatements is related to 
CFO financial expertise and influence. However, I also find that while the likelihood of error-
correcting restatements are decreasing in CFO expertise and influence, this association depends 
upon whether or not companies are undergoing organizational change. In comparisons between 
associations of CFO financial expertise and influence, audit committee financial expertise and 
auditor quality with restatements that correct unintentional error versus restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement, I find that CFO (audit committee) financial expertise is more strongly 
associated with error-correcting (intentional misstatement-correcting) restatements. In contrast to 
these findings of associations between restatements and characteristics of those responsible for 
financial reporting quality, I find no associations between these characteristics and internal 
control quality (proxied by auditor’s SOX 404 opinions).  
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Section 3.6 summarizes by presenting both the study limitations and contributions and 
suggesting ideas for future research.  
3.2 Theoretical Model 
Figure 1 presents a theoretical model of determinants of unintentional error in audited 
financial statements of public companies. This section explains my choice of the firm, 
management, audit committee, and auditor characteristics included in the model. This section 
also highlights relationships between these characteristics and internal control quality and 
restatement that have been investigated in prior research, and the associations that to my 
knowledge have yet to be studied.   
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Figure 1 
Determinants of Undetected, Unintentional Errors in Audited Financial Statements 
 
 
3.2.1 Organizational change  
Of the firm characteristics that Doyle et al. (2007b) find to be associated with internal 
control quality (i.e., organizational change, firm size, age, financial challenges, and complexity), 
organizational change is the one that signals change in the other firm characteristics and alters 
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the control risks faced by the company. Restructuring, growth, foreign expansion, acquisition 
activity and other organizational changes alter business processes and may introduce, or make 
more contentious, accounting issues. Organizational change may lead to internal control 
weaknesses if management and the audit committee do not anticipate the impact of change and 
modify controls and processes appropriately. Conversely, internal control may improve 
following organizational change if management and the audit committee respond to change with 
more vigilant internal control oversight.  
Prior research shows mixed results for the associations between organizational change 
and internal control strength and restatements (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007, Doyle et al. 2007a, 
Goh 2009, Hoitash et al. 2009, Johnstone et al. 2011, Li et al. 2010, Lisic et al. 2014, Zhang et al. 
2007). Studying the association between organizational change and internal control in a model 
that includes management, governance, and audit effects - as suggested by Caskey et al.’s (2010) 
theoretical paper - may shed light on these mixed results.   
3.2.2 CFO and CEO financial expertise, influence, and incentives 
Of all the senior managers, the CFO plays the most significant role in overseeing 
financial reporting and ensuring internal control over financial reporting is established and 
maintained in compliance with SOX and other business and regulatory requirements (Aier et al. 
2005, Ge et al. 2011, Geiger and North 2006, Li et al. 2010, Mian 2001, Wang 2010). Both 
CFOs and CEOs file certifications of financial information and assessments of the effectiveness 
of internal controls over financial reporting (SEC 2003a) and influence auditor selection (Cohen 
et al. 2010). As expected, prior research concludes that CFOs shoulder greater responsibility for 
financial reporting and internal control than CEOs. Relative to CEOs, CFOs receive larger bonus 
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reductions following reporting of internal control weaknesses (Hoitash et al. 2012), turn over at a 
greater rate following restatements due to irregularities26 (Hennes et al. 2008), and suffer greater 
turnover and within-firm demotions following non-fraudulent restatements (Burks 2010). While 
the CFO plays the most significant internal control oversight role, their role may be limited if the 
CEO is incented to misstate and is not constrained by a strong, independent board.  
CFO financial expertise27 is associated with both the revelation and remediation of 
internal control weaknesses (Johnstone et al. 2011, Krishnan 2005, and Li et al. 2010). However, 
CFOs’ financial expertise may not be sufficient to ensure effective internal controls if CFOs do 
not have sufficient influence within the organization to muster or reconfigure accounting 
resources to respond to organizational change. Jiang et al. (2010, 515) argue that CFOs receiving 
greater equity incentives relative to CEOs “have more control over financial reporting”. Two 
recent studies (Balsam et al. 2014, Hoitash et al. 2012) find that internal control quality is 
increasing in CFOs’ equity incentives and support the view that the association between CFO 
influence and internal control quality should be included in the theoretical model. A third study 
(Bedard et al. 2014) finds companies with CFOs who are members of their companies’ boards, 
not only have more effective internal control over financial reporting but also a lower likelihood 
of restatement and higher accruals quality. Neither the relationships between CFOs’ financial 
expertise and influence and restatements that correct unintentional error, nor the relationships 
                                                   
26
 Identified by Hennes et al. (2008, 1489) as restatements containing the word “fraud” or “irregularity” or variants 
thereof, restatements related to SEC or Department of Justic investigations, and the presence or absence of “other 
investigations into the accounting matters (e.g., the Audit Committee hires a forensic accounting firm”). 
 
27
 Definitions of financial expertise vary in prior research. Frequently researchers restrict financial expertise to 
accounting expertise evidenced by accounting qualifications (i.e., Certified Public Accountants and Chartered 
Accountants), prior audit experience (work or partner experience at a Big 4/5/6/8 or national audit firm), or 
experience supervising accounting functions (i.e. prior experience as a chief financial officer, chief accounting 
officer, vice president of finance, controller, or treasurer). The definition of financial expertise is sometimes 
expanded (e.g. Keune and Johnstone 2011) to include those with finance expertise (i.e., bankers, investment 
bankers, Certified Financial Analysts, venture capitalists, and business school faculty).  
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between internal control quality and the interactions of organizational change and CFOs’ 
financial expertise and influence have been investigated thus far. A better understanding of such 
associations may assist CFOs to allocate their time between financial reporting and strategic 
management responsibilities and improve auditors’ control risk assessments.   
3.2.3 Audit committee financial expertise 
Regulatory and listing changes over the past 15 years have bolstered audit committee 
independence, financial knowledge, and control over audit and financial reporting processes 
(Abbott and Parker 2000, DeFond and Francis 2005, DeZoort et al. 2008, SEC 2003b, SOX 
Section 301 2002). Overall, recent archival research (Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014, Carcello 
et al. 2011b, Lisic et al. 2014) and semi-structured interviews of external auditors (Cohen et al. 
2010) and of public company audit committee members (Beasley et al. 2009) reveal that audit 
committees are “more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and powerful” post-SOX (Cohen et al. 
2010, 752). The audit committee is now directly responsible for the appointment, compensation 
and oversight of the work of the external auditor.  
Yet the audit committee’s role remains “inherently limited given the nature of the 
function. Audit committees only meet periodically, usually deal with complex but limited 
second-hand information, and include members with less knowledge of the company’s 
operations, controls, and reporting than management” (DeZoort et al. 2002, 41). Management 
and both external and internal auditors inform audit committees. SOX Section 302 requires 
management to disclose any internal control deficiencies and weaknesses to both auditors and 
the audit committee. External auditors are required to communicate to audit committees in 
writing regarding any significant deficiencies and internal control weaknesses (PCAOB Auditing 
 57 
 
standards No. 2 and No. 5). The Chief Audit Executive in charge of the internal audit function 
(IAF) commonly reports to the audit committee, although audit committee oversight of the IAF 
is not mandated, and the nature and effectiveness of the IAF can vary greatly (Abbott et al. 
2012)28.  
Changes in regulation and best practices have reduced post-SOX variation in audit 
committee composition and activity (Carcello et al. 2011a, Cohen et al. 2008). Now, virtually all 
audit committees are composed of all independent directors. Most have three members and aim 
to meet at least quarterly. Public companies are required to designate an audit committee 
financial expert or explain why they have not done so (SOX Section 301). The financial 
expertise of audit committees varies not only with the number of financial experts on the 
committee but also with whether or not the financial experts have financial expertise (e.g., 
accounting qualifications or prior audit or CFO experience) rather than supervisory expertise 
gained overseeing the financial reporting process (e.g., experience as a Chief Executive Officer, 
Board Chair, and Chief Operating Officer). Supervisory expertise is sufficient to qualify an audit 
committee member as a financial expert.  
Many studies show audit committee financial expertise is related to internal control or 
financial reporting quality (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004, Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Cohen et al. 
2014, Dhaliwal et al. 2010, Goh 2009, Hoitash et al. 2009, Johnstone et al. 2011, Keune and 
Johnstone 2012, Krishnan 2005, Lisic et al. 2014, and Zhang et al. 2007). Studies show that more 
                                                   
28
 Due to the absence of IAF data, empirical research on the IAF contribution to financial reporting quality is scarce 
(Abbott et al. 2012, DeFond and Zhang 2013, Prawitt et al. 2009). Two of the few archival studies, Lin et al. (2011) 
and Prawitt et al. (2009), obtain data from the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Global Audit Information Network 
(GAIN) database, a compilation of survey response of Chief Audit Executives of IIA members. Prawitt et al. (2009) 
find that the IAF is (is not) associated incrementally over and above the external auditors with smaller positive 
(negative) abnormal accruals and meeting and beating analyst forecasts. Lin et al. (2011) find the nature and scope 
of IAF activities and the IAF education attribute are associated with SOX 404 material weakness disclosure.  
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independent audit committees appoint higher quality auditors (DeZoort et al. 2002) and that audit 
committees with CPA members are more supportive of auditor-proposed adjustments post-SOX 
(DeZoort et al. 2008). The association between audit committee financial expertise and financial 
reporting quality is underlined by Srinivasan’s (2005) finding that audit committee members 
with financial expertise lose more positions on other boards relative to other audit committee 
members following accounting restatements. Boards with a clear understanding of their firm 
circumstances and these associations will be better informed to choose audit committee members 
who bring the best mix of financial expertise and other expertise (e.g., supervisory, industry, and 
legal) to the audit committee.   
3.2.4 Auditor quality 
Whether or not internal control weaknesses result in financial reporting error depends on 
auditor quality. Skilled auditors plan and conduct audits recognizing internal control weaknesses. 
While archival researchers “hypothesize that auditors are a determinant of earning quality 
because of their role in mitigating intentional and unintentional misstatements” (Dechow et al. 
2010, 383), the aspects of auditor quality driving this mitigation (e.g., auditor expertise, 
independence, incentives, and effort) continue to be investigated.  
In their synthesis of audit research, Knechel et al. (2013, 385) conclude that there is “little 
consensus about how to define, let alone measure, audit quality”. This is not surprising given 
archival researchers lack the publicly available data necessary to triangulate many findings of 
experimental, survey, and qualitative audit research (Francis 2011). The publicly observable data 
used by archival researchers to construct auditor quality proxies include both output measures 
(e.g. restatement frequency, results of PCAOB inspections, and clients’ accruals quality) and 
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input measures (e.g., auditor size, industry specialization, client fees, and auditor tenure). The 
output measures are not suitable audit quality proxies for this study because: (1) Restatements 
are used in this study to construct the proxy for unintentional error and accordingly cannot also 
be used as a proxy for auditor quality; (2) The publicly available portions of PCAOB inspection 
reports cannot be matched to restatement data because inspection reports do not refer to the 
client or engagement office and are less likely to be available for firm-years when smaller 
auditors conducted the audit;29 and (3) Accruals quality is inflated by both intentional 
misstatement and unintentional error and hence is an unsuitable proxy for auditor quality in tests 
that compare the associations of determinants between restatements that correct unintentional 
error vs. intentional misstatement. Many auditor quality input proxies (e.g., industry 
specialization, client influence, and auditor effort) are constructed from publicly available audit 
fee data and thus are highly correlated with both client and auditor size.  
Theory suggests higher quality auditors are less dependent on any one client, invest more 
in audit methodologies and technologies, and exert more effort to protect their reputations. 
Consistent with theory, many studies find earnings quality increasing in auditor quality (e.g., 
Becker et al. 1998, Choi et al. 2010, Francis and Krishnan 1999, Francis et al. 1999, Francis and 
Yu 2009, Lennox 1999, Reynolds and Francis 2001, Teoh and Wong 1993, and Weber and 
Willenborg 2003). These studies proxy auditor quality with engagement office and/or firm level 
measures of auditor size. However, recent studies find mixed evidence of association between 
restatement and auditor quality proxied by auditor size (Cohen et al. 2014, Ettredge et al. 2014, 
Francis et al. 2013, Francis and Michas 2013, and Newton et al. 2013). Hennes et al. (2014) find 
                                                   
29
 The PCAOB conducts inspections annually for firms that regularly provide audit reports for more than 100 
issuers, and at least triennially for firms that regularly provide audit reports for 100 or fewer issuers 
(www.pcaobus.org/inspections). 
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auditors are dismissed after restatements (albeit dismissal likelihood is less for less severe 
restatements). To my knowledge, a study of the association between auditor quality and 
restatements that correct unintentional error, and a comparison of the associations between 
auditor quality and restatements that correct unintentional error vs. restatements that correct 
intentional restatements, has not yet been undertaken to investigate these mixed findings. 
Investigating these associations may lead not only to audit committees appointing auditors that 
better fit firm circumstances but also may help regulators refine their use of restatements as an 
audit quality metric.  
3.3 Hypotheses Development and Related Literature 
This section reviews literature cited in developing the theoretical model and other 
research that I rely on to develop 13 hypotheses.  
3.3.1 Internal control and organizational change  
Some types of change disrupt control systems more than others. For example, control 
systems that accommodate modest sales and asset growth may be disrupted by downsizing, 
merger, or other restructuring activities that introduce new accounting and business 
disposition/integration issues which require greater change in financial reporting and control 
processes. Internal control weaknesses and restatements evidence a failure of management to 
either design or maintain effective control at some point during the evolution of the business. 
Plumlee and Yohn (2010) find internal control weaknesses are reported by 44% of companies 
restating financial statements filed in the 2003-2006 time period. Regression results of prior 
research show mixed results for the associations between organizational change and both internal 
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control quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007, Doyle et al. 2007a, Goh 2009, Hoitash et al. 2009, 
Johnstone et al. 2011, Li et al. 2010, Lisic et al. 2014, and Zhang et al. 2007) and restatement 
likelihood (Carcello et al. 2011b, Cohen et al. 2014, Ettredge et al. 2014, Francis et al. 2013, and 
Lisic et al. 2014). Results of the two recent restatement studies that include not only 
organizational change but also both auditor quality and audit committee measures in regressions 
(Carcello et al. 2011b, Cohen et al. 2014), show a significant positive association between 
organizational change and restatements that evidence internal control breakdown, thus leading to 
my first prediction, worded in the alternative: 
H1: Internal control quality is negatively associated with organizational change. 
3.3.2 CFO financial expertise and influence 
CFO financial expertise is associated with both the revelation and remediation of internal 
control weaknesses (Johnstone et al. 2011, Krishnan 2005, and Li et al. 2010). These findings, 
together with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.’s (2008) conclusion that internal control deficiencies are 
associated with unintentional error30 suggest that internal control weaknesses will be decreasing 
in CFO financial expertise. Since firms may invest in superior auditor quality to compensate for 
weak internal controls (Hogan and Wilkins 2008, Hoitash et al. 2009, Lu et al. 2011, and 
Simunic 1980) and CFOs influence auditor selection (Cohen et al. 2010), the association 
between unintentional error in audited financial statements and CFO financial expertise is an 
empirical question. I rely on Aier’s et al. (2005) pre-SOX-sample study that finds restatements 
                                                   
30
 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008, 233) find that relative to a control sample, firms with internal control deficiencies 
“report, on average, larger positive and larger negative abnormal accruals … consistent with internal control 
weaknesses adding noise to accruals through unintentional errors, inadvertent oversights, and accidental 
misstatements that affect earnings in both directions.” 
 62 
 
are decreasing in CFO financial expertise to form the following hypotheses written in the 
alternative: 
H2: Internal control quality is positively associated with CFO financial expertise. 
H3: The likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error is negatively associated 
with CFO financial expertise.  
 
Expertise alone may not be sufficient to prevent control breakdown and unintentional 
error if the CFO does not have the stature within the organization to ensure sufficient resourcing 
of financial reporting and control processes and the appointment of a high quality auditor. In all 
but the smallest of businesses, financial reporting systems are integrated with business processes 
and many people exercising important controls are not under the direct supervision of the CFO. 
Integrated systems frequently span departments, divisions, and subsidiaries. For example, 
Hoitash et al. (2012, 792) observe that company-wide “problems pertaining to information 
technology (e.g., the use of a legacy system that lacks integration or a system that is not properly 
configured and therefore does not enforce segregation of duties) can potentially impact multiple 
business process areas such as the order-to-cash-collection process and the purchase-to-pay 
process.” Effective control involves training and monitoring personnel both inside and outside 
the accounting area.  
CFOs with the greatest influence are not necessarily those with the most financial 
expertise. Hoitash et al. (2012) find account specific, but not company-wide, control weaknesses 
are associated with changes in CFO compensation. A decade ago, a CFO “saw the business more 
through an accounting lens than through strategy and value-creation lenses” (Groysberg et al. 
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2011), whereas now, “[n]early one-third of new CFOs … have spent a sizable portion of their 
career in investment banking, consulting, or private equity” (Agrawal et al. 2013). In many 
organizations a CFO plays a more strategic role, particularly in larger organizations with a 
separate controller and treasurer reporting to the CFO. Nonetheless, in a post-SOX survey, 
Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) find that financial performance continues to be an important 
determinant of CFO bonuses and that greater bonus weight is placed on financial performance 
measures for CFOs with longer tenure and for CFOs of larger firms.  
Jiang et al. (2010, 515) argue that CFOs receiving greater equity incentives relative to 
CEOs “have more control over financial reporting”. Supporting this view, post-SOX studies find 
that internal control quality is increasing in CFOs’ equity incentives (Balsam et al. 2014, Hoitash 
et al. 2012). My next two predictions, expressed in the alternative, are based on Balsam et al.’s 
(2014) and Hoitash et al.’s (2012) findings, together with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.’s (2008) 
conclusion that internal control deficiencies are associated with unintentional error: 
H4: Internal control quality is positively associated with CFO influence. 
H5: The likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error is negatively associated 
with CFO influence.  
Internal control will deteriorate if not modified appropriately in response to business 
change. For example, access rights need to be updated for personnel changes and period-end 
processes need to be modified as a firm expands globally. When change is anticipated and 
viewed as an opportunity for control improvement, management will tune controls to changing 
business processes and avoid deterioration of financial reporting quality. For instance, firms may 
improve Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems or invest in staff training leading up to 
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expanding operations or merging with another firm. Such improvements may explain Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al.’s (2008, p. 237) “contradictory” finding that firms that engage in restructuring report 
higher quality accruals. Similar reasoning has been used to explain why the Year 2000 (Y2K) 
fears of wide-spread failures of older systems at the start of the new millennium were not 
realized. 
I argue that CFOs with greater financial expertise are more likely to recognize any new 
accounting or control issues that arise as a result of organizational change. I further argue that 
CFOs with greater influence are more likely to be positioned within the management structure 
(1) to learn of organizational change sooner (which provides time to plan control changes to keep 
controls and business processes better matched); (2) to participate in organizational change 
planning; and (3) to have the power to influence the personnel, system and business process 
changes necessary to improve internal control. Accordingly, my next two predictions (in 
alternative form) are:   
H6: The association between internal control quality and organizational change is 
moderated by CFO financial expertise.  
H7: The association between internal control quality and organizational change is 
moderated by CFO influence.  
My last hypothesis concerning the CFO associations with unintentional error posits that 
the negative association between CFO influence and misreporting is greater for restatements that 
correct unintentional error than those that correct intentional misstatement. When bonus and 
equity incentives constitute a large portion of CFO compensation, CFOs may engage in 
opportunistic behavior. Feng et al. (2011) find that CFOs succumb to CEOs in material 
accounting manipulations, suggesting the association of CFO incentives and intentional 
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misstatements may mimic that of CEOs (see Armstrong et al. 2010 for a review of recent CEO 
incentives literature). However, such succumbing need not lead to intentional misstatement if the 
CEO is not motivated to misreport. Jiang et al. (2010) find the association between CEO equity 
incentives and discretionary accruals is not significant post-SOX and that greater CFO incentive 
is associated with lower discretionary accruals post-SOX. Similarly, Armstrong et al. (2010) fail 
to find post-SOX evidence of an association between greater CEO equity incentives and 
manipulation related restatements, AAERs, and lawsuits. CFOs’ equity incentives, which are less 
post-SOX (Indjejikian and Matejka 2009), are more important than CEOs’ equity incentives in 
explaining associations with accruals and meeting earnings benchmarks (Balsam et al. 2014, 
Jiang et al. 2010).  
The Armstrong et al. (2010), Feng et al. (2011) and Jiang et al. (2010) results, taken 
together with the arguments used to develop hypothesis H7, suggest the negative relationship 
between CFO influence and unintentional error would be greater than the relationship with 
intentional misstatement. While the association between CFO influence and intentional 
misstatement is not posited or tested in this study, a negative association would bias against 
finding results for this prediction. I predict (in alternative form):   
H8: Restatements that correct unintentional error are more likely to be decreasing in 
CFO influence than restatements that correct intentional misstatement. 
3.3.3 Audit committee financial expertise 
Restatement signifies that the audit committee failed in its oversight of the internal 
control and financial reporting processes. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) predicts an 
independent audit committee with appropriate expertise performs a monitoring role that reduces 
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agency costs. Conversely, the institutional and managerial hegemony perspectives suggest that 
audit committee expertise does not guarantee monitoring quality. Institutional theory predicts 
audit committee members may not be selected for their monitoring ability but instead for 
credentials and experience that better conform to regulatory guidance and best practices (see 
Cohen et al. 2008 and Beasley et al. 2009 for literature overviews). Emphasis on financial 
expertise in selecting audit committee members may compromise audit committee performance 
if less able committee members are selected or audit committee members become less inclined to 
ask challenging questions. Management hegemony theory, from the strategy literature, predicts 
that board members selected by management will be more passive and challenge management 
less (see Cohen et al. 2008 for literature overview). Consistent with this prediction, recent studies 
find CEO involvement in selecting board members (Carcello et al. 2011b) or the presence of a 
more powerful CEO (Lisic et al. 2014) moderates the negative association between audit 
committee expertise and restatement. Moreover, although financial expertise is “by far the most 
common reason for being asked to serve on the audit committee” (Beasley et al. 2009), CEOs 
frequently have social connections with audit committee members. Audit committee monitoring 
is weaker (i.e., greater earnings management, lower audit fees, fewer going concern opinions, 
and disclosure of fewer internal control weaknesses) when the CEO has friendship ties, but not 
professional and educational ties, with the audit committee (Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014). 
The recent studies that find association between internal control quality and audit committee 
financial expertise while controlling for CEO characteristics (Bruynseels and Cardinaels 2014, 
Lisic et al. 2014) do not control for CFO characteristics. Thus, testing, in a more complete 
model, the association between audit committee financial expertise and both internal control 
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quality and restatements that evidence breakdown of internal control leads to my next two 
predictions:  
H9: Internal control quality is increasing in audit committee financial expertise. 
H10: The likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error is decreasing in audit 
committee financial expertise. 
In contrast to prior research that finds few associations between accounting restatements 
and a wide range of governance measures (Carcello et al. 2011a, Larker et al. 2007)31, the 
negative association between restatements and audit committee financial expertise shown in both 
pre-SOX and post-SOX studies (Abbott et al. 2004, Agrawal and Chadha 2005, Badolato et al. 
forthcoming, Carcello et al. 2011b, Cohen et al. 2014, Lisic et al. 2014) is consistent with agency 
theory. Nonetheless, it is not clear that restatement samples used in prior research showing a 
relationship between restatements and audit committee financial expertise support a conclusion 
that audit committee financial expertise is associated with restatements that correct unintentional 
error.  
It is possible that associations with restatements that correct intentional misstatement and 
not restatements that correct unintentional error are driving the audit committee financial 
expertise restatement association research results. Audit committees aware of management’s 
incentives to misstate may ask probing questions that lead to their fuller appreciation for 
                                                   
31
 Carcello et al. (2011a) summarize selected results from 12 corporate governance literature reviews or meta-
analysis papers and cite only audit committee independence and expertise associations with restatements. Larker et 
al. (2007, 10) during the June 2002 to March 2003 sample period find “little relation to accounting restatements” 
between 14 governance variables constructed using principal component analysis of 39 governance characteristics 
that include audit committee independence, size, meeting frequency, but not audit committee expertise, measures. 
Baber et al. (2012) find observing associations between restatements and composite measures of Board and external 
governance factors, depends on the time period and whether or not governance interactions are included in 
regressions.   
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potential misstatement. While audit committees may also ask probing questions about internal 
control quality in general, audit committees may ask less probing questions about specific 
unintentional errors as they are unlikely to be asked to intervene in negotiations between 
management and auditors in correction of unintentional error. Carcello et al. (2011b, 22) find 
audit committee financial expertise is associated only with more severe restatements that involve 
“fraud, SEC AAERs, litigation, a change in net income/revenue of more than -10 percent, or a 
market reaction to the announcement of more than -10 percent”. Cohen et al. (2014) find audit 
committee expertise is associated with restatement in the expected direction overall and in the 
partition with negative market reaction to restatement announcement but do not report results for 
the partition with the few observations with positive market reaction. Badolato et al.’s 
(forthcoming) study, the only study I am aware of that partitions restatements using 
AuditAnalytics’ accounting and clerical error classification code, find no evidence of an 
association between audit committee expertise and restatements that correct unintentional error. 
Badolato et al. (forthcoming) find that audit committees with both financial expertise and high 
status relative to management is associated with fewer irregularities (i.e., firm-years with SEC 
and Department of Justice enforcement actions that establish intent and settled class-action 
lawsuits that allege GAAP violations) but that irregularities are not decreasing in audit 
committee financial expertise alone.  
Given the results of prior research on the association between unintentional error and 
audit committee financial expertise is limited and mixed, I base my prediction that audit 
committee financial expertise is more strongly associated with correction of intentional 
misstatement than unintentional error on consideration of the audit committee’s role. The audit 
committee is more likely to engage in discussions of estimates subject to intentional 
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misstatement than correction of unintentional error: when discovered, unintentional errors 
require management correction not negotiations with management and auditors. An association 
between audit committee financial expertise and unintentional error is more likely to be an 
indirect effect mediated by the audit committee’s effect on resourcing of controls and the 
accounting function. I reason that the association between the audit committee’s financial 
expertise and negotiations with management and auditors over contentious financial statement 
amounts is likely to be stronger than the association with internal control quality, given the CFO 
has primary responsibility for internal control. Thus, I make the following prediction concerning 
the association between restatements and audit committee financial expertise, written in the 
alternative: 
H11: Restatements that correct intentional misstatement are more likely to be decreasing 
in audit committee financial expertise than restatements that correct unintentional 
error. 
3.3.4 Auditor quality 
Economic dependence theory predicts higher quality auditors will be less dependent on 
any one client and are therefore less incented to succumb to management pressure (DeAngelo 
1981). Auditor size is a frequently used proxy of auditor quality. Given client loss is likely to be 
felt more acutely at the engagement office level, researchers measure auditor size at the 
engagement office level as well as at the firm level (e.g., Craswell et al. 2002, Reynolds and 
Francis 2001). While economic dependence theory relates to auditor independence, knowledge 
theory relates more directly to an auditor’s ability to detect accounting errors and misstatements. 
The PCAOB Office of Research and Analysis (2013a, 22) asserts that “spending earmarked 
toward areas such as technology and systems, training and guidance, audit methodology and risk 
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management tools, and technical consulting resources … should theoretically help to improve 
audit quality”. PCAOB inspectors consider both audit performance and infrastructure when 
assessing audit quality control policies and procedures of larger audit firms (Church and 
Shefchik 2012). The Big 4 (Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC) 32 invest more than smaller firms in 
proprietary audit methodologies, audit technologies, and codification of best practices and 
GAAP interpretation (Bedard et al. 2008, Dowling and Leech 2007, Dowling and Leech 2014, 
and Francis et al. 2014). Infrastructure spending that facilitates knowledge sharing also builds 
reputational capital (DeAngelo 1981). The theory of reputation protection (see Reynolds and 
Francis 2001 for an overview) predicts that larger auditors, with more reputation capital at risk, 
are perceived as more independent by their clients and will exert more audit effort. 
Consistent with theory, many studies find earnings quality (proxied by accruals quality, 
restatements, going concern opinions, ERCs, meeting and beating benchmarks, reporting 
comparability, etc.) increasing in auditor quality (proxied by auditor size measured at the firm 
level and office level) (Choi et al. 2010, Francis 2004, Francis and Michas 2013, Francis and Yu 
2009, Francis et al. 2014, Reynolds and Francis 2001). In contrast, evidence of association 
between restatement and auditor quality is mixed in recent restatement studies (Cohen et al. 
2014, Ettredge et al. 2014, Francis and Michas 2013, Francis et al. 2013, Newton et al. 2013) 33. 
Furthermore, of these recent restatement studies only Cohen et al. (2014) includes audit 
committee expertise in tests. Cohen et al. (2014) predict, but did not find, a negative association 
                                                   
32
 I chose to label as “Big 4” the Big 8/6/5/4 classifications used in the various studies based on the time period of 
the study. The Big 8 shrank to the Big 4 with the collapse of Arthur Andersen and audit firm mergers since 1989. 
The Big 4 audit approximately four fifths of accelerated SEC registrants and half of non-accelerated SEC registrants 
(based on data extracted Dec. 13, 2013 from the AuditAnalytics database). 
 
33
 Contrary to Lobo and Zhao’s (2013) recommendations based on findings in their audit fee restatement study, these 
recent studies (Ettredge et al. 2014 being the possible exception) include both quarterly and annual restatements in 
restatement samples and do not adjust audit fee measures of audit effort for pre-audit risk.  
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between auditor quality (included as a control variable and proxied by auditor size) and 
restatements.   
The evidence that auditor quality is associated with litigation risk is mixed (Casterella et 
al. 2010). Based on their extensive review of both older and more recent theoretical and 
empirical auditor litigation research, DeFond and Zhang (2014, 70) note that it is “somewhat 
surprising that the link to audit quality is not more conclusive”. Lys and Watts (1994) study 
lawsuits against auditors from 1955-1994 and conclude that the likelihood of a lawsuit may have 
more to do with a client’s size and stock performance than audit failure. Notwithstanding the fact 
that higher quality auditors have larger clients on average (Lawrence et al. 2011) and “deeper 
pockets”, it does not necessarily follow that auditors will increase audit effort in response to 
increased litigation risk. Prior research shows auditors respond to litigation risk by charging 
higher fees, increasing going concern opinions, and shedding riskier clients, but most studies are 
not able to disentangle whether or not auditors respond with greater audit effort (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). In fact, researchers suggest auditors may respond to legal rules and damage award 
precedents with “excessive auditor conservatism” rather than increased audit effort (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014, 24). Therefore, while “[u]niversally, the accounting profession has long argued that 
their culpability and, accordingly, liability for failures to detect and report management fraud is 
less than that for failures to detect and report financial statement errors” (Ferguson and Majid 
2003, 365), it may be that different quality auditors do not differ in their audit effort response to 
litigation risk. In international settings, where the litigation risk is lower than in the United 
States, studies find reputation protection incentives extend beyond the auditor litigation 
incentives (e.g., Lennox and Li 2012, Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). 
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Even though the recent restatement studies do not focus on unintentional error, three of 
the recent restatement studies report results of additional analyses partitioned by restatement 
severity which may shed light on whether it is unintentional error or intentional misstatement 
that is driving the auditor quality associations. The results of these additional analyses are mixed. 
Francis et al. (2013) find auditor quality (proxied by engagement office size) is negatively 
associated with income-decreasing, income-increasing, and no-net-income-effect restatements. 
Newton et al.’s (2013) tabulated results show a significant association only between auditor 
quality (proxied by engagement office size) and income-decreasing (more severe) restatements. 
Inconsistently, Newton et al.’s (2013) tabulated results in Big 4 and non-Big 4 partitions show no 
significant association between restatements and engagement office size in the Big 4 partition 
and significant association only with income-increasing restatements (less severe restatements) 
in the non-Big 4 partition. Ettredge et al. (2014, 259) find their results, showing that clients of 
lower quality auditors (proxied by non-Big 4 firms and smaller engagement offices) are 
associated with more restatements than clients of higher quality auditors during the 2008 
recession, are driven by restatements with more negative market reaction and not “merely with 
smaller errors in financial statements”.  
The Ettredge et al. (2014), Francis et al. (2013) and Newton et al. (2013) results cited 
above are somewhat surprising. Given that higher quality auditors have greater reputational 
capital at risk would they not increase effort to detect less severe unintentional errors as well as 
intentional misstatements that management might try to conceal? It is possible that auditors do 
not perceive reputational consequences for less severe restatements. Supporting this possibility, 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008, 236) find fees, a proxy for audit effort, are not significantly higher if 
the weaknesses are “less severe and are relatively isolated (e.g., account-specific or subsidiary-
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specific)”. However, Hennes et al. (2014) find auditors are dismissed after both more and less 
severe restatements, albeit dismissal likelihood is less for less severe restatements and the 
likelihood is further reduced for Big 4 auditors with operationally complex clients where the 
choice of replacement auditors is limited.  
It is also possible that smaller auditors (a frequent proxy for lower auditor quality) have 
more experience estimating the risk of unintentional error than larger auditors. As Francis (2011, 
133) observes “large and small accounting firms … can have quite different clienteles at the 
extremes”. Auditor selection bias leads to smaller, less profitable firms being audited by smaller 
auditors (Lawrence et al. 2011). Hence, smaller auditors may have more experience auditing the 
smaller, financially weaker companies that are more likely to have entity-wide control problems 
(Doyle et al. 2007b). Moreover, the audit staff at smaller engagement offices assessing the 
evidence used to make error risk decisions may work more directly with experienced partners 
than audit staff at larger engagement offices. The knowledge sharing benefits realized from 
infrastructure investments by the Big 4 may be inherently limited (Vera-Munoz et al. 2006). 
Types of critical auditor knowledge that may only be shared by working closely together rather 
than relying on centralized resources and transmission across a network of decentralized offices 
may be better shared in smaller engagement offices.  
Assessing unintentional error risk involves understanding clients’ internal controls and 
conducting control tests of appropriate controls. Bedard et al. (2008) overview the literature on 
issues in using the formalized decision support systems adopted for risk management practices 
and procedures by larger firms. Such decision support systems enable centralizing of control 
over certain parts of the audit, force compliance with firms’ methodology and standards, 
facilitate monitoring and review, and yet may have their potential limited if implemented so as to 
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encourage a “ticking the box” over judgment mentality (Bedard et al. 2008, 199). The PCAOB 
finds even large, annually inspected accounting firms have deficiencies in identification and 
testing of controls (Church and Shefchik 2013, PCAOB 2012a). In 2013, the PCAOB issued a 36 
page staff audit practice alert, to notify engagement partners, senior members of the engagement 
team, engagement quality reviewers, and audit committees about on-going deficiencies in audits 
of internal control and suggested remedies including improving risk assessment (PCAOB 2013).   
Given the mixed evidence of association between auditor quality and restatement, the 
lack of research on the association of auditor quality and unintentional error, the possible 
implication of auditor selection bias, and the PCAOB’s concerns about risk assessment, it is an 
empirical question as to whether or not auditor quality is related to unintentional error in audited 
financial statements. Accordingly, I predict in the alternative:  
H12: The likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error is decreasing in auditor 
quality.  
While I predict there is a negative relationship between auditor quality and restatements 
that correct unintentional error, I expect that higher quality auditors will be associated with fewer 
restatements that correct intentional misstatements. This prediction is consistent with Francis et 
al. (2013) and Ettredge et al.’s (2014) findings that higher quality auditors (proxied by auditor 
size) are associated with fewer severe restatements (respectively, income-decreasing 
restatements and restatements with more negative market reaction to restatement announcement) 
but not less severe restatements. These findings of association between auditor quality and more 
severe restatement are consistent with reputation protection theory and Lennox and Pittman’s 
(2010) finding that an association with AAERs is four times more likely for non-Big 4 auditors 
(a common proxy for lower auditor quality) than Big 4 auditors. Whereas I argued smaller 
 75 
 
auditors may better estimate the risk of unintentional error than larger auditors, I do not expect 
this to be the case for the risk of intentional misstatement. Intentional misstatements being 
indicated by observable benchmarks such as management earnings guidance, analysts’ forecasts, 
and bonus targets are more transparent than unintentional errors. Since auditors of greater and 
lesser quality are likely to recognize transparent audit risks, reputation theory predicts higher 
quality auditors will respond with more audit effort than auditors of lesser quality.  
In other words, while the relationship between auditor quality and restatements that 
correct unintentional error may be a competence story, I expect the relationship between auditor 
quality and restatements that correct intentional misstatement is more of an incentives story. I do 
not develop a hypothesis or test directly the prediction that auditor quality is negatively related to 
restatements that correct intentional misstatements. Rather, I predict a comparatively greater 
negative association between auditor quality and restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement than between auditor quality and restatements that correct unintentional error. A 
positive association or lack of association between auditor quality and restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement will bias against finding predicted results. My final prediction, 
developed based on reputation theory, the reasoning supporting H12 and empirical evidence, 
expressed in the alternative is: 
H13: Restatements that correct intentional misstatement are more likely to be decreasing 
in auditor quality than restatements that correct unintentional error.   
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3.4 Sample Selection and Research Design 
3.4.1 Samples 
The sample used to test hypotheses includes 121 restatements that correct unintentional 
error, 104 restatements that proxy for restatements that correct intentional misstatement, and a 
control group of 121 firm-years without restatement. Chapter 2 details my selection of the 
restatements that correct unintentional error and restatements that proxy for restatements that 
correct intentional misstatement (Table 11). To create the control group, I chose companies that 
are nearest in asset size to the companies that restated to correct unintentional error that also (1) 
have all necessary data for tests of hypotheses, (2) are within the same two digit SIC code and 
year, and (3) are without restatements in the AuditAnalytics database at the time of data 
collection34. These criteria resulted in matching 70% of companies without restatement within 
10% of the asset size of their matched unintentional error restatement observation. Pairs of these 
three types of companies are combined in different ways to form three samples, i.e., the ERROR 
sample is comprised of the 121 restatements that correct unintentional error and the 121 control 
companies; the INTENT sample is comprised of the 104 restatements that proxy for restatements 
that correct intentional misstatement and the 121 restatements that correct unintentional error; 
and the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample is comprised on the 104 restatements that proxy for 
restatements that correct intentional misstatement and the 121 control companies without 
restatement.        
                                                   
34
 April, 2013. There is always the possibility that one or more of the control companies will restate in the future. 
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3.4.2 Research design 
I use three logistic models to test the 13 hypotheses. Model 1, estimated using the 
ERROR sample, tests the six hypotheses that investigate associations between internal control 
quality and CFO and audit committee characteristics. Model 2, also estimated using the ERROR 
sample, tests the associations between restatements that correct unintentional error and CFO, 
audit committee, and auditor characteristics. Model 3, estimated using the INTENT sample, 
compares restatement likelihoods associated with CFO, audit committee, and auditor 
characteristics between restatements that correct unintentional error and restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement. I also re-estimate Model 2 using the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample 
to aid in the interpretation of Model 3 results. While Models 2 and 3 investigate the total effects 
of CFO, audit committee, and auditor characteristics and suffice to investigate the hypotheses, 
mediated logistic models will be used to test the indirect effect on restatements that correct 
unintentional error (intentional misstatement) through internal control quality when total effects 
are significant.  
Table 12 presents all variables used in the models. Table 12 also itemizes alternate 
measures of several test variables and the five components of one composite measure. While 
models will be estimated and reported using all measures shown in Table 12, hypotheses tests 
will be conducted on models that omit control variables that do not improve model fit and are not 
significant in any of the models.   
3.4.2.1 Model 1: Internal control quality association tests 
To test the hypotheses that investigate associations between internal control quality and 
organizational change (H1, H6, and H7), CFO financial expertise (H2), CFO influence (H4) and 
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audit committee financial expertise (H9), I estimate the following logistic regression (Model 1) 
using the ERROR sample comprised of 121 restatements that correct unintentional error and the 
matched control group of 121 firm-years without restatement:  
ICWEAKit           = β0 + β1 ORGCHANGEit  + β2CFOEXPit + β3CFOPOWERit   
                                            + β4ORGCHANGEit  X  CFOEXPit  + β5ORGCHANGEit  X  CFOPOWERit 
                                            +  β6ACEXP it    +  β7AUDITORQUAL it  +  β8AUDITFEE it +  β9AUDITINF it 
                                            +  β10AUDITTENURE it +  β11AUDITORCHANGE it +  β12CFOCHANGE it 
                                            +  β13CFO_EQUITY_PAYit +  β14GOVERNANCE it +  β15IAFit 
                                            + β16FIRMSIZEit + β17AGEit + β18LOSSit + β19COMPLEXITYit 
  
                                                                
+ β20FOREIGNit + β21LEVERAGEit + β22MTBit + β23ISSUEit  
                                            + β24VOLATILITYit  + β25MISSTATEINCENTit  
                                            + ∑tYEARt +  ∑tINDUSTRYt + ε it                                                                          [1a, 1b] 
 
 
The binary variable (ICWEAK) in Model 1 captures auditor opinions on the effectiveness 
of internal control over financial reporting. AuditAnalytic’s database codes auditor’s SOX 404 
opinions as originally filed and as amended. Accordingly, I plan to use two complementary 
measures of internal control quality. Model 1a’s dependent variable is auditor’s SOX 404 
opinions as originally filed (ICWeakORIGINAL). Model 1b’s dependent variable is auditor’s 
SOX 404 opinions after amendments, if any (ICWeakAMENDED). Internal control quality 
assessments may be revisited and SOX 404 reports amended upon discovery of the need to 
restate financial statements. Thus, although ICWeakAMENDED may more accurately reflect 
internal control quality than ICWeakORIGINAL, results of tests using the amended auditor 
opinions of internal control may be confounded by differences in auditors’ control evaluations 
given that evaluations may be revisited more frequently in the restatement group than in the 
control group.  
My measure of organizational change (ORGCHANGE) captures changes resulting from 
the company engaging in restructuring, acquisitions or a first-time global expansion during the 
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restated year. The theoretical model predicts that the association between organizational change 
(ORGCHANGE) and internal control quality depends on the CFO’s financial expertise 
(CFOEXP) and influence (CFOPOWER). A significant β4 (β5) supports H6 (H7) that CFO 
financial expertise (influence) moderates the association between organizational change and 
internal control quality.   
H1 tests the association between organizational change and internal control quality. Since 
I hypothesize that the association between organizational change and internal control quality 
depends on CFO characteristics, I conclude H1 is supported if the confidence interval of the 
product of the odds ratios of ORGCHANGE, CFOEXP X ORGCHANGE, and CFOPOWER X 
ORGCHANGE is greater than one35. However, if I do not find support for H6 (H7), I will instead 
examine the significance of ORGCHANGE in Model 1 with the interaction variables omitted to 
test H1.   
Similarly, given the hypothesized interaction of organizational change and CFO 
characteristics, investigating the association between internal control quality and CFO financial 
expertise (CFOEXP) (H2) and influence (CFOPOWER) (H4) involves considering both main 
and interaction effects. Accordingly, I will investigate whether or not the product of the odds 
ratios for CFOEXP (CFOPOWER) and CFOEXP X ORGCHANGE (CFOPOWER X 
                                                   
35
 While I present results of logistic regressions both as logits (log odds) and as odds ratios (exponentiated logits), 
interpretation of results is more straight-forward when results are expressed as odds ratios because “a remarkable 
property of logistic regression [is] that the odds ratio of an effect is constant regardless of the values of the 
covariates” (STATA technical bulletin, January 2000, p. 21). This constancy does not hold for logistic results 
expressed as logits where interpretation of results depends on values of the other variables (Ai and Norton 2003). 
When results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly positive if the confidence interval for that 
variable is greater than 1. Similarly, when results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly negative 
if the confidence interval is less than 1. Results for hypotheses tests are insignificant if the confidence interval 
includes 1 when results are reported as odds ratios. Interactions expressed as odds ratios operate multiplicatively. 
Accordingly, the test of the overall significance of a variable with a significant interaction when results are 
expressed as odds ratios is whether or not the confidence interval of the product of the main and interaction effects 
contains 1.    
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ORGCHANGE) is less than one to test H2 (H4). If the β4 and β5 odds ratios are not significant, 
then finding that the confidence interval of the odds ratio of β2 (β3) is less than one in a Model 1 
without interaction terms supports H2 (H4).  
Internal control quality’s association with the audit committee’s financial expertise 
(ACEXP) is tested by H9. If the confidence interval of the odds ratio β6 is less than one, H9 is 
supported. I do not predict a significant association between auditor quality and internal control 
quality based on the theoretical model that I developed.  
Model 1 test variable measures 
I considered using six alternative CFOEXP measures to capture differing aspects of CFO 
financial expertise, i.e., a CFO’s audit experience at a Big 4/5/6/8 audit firm (depending upon the 
time period), (CFOBIG4), audit experience as a Partner at a Big 4/5/6/8 or national firm 
(CFO_BIG4PARTNER), professional designations (CFOCPA), graduate business education 
(CFOMBA), previous experience as a CFO at another company (CFOPREVIOUS), and tenure at 
the restating company (CFOTENURE). The first four of these measures, or combinations 
thereof, are frequently used in the literature to proxy for financial expertise and capture 
experience gained outside of the company. Aier et al. (2005) test years of work experience as 
CFO, work experience as a CFO at another company, whether or not the CFO has an MBA and 
whether or not the CFO has CPA accreditation. They find all but work experience as CFO at 
another company are associated with restatement likelihood. The CFOBIG4 and 
CFO_BIG4PARTNER measures capture whether or not the CFO has experience with different 
accounting systems, while CFOTENURE captures experience with the company’s systems.  
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While I report descriptive statistics for all six measures of CFO financial expertise in 
Table 15, for parsimony, I use only CFOBIG4 in tests of hypotheses. I selected CFOBIG4 as the 
measure of financial expertise for hypotheses testing because (1) there are too few companies 
with CFOs with experience as national audit Partners (CFO_BIG4PARTNER) to conduct tests; 
(2) three other measures of financial expertise (CFOCPA, CFOMBA, and CFOPREVIOUS) do 
not vary between subsamples used in tests (Table 16 p> 0.25); and (3) the length of time the 
CFO has been with a company (CFOTENURE) may capture not only financial expertise but also 
CFO influence (CFOPOWER) which may confound results of tests.  
The logarithm of the total compensation of the CFO scaled by the total compensation of 
the CFO is my CFOPOWER measure. I base this measure on Feng et al.’s (2011) computation of 
CEO payslice (i.e., CEO total compensation divided by compensation of top five executives’ 
compensation) and compute CFO and CEO total compensation following Hoitash et al. (2012). I 
use total compensation rather than equity compensation in the measure since post-SOX CFOs’ 
incentive compensation has been reduced (Indjejikian and Matejka 2009). Balsam et al. (2014) 
and Armstrong et al. (2010) discuss selection bias resulting from restricting a sample to firms 
covered in Execucomp. In this study over one third of the sample lacks Execucomp data. 
Furthermore, Execucomp changed the computation of equity incentives during the sample period 
(Kini and Williams 2012). Accordingly, I gather compensation data for all companies from 
proxy statements. When proxy statements do not report stock options and stock awards at grant 
date values, I value these equity grants using a Black-Scholes model and information from proxy 
statements and 10-Ks. 
Defond et al. (2005) discuss the controversy surrounding the qualification and experience 
requirements of audit committee financial experts. Defond et al. (2005) find that the market 
 82 
 
reacts positively (does not react) to the appointment of financial experts defined narrowly as 
those with prior accounting or audit related experience (defined broadly to include those with 
experience supervising the preparation of financial statements). Three measures of ACEXP 
consistent with a narrow definition of financial expertise are: (1) whether or not at least one 
member of the audit committee has audit experience at a Big 4 firm (ACBIG4); (2) whether or 
not at least one member of the audit committee has a CPA or CA qualification (ACCPA); and (3) 
the proportion of audit committee members with prior accounting or audit related experience 
measured following Hoitash et al. (2009) and Cohen et al. (2014) (ACAFE). A fourth measure, 
the proportion of audit committee members with MBAs (ACMBA) is more likely to capture the 
power or status of the audit committee, an idea that is investigated in recent studies (e.g. 
Badolato et al. forthcoming). Just as I report descriptive statistics for multiple measures of CFO 
financial expertise (Table 15) but select only one measure for hypotheses testing for parsimony, I 
report descriptive statistics for all four measures of audit committee financial expertise (Table 
15) but use only the ACBIG4 measure, the measure that is most likely to capture experience with 
financial statements of public companies, in hypotheses tests. 
3.4.2.2 Model 2: Unintentional error restatement association tests  
To test the hypotheses that investigate associations between restatements that correct 
unintentional error and CFO financial expertise (H3), CFO influence (H5), audit committee 
financial expertise (H10) and auditor quality (H12), I estimate the following logistic regression 
(Model 2) using the ERROR matched sample comprised of the 121 restatements that correct 
unintentional error and the matched control group of 121 firm-years without restatement: 
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  ERRORit           = β0 + β1 ORGCHANGEit  + β2CFOEXPit + β3CFOPOWERit                                          
                                            +  β4ACEXP it    +  β5AUDITORQUAL it  +  β6AUDITFEE it +  β7AUDITINF it 
                                            +  β8AUDITTENURE it +  β9AUDITORCHANGE it +  β10CFOCHANGE it 
                                            +  β11CFO_EQUITY_PAYit +  β12GOVERNANCE it +  β13IAFit 
                                            + β14FIRMSIZEit + β15AGEit + β16LOSSit + β17COMPLEXITYit 
  
                                                                
+ β18FOREIGNit + β19LEVERAGEit + β20MTBit + β21ISSUEit  
                                            + β22VOLATILITYit  + β23MISSTATEINCENTit  
                                            + ∑tYEARt +  ∑tINDUSTRYt + ε it                                                                          [2] 
 
Model 2 is Model 1 with a different dependent variable, ERROR, and the interactions 
between organizational change and the CFO’s financial expertise and influence omitted. ERROR 
is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the company restates to correct unintentional error and 
0 if the company is without restatement.   
I exercise caution before concluding that a confidence interval of the odds ratio of β2 (β3) 
for CFOEXP
 
(CFOPOWER)
 
that is less than one
 
supports H3 (H5), i.e., that increased CFO 
financial expertise (influence) is associated with a lower likelihood of restatement to correct 
unintentional error. If model fit is significantly improved by including the interaction of 
organization change and CFO financial expertise (influence) in Model 236, I will modify Model 2 
to include interactions between organizational change and CFO financial expertise (influence). 
Accordingly, if these interactions are included, I will investigate whether or not the confidence 
interval of the product of the odds ratios for CFOEXP (CFOPOWER) and CFOEXP X 
ORGCHANGE (CFOPOWER X ORGCHANGE) is less than one before concluding on H3 (H5).  
A confidence interval of the odds ratio β4 of ACEXP that is less than one supports H10 
and shows that increased audit committee financial expertise is associated with a lower 
                                                   
36
 To decide whether or not model fit is improved, I will check both that the area under the ROC curve is greater 
when the interactions are added to Model 2, relative to Model 2 without interactions, and that a likelihood ratio test 
comparing the expanded Model 2 with interactions to Model 2 without interactions is significant. 
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likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error. A confidence interval of the odds ratio β5 
of AUDITQUAL
 
that is less than one
 
supports H12 and shows that increased auditor quality is 
associated with a lower likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error. 
Model 2 test variable measures 
The same CFOEXP, CFOPOWER, and ACEXP measures used in tests of respectively, 
H2, H4, and H9, are also used to test, respectively, H3, H5, and H10. I use an office size 
(OFFICESIZE) measure of auditor size to proxy for auditor quality (AUDITORQUAL) in main 
hypotheses tests and a firm size measure (BIG4) only in additional analyses. I measure 
OFFICESIZE as the logarithm of total office-specific audit fees following Francis and Yu 2009 
and Francis and Michas 2013. BIG4 (used in additional analysis) captures whether or not the 
company engaged a Big 4/5/6/8 auditor, depending upon the time of the engagement (i.e., 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC today). 
3.4.2.3 Model 3: Comparison of restatement likelihood between restatement types 
Model 3 tests hypotheses H8 (whether or not increasing CFO influence reduces the 
likelihood of restating to correct unintentional error more than the likelihood of restating to 
correct intentional misstatement), H11 (whether or not increasing audit committee financial 
expertise reduces the likelihood of restating to correct intentional misstatement more than the 
likelihood of restating to correct unintentional error), and H13 (whether or not increasing auditor 
quality reduces the likelihood of restating to correct intentional misstatement more than the 
likelihood of restating to correct unintentional error). Model 3 is Model 2 with a different 
dependent variable, INTENT. INTENT is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the company 
restates to correct intentional misstatement and 0 if the company restates to correct unintentional 
 85 
 
error. The same CFOPOWER, ACEXP, and AUDITQUAL measures used in tests of, 
respectively, H5, H10, and H12, are also used to test, respectively, H8, H11, and H13. I estimate 
Model 3 using the INTENT sample comprised of the 104 intentional misstatement restatements 
and the 121 restatements that correct unintentional error.  
Implicit in the design of Model 3 tests is the assumption that increasing CFO influence, 
audit committee financial expertise, and auditor quality are associated with changes in the 
likelihood of restating to correct unintentional error and intentional misstatement in a 
directionally consistent way. For example, I assume that increasing audit committee financial 
expertise will not be associated with a significant decrease in the likelihood of unintentional error 
while also being associated with a significant increase in the likelihood of intentional 
misstatement. When significant associations between a test variable and the two types of 
restatements are directionally opposite, it is not readily apparent which of the two associations is 
driving any significant difference in Model 3. Therefore, before concluding on Model 3 tests I 
will regress INTENTvsNORESTATE, a variable equal to 1 if the company restates to correct 
intentional misstatement and 0 if the company is without restatement, on the right hand side 
variables in Model 2 and compare the results of this regression to Model 2 results to ensure that 
this assumption is not violated.     
A confidence interval for the odds ratio β4 of ACEXP that is less than one supports H11 
(i.e., restatements that correct intentional misstatement are more likely to be decreasing in audit 
committee financial expertise than restatements that correct unintentional error) provided that 
there is no reason to suspect that the directional consistency assumption is violated and that 
restatement likelihood is decreasing in audit committee financial expertise, for any significant 
restatement/audit committee financial expertise association(s).  
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Similarly, a confidence interval for the odds ratio β5 of OFFICESIZE that is less than one 
supports H13 (i.e., restatements that correct intentional misstatement are more likely to be 
decreasing in auditor quality than restatements that correct unintentional error) provided there is 
no reason to suspect that the directional consistency assumption is violated and restatement 
likelihood is decreasing in auditor quality, for any significant restatement/auditor quality 
association.    
Before I can conclude H8 is supported (i.e., restatements that correct unintentional error 
are more likely to be decreasing in CFO influence than restatements that correct intentional 
misstatements), results must show that the confidence interval of CFOPOWER (or of the product 
of CFOPOWER and CFOPOWER X ORGCHANGE if model fit is significantly better with 
interactions added) is greater than one provided that there is no reason to suspect that the 
directional consistency assumption is violated and that restatement likelihood is decreasing in 
CFO influence for any significant restatement/CFO influence association.  
3.4.2.4 Control variables 
Because my hypotheses investigate the association between internal control quality and 
restatements and organizational change, auditor quality, audit committee expertise, and CFO 
expertise and influence, I include variables to control for other auditor, management, 
governance, and firm characteristics that prior research shows are associated with internal 
control quality and restatements. I also include variables used in prior restatement research to 
control for restatement risk since Models 1 and 2 compare firm-years restated to correct 
unintentional error to a control group without restatement. 
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Specifically, since my measure of auditor quality is auditor size, I include variables to 
control for other auditor characteristics that, if omitted, might bias results. I expect auditor effort 
(AUDITFEE) to increase as control weaknesses and the likelihood of restatement increase. I 
measure AUDITFEE as the natural logarithm of audit fees (Cohen et al. 2014, Keune and 
Johnstone 2012, Lobo and Zhao 2013).37 AUDITINF captures the impact the loss of the company 
as an audit client would have on the audit office (Francis and Michas 2013, Francis and Yu 
2009). I do not predict the sign of the association with AUDITINF as auditors may either waive 
adjustments more willingly to retain an influential client or resist client demands to protect their 
reputation and ensure long-term viability. Krishnan (2005) finds control weaknesses are 
decreasing in auditor tenure. In contrast, Keune and Johnstone (2012) cite several studies 
showing that audit quality diminishes with the length of the client-auditor relationship. As there 
is potential for both loss of independence and greater knowledge of the client’s business with 
longer tenure (AUDITORTENURE), I control for auditor tenure but do not make a directional 
prediction (see Davis et al. 2009 and Knechel et al. 2013 for overviews of audit tenure literature). 
I also control for, but do not make a directional prediction on, AUDITORCHANGE. While there 
is a risk that in the first year of an audit engagement (AUDITORCHANGE), auditors may not 
have an adequate understanding of the client`s business, it is also possible that auditors expend 
extra effort in the initial months of the engagement to ensure any contentious issues are 
addressed promptly.  
                                                   
37
 I chose this simpler measure rather than using the residual of a fee model because the fee models are not ideal for 
this study setting. The Keune and Johnstone (2011) include internal control weaknesses, a dependent variable in this 
study, as one of the predictor variables in their fee model. The Lobo and Zhao (2013) fee model includes the 
predicted probability of misstatement, based on the misstatement detection model of Dechow et al. (2011) who 
created their model to predict AAERs. AAERs relate to intentional misstatement but not necessarily to unintentional 
error restatement risk. 
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I also control for CFO incentives to misreport (CFO_EQUITY_PAY) and a change in 
CFO (CFOCHANGE). I choose to use CFO equity compensation as a control variable rather than 
CEO equity compensation as Balsam et al. (2014) overview prior literature that finds that “equity 
incentives of CFO play a more significant role in determining internal control quality than those 
of the CEO”. Jiang et al. (2010, 515) find in the 1993-2006 period that “CFO equity incentives 
range from 28% (lower quartile) to 81% (the upper quartile) of CEO equity incentives”. I 
measure CFO_EQUITY_PAY as the logarithm of the proportion of equity pay in a CFO’s total 
compensation (CFO_EQUITY_PAY). The untransformed measure is commonly used by 
compensation consultants (Armstrong et al. 2010). I compute equity pay as the grant date value 
of restricted stock award grants and stock options (using a Black-Scholes model). I do not predict 
a direction for associations with CFO_EQUITY_PAY. Consistent with a pre-SOX literature 
finding strong association between misreporting and stock option compensation (e.g., Burns and 
Kedia 2006), Jiang et al. (2010, 514) find that “CFO incentives are still increasing in likelihood 
of beating analyst forecasts”, albeit “neither CEO nor CFO equity incentives are positively 
associated with the magnitude of accruals during the 2002-2006 post-SOX period”. However, in 
untabulated results, Balsam et al. (2014) find a negative association between reporting of 
material weaknesses and CFO equity-based compensation and Indjejikian and Matejka (2009) 
find that CFO incentive compensation is reduced post-SOX. CFOCHANGE is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the CFO is appointed in the restated year and 0 otherwise. CFOCHANGE 
controls for the CFO having had insufficient time to modify internal control after appointment 
and for any change in resourcing of accounting and control functions that accompanies CFO 
change. Since resources that accompany such a change may either increase or decrease, I make 
no directional prediction for CFOCHANGE. 
 89 
 
To control for differences in corporate governance I use CEOINDEP, an indicator 
variable for whether or not the CEO is also the board chair, a dual role that is associated with a 
greater likelihood of misstatement (Efendi et al. 2007). I also report descriptive statistics for 
GOV, a composite measure, of governance in Table 15. Prior research frequently uses such 
composite measures for governance (e.g., Carcello et al. 2006, DeFond et al. 2005) as an 
alternative to the simpler measure of CEO duality. Earlier composite measures included audit 
committee size and audit committee independence measures for which there is little variation 
post-SOX. Accordingly, I construct my GOV measure, drawing on Hoitash et al.’s (2012) and 
Lisic et al.’s (2014) composite measures, by summing five indicator variables that assign higher 
values to companies where (1) the CEO is not the board chair, (2) the CEO is not a founder of 
the company, (3) the number of directors is less than the sample median, (4) the percentage of 
directors who are independent is greater than the sample median, and (5) the percentage of 
independent board members with tenure longer than the CEO’s tenure is greater than the sample 
median. In choosing a single governance measure for parsimonious hypotheses testing, I selected 
CEOINDEP rather than GOV as Table 15 shows the later composite measure did not vary 
between subsamples (p>0.7). I expect that improving governance will improve internal control 
quality and decrease the likelihood of restatement. 
Other measures are included in tests to control for other differences in internal control 
quality and restatement likelihood. IAF indicates whether or not the company had an internal 
audit function in the year used in the sample. Whereas external auditors may take a “top-down” 
approach to assessing controls if a substantive audit approach is adopted, the mandate of most 
internal audit functions would require a more complete assessment of internal controls. 
Accordingly, I would expect companies that refer to an internal audit function in the audit 
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committee charter or proxy statements to have fewer control weaknesses and restatements to 
correct unintentional errors. I also include variables to control for firm size, age, financial 
challenges, and complexity as Doyle et al. (2007b) find these firm characteristics, in addition to 
organizational change, are related to internal control quality. Smaller (FIRMSIZE), younger 
(AGE) and less profitable (LOSS) companies may not adequately resource their accounting and 
control functions. I expect the likelihood of poor internal control quality and unintentional error 
will be greater for these companies and for more diverse companies with a greater number of 
geographic and operating segments (COMPLEXITY) that need to integrate accounting systems 
and records.  
I also include other controls documented in restatement research to control for differences 
in misstatement incentives; i.e., firm leverage (LEVERAGE), the market to book ratio (MTB), 
volatility of sales (VOLATILITY), an indicator variable of analyst following the company 
(ANALYSTFOLLOW), and whether or not the company is in a litigious industry (LITIGIOUS) 
(Bedard et al. 2014, Carcello et al. 2011b, Cohen et al. 2014, Ettredge et al. 2014, Francis et al. 
2013). I expect that the associations between these five control variables and restatements 
proxying for restatements that correct intentional misstatements will be greater than associations 
with restatements correcting unintentional error in Model 3 but do not make a directional 
prediction for associations in Models 1 and 2. Indicator variables for year and industry are also 
included in tests. 
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3.4.2.5 Additional analyses 
internal control mediation analyses 
The theoretical model depicts both direct and indirect associations between CFO and 
audit committee characteristics and restatements that correct unintentional error; i.e., internal 
control quality mediates associations between CFO and audit committee characteristics and 
restatement likelihood. Models 2 and 3 test whether or not the total effect – the direct plus any 
indirect effects – are significant. In additional analyses I use mediated logistic models with 
internal control as a mediating variable to determine the portion of the total significant CFO 
financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise and auditor quality main 
effects on restatement likelihood that is mediated by internal control quality. The mediated 
logistic analysis estimates three regressions to compute an indirect effect: (a) Model 1 without 
interaction terms, (b) Model 2 (3) which estimates the total effect on restatements that correct 
unintentional error (compares associations between restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement and restatements that correct unintentional error), and (c) Model 2 (3)38 with 
ICWEAK, the mediating variable, included. Mediated logistic analyses will only be conducted 
when the main effect of a test variable(s) (i.e., CFOEXP, CFOPOWER, ACEXP, and 
AUDITQUAL) is shown to be significantly associated with both internal control quality (Model 
1) and either the ERROR (Model 2) or INTENT (Model 3) restatement variable.   
                                                   
38
 The statistical software I am using for the mediated analysis will compute indirect effects, but does not provide 
standard errors or statistical tests for coefficients. As needed, I will bootstrap to compute the standard errors and 
confidence intervals. 
 92 
 
endogeneity 
Since only the earliest restated year of restating companies is included in the sample, I do 
not expect the CFO’s choice to accept an appointment, the audit committee members’ 
willingness to serve on the audit committee, or the auditor’s choice to accept the engagement to 
be related to restatement decisions. However, to address concerns that those responsible for 
financial reporting quality with greater expertise or influence select companies with lower 
financial reporting risk, I will conduct a Hausman test where the null hypothesis is the model as 
described and the alternative is the model that includes lagged values of CFOEXP, CFOPOWER, 
ACEXP and AUDITQUAL (computed using the previous year’s data) as instrumental variables. 
3.4.3 Results 
3.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 13 compares market capitalization, frequency of restated years, and frequency of 
industry for the 121 companies that restate to correct unintentional error in the ERROR and 
INTENT samples, the matching control group of 121 companies without restatement in the 
ERROR sample, and the 104 companies that restate to correct intentional misstatement in the 
ITNENT sample. Table 13 shows that these three groups of companies have similar distributions 
of market capitalization, fiscal years, and industries.  
Table 14 Panel A presents descriptive statistics for test and control variables, together 
with Wilcoxon rank-sum and Pearson Chi-square comparisons between groups with and without 
internal control weaknesses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate 
against outliers. Only the ICWeakAMENDED measure of internal control quality is used in Table 
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14 as only the ICWeakAMENDED measure of internal control quality can be used in Model 1 
tests. Model 1 cannot be estimated with ICWeakORIGINAL because auditors initially filed so 
few reports of ineffective control (i.e., 11 out of the 242 auditor’s SOX 404 reports for the 
ERROR sample) that many industries and years predict effective control perfectly. When these 
industries and years are dropped from the estimation of Model 1, there are too few observations 
to run the regression required for Model 1 tests. 
Consistent with prior internal control quality research, Panel A of Table 14 shows that for 
the ERROR sample (i.e., the sample used in tests of Models 1 and 2 that is comprised of 
companies that restate to correct unintentional error and companies without restatement), smaller 
(FIRMSIZE), less profitable (LOSS) companies and companies undergoing organizational change 
(ORGCHANGE) have less effective internal control (or disclose internal control weaknesses 
more frequently) on average. Of the CFO, audit committee, and auditor measures reported, only 
the CFO_EQUITY_PAY measure differs between companies with and without control 
weaknesses in the ERROR sample: on average, reporting of internal control weaknesses is 
associated with CFO compensation packages that include a lower proportion of stock award and 
stock option grants relative to total compensation.  
Panel B of Table 14 compares control effectiveness between companies in the 
INTENTvsNORESTATE sample. This sample is comprised of companies that proxy for 
companies that restate to correct intentional misstatement and the group of companies without 
restatement included in the ERROR sample. Like Panel A, and consistent with the similar group 
distribution of market capitalization, firm-years, and industries reported in Table 13, Panel B 
shows reporting of ineffective control is associated with smaller, less profitable companies and 
with CFO compensation packages with proportionately less stock awards and stock option 
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grants. However, Panel B also shows a pattern of differences between companies with effective 
vs. ineffective control that differs from the pattern shown in Panel A: Panel B (Panel A) shows 
(1) that organizational change is the same (differs) for companies with and without control 
weaknesses; (2) greater analyst following is associated with less (the same) reporting of control 
weaknesses on average; and (3) audit committees with member(s) with Big 4 audit experience 
are associated with less (the same) reporting of control weaknesses on average.  
Panel C of Table 14 compares test and control variables between groups in the ERROR 
sample. Companies in the group with restatements that correct unintentional error report control 
weaknesses more frequently on average (p<0.01) than companies in the control group without 
restatement. Consistent with Panel A’s comparisons that show internal control is less effective on 
average for smaller, less profitable companies experiencing greater organizational change, Panel 
C shows companies in the group that restate to correct unintentional error are less profitable 
(p<0.001) and are experiencing greater organizational change (p<0.05) relative to companies 
without restatement. Panel C shows all test variables except organizational change (i.e., CFO 
financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise, and auditor quality) are 
the same (p> 0.1) in the group that restates to correct unintentional error and in the control group 
without restatement.  
Panel D of Table 14 compares groups in the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample, the 
sample comprised of intentional misstatement correcting companies and the group without 
restatement. In addition to showing that companies that restate have less effective internal 
control (p<0.001), Panel D shows a pattern of differences between comparisons for the 
INTENTvsRESTATE sample (Panel D) and for the ERROR sample (Panel C) that is consistent 
with the differences summarized in discussion of Panel B comparisons. Specifically, Panel D 
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(Panel C) shows for the INTENTvsNORESTATE (ERROR) sample (1) that organizational 
change is the same (differs) for companies with and without restatement; (2) greater analyst 
following is associated with less (the same) likelihood of restatement on average; and (3) audit 
committees with member(s) with Big 4 audit experience are associated with less (the same) 
likelihood of restatement on average. Panel D shows test variables except audit committee 
financial expertise and CFO influence (i.e., organizational change, CFO financial expertise, and 
auditor quality) are the same (p> 0.2) in the group that restates to correct intentional 
misstatement and in the control group without restatement. 
Panel E of Table 14 compares the two groups of restating companies in the INTENT 
sample. While both groups of restating companies experienced a greater incidence of loss on 
average than the group without restatement (Panels C and D), Panel E shows that companies that 
restate to correct unintentional error are less profitable than companies that correct intentional 
misstatement. While this might suggest that companies restating to correct unintentional error are 
more resource constrained, ineffective internal control is reported more frequently by companies 
that restate to correct intentional misstatement than companies that restate to correct 
unintentional error. This difference may reflect reporting differences rather than actual 
differences in internal control quality as analyst following is greater (p=0.056) for companies 
that restate to correct unintentional errors and ineffective control is reported for only 32.7% 
(16.5%) of companies that restate to correct intentional misstatement (unintentional error). Panel 
E shows test variables except audit committee financial expertise and CFO financial expertise 
(i.e., organizational change, CFO influence, and auditor quality) are the same (p> 0.2) in the 
group that restates to correct intentional misstatement and in the control group without 
restatement. The average CFO and audit committee financial expertise is greater in companies 
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that restate to correct unintentional error than in companies that restate to correct intentional 
misstatement (p<0.1). 
Finding few significant differences for test variables in Panels A (i.e., the associations 
with Internal Control), Panel C (i.e., associations with restatement of unintentional error), and 
Panel E (differences in association strength between restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement and restatements that correct unintentional error) is less concerning than it might be 
in other studies. Table 14 does not model associations when there are significant interaction 
effects. Accordingly, Table 14 univariate comparisons may not be good indicators of results of 
five Model 1, two Model 2, and one Model 3 tests given that I predict CFO financial expertise 
and influence moderate the associations between organizational control and internal control 
quality and error-correcting restatements. Five hypotheses tests are not affected by these CFO 
characteristic interactions (i.e., the association between audit committee financial expertise and 
internal control quality (H9) and error-correcting restatements (H10); the association between 
auditor quality and error-correcting restatements (H12), and the stronger associations of audit 
committee financial expertise and auditor quality between restatements that correct intentional 
misstatements than error-correcting restatements (respectively, H11 and H13)). While univariate 
results do not support four of these five predictions, Panel E demonstrates that companies that 
restate to correct intentional misstatement have on average less audit committee financial 
expertise than companies that restate to correct unintentional error as predicted by H11.  
Table 15 also presents descriptive statistics and group comparisons. However, continuous 
variables in Table 15 are not winsorized. Table 15 includes other measures of CFO and audit 
committee financial expertise and a composite governance measure that are not used in 
hypotheses tests or reported in Table 14. Auditor quality, is the one test variable that is 
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continuous and for which interactions with organizational change are not predicted. Univariate 
results reported in Table 15 for auditor quality are insignificant as are univariate results reported 
in Table 14 for the association between auditor quality and error-correcting restatements (H12) 
and the stronger associations of auditor quality between restatements that correct intentional 
misstatements than error-correcting restatements (H13).     
Table 16 Panel A reports the Pearson correlations between test and control variables for 
the ERROR sample, the sample used to test Models 1 and 2. Correlations between test variables 
(i.e., ORGCHANGE, CFOBIG4, CFOPOWER, ACBIG4, and OFFICESIZE) are low (|r|< 0.2). 
With two exceptions, significant correlations (p<0.05) between test and control variables 
included in Models 1 and 2 are also low (|r|<0.3). The two exceptions are the negative 
correlation between auditor quality (OFFICESIZE) and audit client influence (AUDITINF: r= -
0.708 p<0.001) and the positive correlation between auditor quality and audit fees (AUDITFEE: 
r=0.453 p<0.001). The absolute values of significant correlations between pairs of control 
variables are less than 0.6. The average variance inflation factors (VIFs) are less than two, and 
all individual VIFs (including VIFs of the interactions with organizational change) are less than 
five for the ERROR sample (not in tables) indicating that multi-collinearity is not an issue.  
Table 16 Panel B reports the Pearson correlations between test and control variables for 
the INTENT sample, the sample used to test Models 3. With one exception, the absolute value of 
the correlation is less than 0.61 for all significantly correlated variables (p<0.05) that are used 
together in any of the models. The exception is the correlation between auditor quality 
(OFFICESIZE) and the influence of the audit client (AUDITINF) (r=-0.720 p<0.001). Audit 
committee financial expertise (ACBIG4) is not correlated with any test or control variables and 
CFO financial expertise (CFOBIG4) is correlated with only one control variable (AUDITFEE) 
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(r= 0.144, p<0.05). In contrast, CFO influence within the organization (CFOPOWER) is 
correlated with eight control variables (|r|<0.4), and two test variables, i.e., organizational change 
(ORGCHANGE) (r=0.173; p<0.05) and auditor quality (OFFICESIZE) (r=-0.166; p<0.05)39. 
Organizational change (ORGCHANGE) is correlated not only with CFO influence 
(CFOPOWER), but also with several control variables (|r|<0.3). While audit quality 
(OFFICESIZE) is correlated AUDITINF (r=-0.720 p<0.001), AUDITFEE (r=0.453 p<0.001) and 
eight other control variables (|r|<0.4), it is correlated (r=-0.173 p<0.05) with only one other test 
variable, CFO influence (CFOPOWER). The average variance inflation factors (VIFs) are less 
than two, and all individual VIFs (including VIFs of the interactions with organizational change) 
are less than five, for the INTENT sample used in Model 3 tests (not in tables).     
In summary, with the exception of the correlation between auditor quality (OFFICESIZE) 
and the control variable AUDITINF (r=-0.720 p<0.001), correlations are unlikely to confound 
results. Given the significant correlation with the test variable OFFICESIZE, AUDITINF will not 
be included in main tests.  
3.4.3.2 Results presentation: logit vs. odds ratio metrics 
Panel A of Table 17 presents logit metric test results for all three models. Panel A reports 
estimation results when control variables that are not significant and do not improve overall 
model fit are not included in model tests40. Panel F presents logit metric test results for all three 
models with all control variables included (i.e., the regressions in which the Panel A models are 
“nested”). I conducted likelihood ratio tests that show including all control variables listed in 
                                                   
39
 While CFOPOWER is correlated (r=-0.176 p<0.05) with engaging and auditor from a Big 4 audit firm (BIG4), 
BIG4 is used in additional analysis rather than in the main hypotheses tests.  
40
 I retained all determinants that Doyle et al. (2007b) find associated with internal control quality, i.e., 
organizational change (ORGCHANGE), firm size (FIRMSIZE), profitability (LOSS), age (AGE), and complexity 
(COMPLEXITY).  
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Table 12 in Panel F regressions does not significantly improve the model fit over the model fit of 
the “nested” models reported in Panel A (p>0.2) (not in tables). Since, in contrast to effects 
measured with logits, odds ratio effects are constant regardless of the values of covariates, 
interpretation of results is more straight-forward when results are expressed as odds ratios. 
Accordingly, Panels B through E of Table 17 present odds ratio metric results, together with 
90% confidence intervals (which are equivalent to one-sided 95% confidence intervals), and 
directional predictions that are not reported in Panels A and F. Panel B presents the odds ratio 
metric results for Model 1 using the ERROR sample. Panel C presents the odds ratio metric 
results for Model 2 using the ERROR sample. Panel D presents the odds ratio metric that tests 
Model 2 using the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample to aid in interpretation of any significant 
results of Model 3. Panel E presents the odds ratio metric results for Model 3 using the INTENT 
sample. 
3.4.3.3 Model 1 test results: ERROR sample 
Panel B of Table 17 presents results of tests of the six hypotheses that predict 
associations between internal control quality and CFO financial expertise, CFO influence, and 
audit committee financial expertise. Results are reported for Model 1b, the model that uses 
ICWeakAMENDED as the binary dependent variable. There are insufficient observations in years 
and industries that do not perfectly predict effective control to estimate Model 1a – the version of 
Model 1 that proxies internal control quality with auditor’s SOX 404 opinions as originally filed 
(ICWeakORIGINAL). Reported results for the estimation of Model 1b exclude observations in 
industries that perfectly predict effective internal control (i.e., the Food and Tobacco; the 
Lumber, Furniture, and Parking; Chemicals; and Services industries). It is noteworthy that even 
after amendments auditors report ineffective control in SOX 404 reports for only one company 
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of the 121 without restatement and 20 companies of the 121 (16.5%) that restate to correct 
unintentional error in the ERROR sample used to test Models 1 and 2.  
The results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-square test (p=0.94) and area under the ROC 
curve (0.8929) suggest good overall model fit. A likelihood ratio test comparing Model 1 
estimated with all control variables listed in Table 12 (Panel F) to the nested model reported in 
Panels A and B is not significant (Chi2 = 2.45, p=0.9309 not in tables).   
Panel B shows the interactions between organizational change and CFO financial 
expertise and influence are not significant: the p-value of the interaction 
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE (CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE) is equal to 0.318 (0.644) and the 90% 
confidence intervals cross one (respectively, CI: 0.05 – 2.12 and CI: 0.14 – 2.99). Therefore, H6 
and H7 are not supported. Accordingly, I test H1, H2 and H4 by estimating Model 1 without the 
interactions of CFO financial expertise and influence and organizational change (not in the 
tables). I find using a model without the interaction that organizational change (ORGCHANGE) 
is significant and that the odds of internal control weaknesses are at least 11% greater when 
companies are undergoing organizational change (CI: 1.11 – 12.15, p<0.05 one-sided not in 
tables). Thus, H1 is supported. I also find using a model without interactions that increasing CFO 
influence (CFOPOWER) is associated with an increase in the odds of internal control weakness 
(CI: 1.15 – 5.64, p<0.05 one-sided, not in tables) which is opposite to the H4 prediction. Hence, 
H4 is not supported. Further, when using a model without interactions I find that the odds of 
internal control weakness are the same for CFOs with greater and lesser financial expertise 
(CFOBIG4) (CI: 0.42 – 3.177, p>0.8, not in tables). Consequently, H2 is not supported. These 
results for H1, H2 and H4 using the model without interactions are consistent with results (p< 
0.1 one-sided) reported in Panel B for respectively for ORGCHANGE (p<0.1 one-sided), 
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CFOBIG4 (p>0.5), and CFOPOWER (p<0.05 one-sided, CI: 1.01 – 8.98) when the insignificant 
interactions are included in Model 1 tests. 
The final Model 1 test investigates the association between internal control quality and 
audit committee expertise (H9). The result using a model without interactions is the same as the 
result reported in Panel B: while the odds ratio for ACBIG4 shows the odds of internal control 
weaknesses for companies with audit committees with greater financial expertise is half that of 
companies with audit committee with lesser financial expertise, this difference in odds is not 
significant (CI: 0.21-1.47). Accordingly, this result, while directionally consistent with H9, does 
not support H9. Significant associations between control variables and internal control quality 
(i.e., associations with AUDITFEE and FIRMSIZE) are directionally as predicted.    
In summary, of the six hypotheses of associations with internal control quality, only H1, 
the negative association between internal control quality and organizational change is supported. 
Results are directionally consistent but not significant for three of the other five hypotheses – the 
moderating effect of CFO financial expertise and influence on the association between 
organizational change and internal control quality (H6 and H7) and the positive association 
between audit committee financial expertise and internal control quality (H9). The predicted 
positive relationship between internal control quality and increasing CFO financial expertise 
(H2) and increasing CFO influence (H4) is not supported. In short, Model 1 tests show firm 
factors - organizational change and firm size (ORGCHANGE and FIRMSIZE) - rather than the 
influence of CFOs or the financial expertise of CFOs and audit committees are associated with 
internal control quality proxied by auditor’s SOX 404 opinions of control effectiveness.  
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3.4.3.4 Model 2 test results: ERROR sample 
Panel C of Table 17 and the second column of Panel A show results of tests for the four 
hypotheses that predict associations between restatements that correct unintentional error and 
CFO financial expertise (H3), CFO influence(H5), audit committee financial expertise (H10), 
and auditor quality (H12). Model 2 tests use the ERROR sample. The interactions of 
organizational change and both CFO financial expertise (CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE) and CFO 
influence (CFOPOWER*ORCHANGE) are included in the regressions shown in Panels A and C. 
These interactions are included because organizational change (ORGCHANGE) is significant 
(p<0.1 one-sided, not in tables) in a model estimated without these two interactions. 
Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test shows that the including these two interactions significantly 
improves (p<0.05) model fit in comparison with the model without these interactions. The results 
of the Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-square test (p=0.31) reported in Panel C and the area under the 
ROC curve shown in Figure 2 (0.7288) suggest the overall model fit is adequate. A likelihood 
ratio test that compares Model 2 estimated with all control variables listed in Table 2 and the two 
interactions with organizational change (Panel F) to the nested model reported in Panels A and C 
is not significant (Chi2 = 3.01 p=0.8840 not in tables).  
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FIGURE 2 
Area Under the ROCa Curve for the Logistic Regression Reported in Table 17 Panel Cb 
 
 
a. The area under the receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve above is a measure of 
the overall ability of the logistic regression reported in Table 17 Panel C to discriminate 
between firm-years that restate to correct unintentional error and “matched” firm-years 
(in the same year and two digit SIC code nearest in asset value) without restatement. 
The curve is created by plotting the false positives / true positives (sensitivity) against 
100% - false negatives / true negatives (1 - specificity) at various classification cut-off 
thresholds. The curve depicts the trade-offs between false positive and false negative. 
 
b. The logistic regression reported in Table 17 Panel C tests associations between 
restatements that correct unintentional error and CFO financial expertise, CFO 
influence, audit committee financial expertise and auditor quality.  
Panel C reports the odds ratio that compares the odds of restating to correct unintentional 
error for companies with greater CFO financial expertise to the odds of error-correcting 
restatement for companies with lesser CFO financial expertise. The confidence interval results 
reported at the bottom of Panel C show that overall, the odds of restatement to correct 
unintentional error for companies with CFOs with greater financial expertise are less than half 
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the odds of restatement for companies with lesser financial expertise (CI: -2.49 – 0.47). Hence, 
H3 is supported. However, the confidence interval is greater than one for CFOBIG4 (CI: 1.01 – 
3.39) and less than one for CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE (CI: 0.06 – 0.60), the variables that were 
combined to compute the overall CFO financial expertise effect reported at the bottom of Panel 
C. These divergent results shows that the effect of CFO financial expertise depends on 
organizational change and that companies undergoing organizational change are driving the 
results for H3.  
Panel C also reports the odds ratio that compares the odds of restating to correct 
unintentional error for companies with more influential CFOs to the odds for companies with 
lesser influential CFOs. The results reported at the bottom of Panel C show that overall, the odds 
of restatement to correct unintentional error for companies with influential CFOs are less than 
one third the odds of restatement for companies with less influential CFOs (CI: -1.34 – 0.34). 
This result shows that H5 also is supported. However, the confidence interval is greater than one 
for CFOPOWER (CI: 1.10 – 3.00) and very near less than one for CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE 
(CI: 0.18 – 1.08), the variables that were combined to compute the overall CFO influence effect 
reported at the bottom of Panel C. These divergent results shows that the effect of CFO influence 
depends on organizational change and that companies undergoing organizational change are 
driving the results for H5. My conclusion that the change in the odds of restatement to correct 
unintentional error in response to change in CFO influence (financial expertise) depends on 
organizational change is the reason the relationship between CFO influence (financial expertise) 
and the likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error is not observed in univariate 
analyses and when the multivariate model does not include the interaction of CFO influence 
(financial expertise) and organizational change (p > 0.1 not in tables).   
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 Panel C shows the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error are the same for 
audit committees with greater and lesser financial expertise (CI: 0.60 - 1.68) and for greater and 
lesser auditor quality (CI: 0.88 - 1.24). Accordingly, H10 and H12 are not supported. Panel C 
also shows that profitability (LOSS) is the only control variable significantly associated with the 
likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error (p<0.1). Less profitable (LOSS) 
companies are approximately one to five times more likely (CI: 1.72 – 5.76) to restate to correct 
unintentional errors than more profitable companies.  
In summary, increasing CFO financial expertise and influence reduces the likelihood of 
restatement to correct unintentional error (albeit these relationships depends upon whether or not 
companies are undergoing organizational change) while increasing audit committee financial 
expertise and auditor quality do not. Support for H3 (H5), the association between the likelihood 
of restatements to correct unintentional error and CFO financial expertise (influence), is only 
observable when the dependence of this relationship on organizational change is modeled: in 
companies undergoing organizational change, the odds of restatement are smaller for CFOs with 
greater financial expertise (influence) relative to other CFOs but the reverse is true in companies 
not undergoing organizational change. The odds of restatement to correct unintentional error are 
the same for audit committees with more or less financial expertise (H10) and for greater and 
lesser auditor quality (H12). 
Model 2 results: INTENTvsNORESTATE sample  
Column 3 of Panel A (Panel D) reports the logit metric (odds ratio metric) results for 
Model 2 estimated using the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample. The INTENTvsNORESTATE 
sample is comprised of the 104 companies that restate to correct intentional misstatement and the 
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121 companies without restatement. While no hypotheses are tested by the Model 2 regression 
estimated using the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample, results are presented to show that the 
consistency assumption described in the research design is not violated. This assumption, (i.e., 
that any significant associations between CFO financial expertise, CFO influence, audit 
committee financial expertise, and auditor quality and restatement are in the same direction for 
restatements that correct unintentional error and restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement) underlies interpretation of Model 3 results.  
Confidence intervals for products of CFOBIG4 and CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 
(CFOPOWER and CFOPWER*ORGCHANGE) are not reported as the interaction 
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE (CFOPOWER and CFOPWER*ORGCHANGE) is not significant 
(p>0.3) and a likelihood ratio test shows that including these interactions in the model does not 
improve model fit (p>0.6 not in tables). The interactions are retained so that the presentation of 
models is consistent across Panels A – F. None of the significant variables in Panel D are also 
significant in Panel C and vice versa. Therefore, the consistency assumption described in the 
research design section is not violated.  
It is noteworthy that the odds of restating to correct intentional misstatements is up to two 
times (the reciprocal of 0.31 – 1) more likely for audit committees with less financial expertise 
relative to audit committees with greater financial expertise (CI: 0.31 – 0.99). This is consistent 
with the univariate comparison in Table 14 Panel D that shows audit committees of companies 
that restate to correct intentional misstatements have less financial expertise than audit 
committees of companies without restatements (p<0.05). 
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In contrast to the significant association between audit committee financial expertise and 
restatements to correct unintentional error, the odds of restatement to correct intentional 
misstatements are the same for companies with differing levels of CFO financial expertise, CFO 
influence, and auditor quality. The odds of restatement change with changes in three of the 
control variables. The odds of restatement for auditors with the greatest tenure may as much as 
double the odds of restatements for recently engaged auditors (CI: 1.01 – 2.04). Conversely, 
restatements to correct intentional misstatement are less likely when stock awards and options 
granted in the year comprise a greater proportion of CFO total compensation (CI: 0.04 – 0.47) 
and for companies with greater analyst following (CI: 0.23 -0.92).  
3.4.3.5 Model 3 test results: INTENT sample    
Panel E of Table 17 and the fourth column of Panel A report results of tests for the three 
hypotheses that compare the relative strength of associations between restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement and restatements that correct unintentional error. These comparisons of 
associations test the relative effects of CFO influence (H8), audit committee financial expertise 
(H11), and auditor quality (H13) on the two types of restatements. Confidence intervals for 
products of CFOBIG4 and CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE (CFOPOWER and 
CFOPWER*ORGCHANGE) are not reported as the interaction CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 
(CFOPOWER and CFOPWER*ORGCHANGE) is not significant (p>0.3) and a likelihood ratio 
test shows that including these interactions in the model does not improve model fit (p>0.5). The 
interactions are retained so that the presentation of models is consistent across Panels A – F. The 
results of the Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-square test (p=0.92) and area under the ROC curve 
(0.7719) suggest the overall model fit is adequate. A likelihood ratio test that compares Model 2 
estimated with all control variables listed in Table 12 and the two interactions with 
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organizational change (Panel F) to the nested model reported in Panels A and E is not significant 
(Chi2 = 8.27 p=0.4078 not in tables).  
Panel E shows that the confidence interval for CFO influence (CFOPOWER) includes 1.0 
(CI: 0.49 – 1.39) which shows that the change in the odds of restatement in response to 
increasing CFO influence (CFOPOWER) does not differ for the two types of restatements. H8 is 
not supported. However, while not hypothesized, Panel E also shows that the confidence interval 
for CFO financial expertise (CFOBIG4) does not include 1.0 (CI: 0.20 – 0.80, p<0.05) which 
shows that the change in the odds of restatement in response to increasing CFO financial 
expertise (CFOBIG4) does differ for the two types of restatements. Results reported in Panel C 
(D) show that the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error (intentional misstatement) 
are less (not significant) for CFOs with greater financial expertise. However, Model 2 results 
also show that the effect of CFO financial expertise on restatement to correct unintentional error 
depends on organizational change and this dependence is not modeled in tests using Model 3. 
Accordingly, I conclude that the change in odds ratio in response to increasing CFO financial 
expertise differs between the two types of restatements and that this difference is driven by the 
relationship of CFO financial expertise to restatements that correct unintentional error but do not 
attribute any significance to the direction of this difference.       
The odds ratio of audit committee financial expertise (ACBIG4) reported in Panel E is 
less than 1.0 (CI: 0.24 – 0.79, p<0.05). This finding, coupled with both the significant negative 
association between audit committee financial expertise and restatement to correct intentional 
misstatement (Panel D) and the insignificant association between audit committee financial 
expertise and restatement to correct unintentional error (Panel C), supports H11 - restatements 
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that correct intentional misstatement are more likely than restatements that correct unintentional 
error to be decreasing in audit committee financial expertise.  
Finally, Model 3 tests whether or not increasing auditor quality is associated more with 
one type of restatement than the other. Consistent with increasing auditor quality (OFFICESIZE) 
not changing the likelihood of restatement to correct unintentional error (Panel C) or restatement 
to correct intentional misstatement (Panel D), an increase in auditor quality does not change the 
likelihood of one type of restatement more than the other (CI: 0.80 – 1.13, p>0.6). Model 3 tests 
find no evidence to support H13. Results of Model 3 tests also show differences in strength of 
association between likelihood of restatements to correct intentional misstatement vs. 
unintentional error for several of the control variables. First, (taking into account Model 2 tests 
that show the consistency assumption is not violated) Model 3 test results show that the positive 
(negative) association between auditor tenure (CFO equity compensation) and the likelihood of 
restatement is stronger for restatements correcting intentional misstatement than unintentional 
error-correcting misstatements. Model 3 tests (taking into account Model 2 tests that show the 
consistency assumption is not violated) also show that the positive association between losses 
and the likelihood of restatement is stronger for restatements correcting unintentional 
misstatement than restatements correcting intentional error which is consistent with less 
profitable companies investing less in internal control. 
In summary, Model 3 results (1) provide no support that any change in restatement 
likelihood in response to a change in auditor quality differs between the two types of 
restatements; (2) show that an increase in audit committee financial expertise is more likely to 
reduce restatements that correct intentional misstatement than unintentional error; and (3) show 
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that an increase in CFO financial expertise (influence) is (is not) differentially associated with 
changes in the likelihood of the two different types of restatements.  
3.4.3.6 Additional analyses 
Interpreting the moderating effect of CFO financial expertise on organizational change 
Table 17 Panel C shows the multiplicative effects of CFO financial expertise and 
organizational change is significant. However, the results reported in Table 17 Panel C do not 
show whether this significant interaction with organizational change is explained by a decrease 
in the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error for companies with CFOs with financial 
expertise (i.e., a shift of attention from strategic to financial reporting during times of change 
explanation), or rather, an increase in the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error for 
companies without CFOs with financial expertise (i.e., a competence explanation). To test which 
of the explanations is more plausible, I first computed the odds of restatement to correct 
unintentional error for the four combinations of CFO financial expertise and organizational 
change and then tested whether or not the marginal effect of organizational change (change in 
odds) is significant for companies with and without CFOs with financial expertise41. The odds 
(not in tables) of error-correcting restatement for companies with CFOs with financial expertise 
is 1.56 (1.68) for companies not experiencing (experiencing) organizational change and the 
marginal effect of organizational change is not significant (p>0.8 not in tables). The odds (not in 
tables) of error-correcting restatement for companies with CFOs without financial expertise is 
                                                   
41
 First, I reran Model 2 with a constant baseline variable equal to 1 added to the regression and the intercept 
suppressed to show the baseline odds and odds ratios following Newson (2003). Second, following Buis (2010), I 
used Stata’s margin command to display the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error for the four 
combinations of CFO financial expertise and organizational change. Finally, again followed Buis (2010), I used 
Stata’s lincom command to compute the marginal effect of organizational change - the change from the baseline 
odds – for CFOs with and without financial expertise.    
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1.01 (3.41) for companies not experiencing (experiencing) organizational change and the 
marginal effect of organizational change is marginally significant (p=0.13 not in tables). Based 
on this additional analysis, I conclude that CFOs with greater financial expertise are better able 
to modify internal controls in response to business changes and that their greater competence, 
relative to CFOs with lesser financial expertise, is reflected in a lower likelihood of restatement 
to correct unintentional errors in times of organizational change.      
Mediated logistic analysis 
Several factors encountered during the main hypotheses tests necessitated changes to the 
planned mediated logistic analyses to determine the portion of the total association between 
restatements and CFO financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise, 
and auditor quality that is mediated by internal control. First, mediated logistic analyses cannot 
be conducted to study any indirect effects in Model 2. Only one of the companies without 
restatement has auditor SOX 404 reported control weaknesses, the proxy for internal control 
quality. As a result, the reporting of internal control quality for the ERROR sample is too 
unbalanced and mediated logistic analyses related to Model 2 tests cannot be undertaken. 
Second, auditor quality is not significantly associated with internal control quality, restatements 
that correct unintentional error or restatements that correct intentional misstatement: any reported 
measure of indirect and direct effects of auditor quality would be without meaning. Third, CFO 
financial expertise and influence associations with restatements depend on organizational change 
and the program I used to compute the mediated effects cannot deal with such dependencies. 
Accordingly, mediated logistic analysis is limited to the study of the mediation of audit 
committee financial expertise in Model 3.  
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Table 18 Panel A presents Model 2 and 3 results when internal control quality is included 
in the regression. ICWeakAMENDED is significant (p<0.01) in all models presented in Panel A. 
However, CFO financial expertise and influence are still significant in Model 2 and audit 
committee financial expertise is still significant in Model 3. Hence, the proxy for restatements 
that correct unintentional error captures variance not captured by the commonly used proxy for 
internal control quality.  
Table 18 Panel B presents the mediated logistic model that computes the proportion of 
the audit committee financial expertise mediated by internal control quality. As shown at the 
bottom of Panel B, 14.8% of the effect of audit committee financial expertise in Model 3 is 
mediated by internal control. So the majority of the effect of increasing audit committee financial 
expertise on reducing the likelihood of restatement to correct intentional misstatement would not 
be through the audit committee’s oversight of internal control but rather through their direct 
interactions with management and auditors at audit committee meetings.  
Sensitivity of results to CFO changes 
Tests were re-estimated excluding the 38 companies with CFO changes. The main 
findings are the same when these 38 companies are excluded. 
Endogeneity 
The Hausman tests for endogeneity in Models 1, 2 and 3 using the lagged values of CFO 
financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise and auditor quality as 
instrumental variables could not be performed with the sample data. Weesie (1999) suggests 
using the STATA suest command to conduct generalized Hausman tests with seemingly 
 113 
 
unrelated estimations. Seemingly unrelated estimation could (could not) be performed using the 
lagged values of CFO financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise 
and auditor quality instrumental variables for Model 2 (Models 1 and 3). Post estimation tests for 
Model 2 show coefficients of CFO financial expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial 
expertise, and auditor quality did not differ between the regressions in the seemingly unrelated 
estimations (p>0.1). Correlations between the test variables and their lagged values used as 
instrumental variables are greater than 0.4 (p<0.0001) (i.e., for CFO financial expertise 0.87; 
audit committee financial expertise 0.87; and auditor quality 0.44). 
Badolato et al. (2014) argue that whether or not a firm's headquarters is located within 
one of the largest ten metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) may be used to instrument for 
financial expertise. Following their logic, I also argue that CFOs and audit committee members 
with greater financial expertise and influence, and auditors of higher quality, have more choice 
of companies with which to associate in MSAs with larger populations. I conduct generalized 
Hausman tests using the population of MSAs of the audit engagement office to instrument for 
test variables instead of lagged values in seemingly unrelated estimations42. In post-estimation 
results of seemingly unrelated estimations of all three models using MSA population as an 
instrumental variable, I find the coefficients of proxies for auditor quality, CFO financial 
expertise, CFO influence, audit committee financial expertise are the same (p<0.11) in the 
simultaneously estimated regressions. Results of these seemingly unrelated estimations do not 
evidence endogeneity.  
                                                   
42
 Additional analyses, not in the tables, shows that MSA population is more likely to be a better instrument for 
auditor quality than financial expertise in Chapter 3 tests. Audit engagement office size (OFFICESIZE), the proxy 
for auditor quality in Chapter 3 tests, is positively related to MSA population for the ERROR sample (r=0.11 p=0.1), 
the INTENT sample (r=0.27 p=0.0001), and the INTENTvsNORESTATE sample (r=0.13 p=0.04). In contrast, the 
correlations between CFO and audit committee financial expertise and MSA population are much weaker (r< 0.06 
and p>0.3). MSA population is not significantly correlated (p<0.6) with any of the dependent variables used in 
Chapter 3 tests (i.e., ICWeakAMENDED, ERROR, INTENT, and INTENTvsNORESTATE). 
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Alternative measure of auditor quality        
Given the lack of associations between auditor quality and internal control quality and 
restatements, I reran all model tests substituting the firm measure (BIG4) for the engagement 
office size measure of auditor quality. Results for BIG4 were insignificant (p>0.3 not in tables) 
in all models. I also reran Models 2 and 3 for only those companies with Big 4 auditors. Once 
again, the auditor quality measure (OFFICESIZE) is not significant (p>0.7 not in tables). I was 
unable to estimate Model 1 for only companies with Big 4 auditors as there were too few 
industries and years that did not perfectly predict effective internal control to complete the 
estimation. I conclude the lack of significance of auditor quality in tests is not due to the choice 
of OFFICESIZE rather than BIG4 as a measure of auditor quality. 
3.4.4 Summary 
3.4.4.1 Findings 
The pattern of association between those responsible for financial reporting quality and 
restatements differs for restatements that correct unintentional error and restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement. CFO expertise and influence, rather than audit committee expertise or 
auditor quality, are related to restatements that correct unintentional error. The odds of such 
restatements are more than one half (one third) less for companies with CFOs with greater 
financial expertise (influence). However, this difference in the odds of restatement is only 
observable when the model used to test associations with restatements that correct unintentional 
errors includes the interactions of major organizational change (e.g., restructuring or merger and 
acquisition activity) with CFO financial expertise and CFO influence. In the absence of major 
organizational change the likelihood of restatements that correct unintentional error is increasing 
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in CFO financial expertise and influence. This relationship is consistent with CFOs with greater 
expertise and influence having greater strategic management responsibilities and concentrating 
their efforts on those responsibilities rather than financial reporting. However, in the presence of 
organizational change, the odds of restatement to correct unintentional error increases (does not 
increase) for companies without CFOs with financial expertise. This finding suggests that CFOs 
with greater financial expertise and influence are better able than CFOs with lesser financial 
expertise and influence to change financial reporting systems as required in response to change.  
While both CFO financial expertise and influence are associated with restatement to 
correct unintentional error, it is CFO financial expertise and not CFO influence that is associated 
with restatements that correct unintentional error more strongly than with restatements that 
correct intentional misstatement. This is consistent with CFOs with greater power not only being 
better able to influence the personnel, system and business process changes so as to prevent 
unintentional financial reporting error, but also being better able to stand up to CEOs and resist 
intentional misstatement. 
In contrast, I find that restatements that correct intentional misstatement are decreasing in 
audit committee financial expertise. This finding is consistent with Keune and Johnstone’s 
(2012, 1641) finding that “that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to 
allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less 
expertise”. While Keune and Johnstone (2012) investigate negotiations to resolve already 
detected misstatements, my study is not so restricted. I find no support for my prediction that 
greater audit committee financial expertise is associated with a reduction in restatements to 
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correct unintentional error43. I conclude from my findings that while audit committees with 
greater financial expertise may ask more probing questions and play a bigger role in negotiations 
between management and external auditors, that greater financial expertise is not necessarily 
related to securing greater resourcing for financial reporting systems and personnel.  
The relationships between restatements that correct unintentional error and CFO financial 
expertise, CFO influence, and organizational change observed with Model 2 tests are not 
mimicked by associations between internal control quality and CFO characteristics and 
organizational change in Model 1 tests. This would be surprising had Rice and Weber (2012, 
811) not found that “only a minority of … firms acknowledge their existing control weaknesses 
during their misstatement periods, and that this proportion has declined over time”. Hence, I do 
not conclude that CFO characteristics are not associated with internal control quality but rather 
that Model 1 results are affected by internal control quality measurement error. In this study, 
auditors report ineffective control in SOX 404 reports as originally filed or amended for only 20 
companies of the 121 (16.5%) that restate to correct unintentional error.   
Finally, in tests of a theoretical model that includes CFO financial expertise and influence 
and audit committee financial expertise, I find no evidence that auditor quality, measured by both 
firm and engagement office size, is associated with either restatement to correct unintentional 
error or restatement to correct intentional misstatement. This finding adds to the mixed results of 
the small number of recent restatement studies that include auditor quality as either a test or 
control variable (Cohen et al. 2014, Ettredge et al. 2014, Francis and Michas 2013, Francis et al. 
                                                   
43
 In their study of the interaction of audit committee financial expertise and status, Badolato et al. (2014, 12) test the 
association of audit committee financial expertise and restatements coded by Audit Analytics as errors as a 
“Falsification test” to “rule out the potential for false positives”. While they do not find an association between 
restatement to correct error and audit committee financial expertise and, it is not clear if their sample includes 
quarterly restatements, Badolato et al. (2014) also find no association between audit committee financial expertise 
and irregularities unless the audit committee also has high status relative to management. 
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2013, Newton et al. 2013). Most of these studies find restatements decreasing in auditor quality, 
at least for the more severe restatements. However, consistent with the results of this study, 
Cohen et al. (2014) (the only one of these studies that includes audit committee expertise in tests) 
predict, but do not find, a negative association between auditor quality (included as a control 
variable and proxied by auditor size) and restatement.    
3.4.4.2 Limitations and opportunities for future research 
This study of determinants of unintentional error in audited financial statements of public 
companies has several limitations. First, interpreting the moderating effects of CFO financial 
expertise and CFO influence on the association between organizational change and restatements 
that correct unintentional error is challenging when using logistic and mediated logistic models. 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) may lead to additional insights in future research. Secondly, 
either the measure of auditor quality or the correlation between the various audit control 
variables may explain the failure to find evidence to support the hypotheses of association 
between auditor quality and restatements. In future studies, results of PCAOB inspections and 
audit firms’ internal engagement quality reviews (Bell et al. 2013, Epps and Messier 2007), and 
self-regulated peer reviews (Casterella et al. 2009), where data is available, may better proxy for 
auditor quality. Using an audit fee model to predict abnormal audit fees may permit a more 
nuanced exploration of auditor measure associations. Finally, this is a small sample study. The 
decision to include in the sample only companies with auditor’s SOX 404 reports for the first 
year of their restated period and no prior restatements, limited the sample size. Less the one fifth 
of the companies that restate to correct unintentional error report ineffective control in auditor’s 
SOX 404 reports (as amended). Given I did not find the predicted associations between the 
characteristics of those responsible for financial reporting quality and the proxy for internal 
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control quality (i.e., auditors’ SOX 404 reports), there is an opportunity to expand the sample in 
the future by including non-accelerated filers not required to obtain an auditor’s opinion on the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. The sample could also be expanded by 
including quarterly restatements, albeit auditors’ responsibilities with respect to annual and 
quarterly financial statements differ. Similarly, there is an opportunity to expand the sample of 
restatements that correct intentional misstatements in future years as the number of AAERs 
increase and by including restatements related to SEC, Department of Justice, or other 
investigations. Expanded samples would increase the power of tests that compare the 
associations between restatements that correct intentional misstatements and restatements that 
correct unintentional error. 
3.4.4.3 Contributions 
In spite of these limitations, this study’s development and testing of a theoretical model 
of the determinants of unintentional error in audited financial statements of public companies 
makes several contributions. The model that is developed in this chapter is more complete than 
models used to date. In particular, it includes the interaction of CFO characteristics and 
organizational change. When these interactions are not included, the effects of CFO 
characteristics may not be observed in archival research in tests. This study’s investigation of 
these interactions has shown that the association between unintentional error and CFO financial 
expertise and influence depends on whether or not companies are undergoing major 
organizational change. This study has also shown that restatements that correct unintentional 
error and internal control measures based on auditor’s SOX 404 reports are not substitute 
proxies. Finally, this study has shown that the determinants of unintentional error differ from 
determinants of intentional misstatement. In particular, whereas an increase in CFO financial 
 119 
 
expertise is more likely to be associated with restatements that correct unintentional error, an 
increase in audit committee financial expertise is more likely to reduce restatements that correct 
intentional misstatement. 
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Chapter 4 - Summary and Conclusion 
In this dissertation I develop a theoretical model of the determinants of unintentional 
error in audited financial statements of public companies. The theoretical model developed 
includes characteristics of organizations and their management, audit committees, and auditors 
with the goal of shedding more light on the roles played by those responsible for preventing and 
detecting unintentional error in audited financial statements. This model is more complete in 
several respects than the models used in most audit research. The first difference is that, the 
model includes characteristics of all three parties responsible for financial reporting quality, 
whereas, with few exceptions, prior research includes characteristics of at most two of these 
parties. The model developed also includes an interaction to model the potential for CFOs and 
audit committees to mitigate disruptive organizational change effects. While organizational 
change will disrupt control systems, change will lead to misreporting only if management and 
the audit committee do not anticipate the impact of change and modify controls and processes 
appropriately. Finally, I model not only the direct associations between restatement and 
determinants tested in other restatement research, but also the indirect, mediating effects of 
CFOs and audit committees on restatements through internal control quality.    
To test the theoretical model, I developed and validated a language-based proxy for 
identifying restatements that correct unintentional error using text search. Chapter 2 discusses 
several advantages this new method of proxy construction has over other proxies currently used 
in restatement research. First, this new method of proxy construction is direct. Some other 
methods indirectly classify as error-correcting, restatements that do not correct intentional 
misstatement (e.g., Hennes et al. 2008) or that do not exhibit attributes frequently associated with 
intentional misstatement (e.g., more severe market reaction or revenue recognition correction). In 
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contrast, this new method classifies restatements as error-correcting directly if the restatement 
announcement contains any of the words or phrases that are listed in Appendix A which assert or 
imply a lack of intent. Second, while other proxy construction methods rely on manual coding of 
restatement announcements (e.g., Plumlee and Yohn 2010), this new proxy is automated and 
hence, replicable, scalable, and transparent. Using the list of error indicator words and phrases 
listed in Appendix A, together with AuditAnalytics text search tool, automated test searches of 
restatement announcements may be conducted swiftly, even when the number of restatement 
announcements is large. Automating identification of restatements that correct unintentional 
error reduces data collection costs that may have discouraged researchers in the past from 
undertaking studies of determinants and consequences of unintentional errors. Third, the 
language-based approach developed in Chapter 2 is not confounded as market reaction proxies 
are when restatement announcements are made in 10-Ks and other regular SEC filings instead of 
in 8-Ks and press releases. Finally, with automated text searches I classify less than one third of 
post-2002 annual restatements as restatements that correct unintentional error, whereas Hennes et 
al. (2008) classify three quarters of restatements in their sample as errors and Plumlee and Yohn 
(2010) classify over half the restatements in their sample as internal error. If this smaller 
proportion reflects a better identification of restatements of unintentional error, the proxy may 
improve the power of tests in studies of the determinants and consequences of unintentional 
error.  
Chapter 2 also itemizes some limitations of this newly developed language-based proxy 
for restatements that correct unintentional error. For example, the success of the language-based 
identification of restatements that correct unintentional error depends on the choice of word(s) 
listed in Appendix A that are used to identify unintentional error restatements. No doubt further 
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study of restatements announced after the list was created could identify additional error-
identifiers that should be included. Furthermore, more sophisticated search criteria using more 
sophisticated text analytics software may improve error restatement identification. However, 
requiring more complex search criteria and tools may also discourage some researchers from 
adopting this language-based proxy. I have conducted validation tests and find that, for years 
with auditor’s SOX 404 opinions, that relative to intentional misstatement firm-years, language-
identified-error-correcting restatements have less persistent income, less positive accruals, and 
less income smoothness. However, validation tests do not prove that this language-based proxy 
is a better proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error than other proxies. A useful 
extension of this research would be to determine whether or not this language-based proxy 
classifies restatements more accurately than prior proxies.       
In Chapter 3 I develop and test the theoretical model. Results of tests show that CFO 
financial expertise and influence moderate the disruptive effects of organizational change and 
decrease the likelihood of restatements to correct unintentional error. Restructuring activity 
accounted for coding organizational change as present for virtually all of the companies 
identified as undergoing organizational change. An extension of this research would be to 
investigate whether or not CFOs with greater financial expertise and influence are also better 
able to mitigate the disruptive effects of change relative to other CFOs for a sample of companies 
experiencing greater variation in change triggers that include not only restructuring but also 
merger and acquisition activity and rapid growth. While several restatement studies look at the 
management turnover consequences of restatements (e.g. Hennes et al. 2008), few studies 
examine management characteristics as determinants of restatements. This dissertation 
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contributes to the stream of literature that examines associations between managerial 
characteristics and restatements directly (e.g. Aier et al. 2005). 
I find no evidence that audit committee financial expertise is associated with 
unintentional error. This implies either that audit committees are unlikely to hear about 
unintentional errors not discovered by auditors or that greater audit committee financial expertise 
does not ensure greater resourcing of internal control systems. Badolato et al. (2014) find that 
both audit committee financial expertise and status (relative to management) are necessary for 
reduction of irregularities and that reduction of errors is not associated with audit committee 
financial expertise and status. While confirming Badolato et al.’s (2014) finding with respect to 
unintentional error, using a different sample I find that audit committee financial expertise is 
associated with restatements that correct intentional misstatement even when audit committee 
status is ignored.  
Surprisingly, I find no support for my predictions that increasing auditor quality, proxied 
by office size, reduces the likelihood of unintentional error restatement. I also find no evidence 
of association between auditor quality and reduction of intentional error misstatement, 
suggesting similar levels of effectiveness or ineffectiveness in reducing restatements by large and 
small audit offices. These findings add to the mixed results of a number of recent restatement 
studies that include auditor quality as either a test or control variable (Cohen et al. 2014, Ettredge 
et al. 2014, Francis and Michas 2013, Francis et al. 2013, Newton et al. 2013). While 
recognizing the limitations of the auditor size proxy for auditor quality, this finding suggests 
further research is necessary to determine whether or not the arguments put forward in Section 
3.3.4 (i.e., that smaller auditors may have more experience auditing the smaller, financially 
weaker companies and that smaller auditors may provide knowledge sharing benefits to 
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inexperienced staff accountants that are not as readily afforded by larger firms) also explain the 
lack of auditor quality results. 
In addition to differences in associations between test variables and the two types of 
restatements, I also observe differences in associations with control variables and the two types 
of restatements. For example, I find that losses (a proxy for resource constraints) are more 
strongly associated with the likelihood of restatements that correct unintentional error than 
restatements that correct intentional misstatement. Similarly, with this research design I find that 
auditor tenure (a proxy for auditor independence) is more strongly associated with the likelihood 
of restatements that correct intentional misstatement than with restatements that correct 
unintentional error. Overall, I conclude that the pattern of association between determinants and 
restatements to correct unintentional error differs from the pattern of association between 
determinants and intentional misstatement. 
In addition to the contributions described in the preceding paragraphs, this dissertation 
makes three other contributions to the literature. First, the new, language-based proxy 
construction method provides not only a way of identifying restatements that correct 
unintentional error but also an automated means of partitioning restatements other than 
partitioning on market reaction. In contrast to prior research (Palmrose et al. 2004, Hennes et al. 
2008), I did not find a market reaction difference between restatements correcting unintentional 
error and restatements that correct intentional misstatement. While partitioning based on market 
reaction may achieve separation based on restatement severity, such partitioning may not be as 
useful for identifying restatements that correct unintentional error.  
Secondly, the results of my theoretical model tests suggest that restatements that correct 
unintentional error may be useful as a proxy for internal control quality. Diminishing data 
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availability is making it increasingly difficult to study internal control determinants and 
consequences using SOX 404 opinions: most misstating firms do not report control weaknesses 
and the proportion reporting weaknesses is declining over time (Rice and Weber 2012). This 
dissertation provides some evidence, using a sample matched by industry and firm size, that 
factors such as organizational change, firm losses, and financial expertise that prior research 
finds associated with internal control weaknesses are also associated with restatements that 
correct unintentional error.  
Finally, in this dissertation I introduce a novel research design that used an unusual 
coding of the dependent variable in logistic regressions to study the relative associations of 
determinants between restatements of different types. By coding the dependent variable as 1(0) 
to indicate the presence of restatements that correct intentional misstatement (unintentional 
error), I was able to compare the difference in pattern of associations between CFO and audit 
committee financial expertise between restatement types. Most restatement research reaches 
conclusions based on comparisons of restatements to control groups without restatement. This is 
the first study of which I am aware that uses this research design to compare the relative 
strengths of associations between two types of restatements.  
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TABLE 1 Chapter 2 Sample Selection 
h, i, j
  
All 
Restatements
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE) b
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM) c
Both Unintentional 
Error and 
Intentional 
Misstatement
Unclassified
(UN) d
Number of restatements in the Audit Analytics  databasea 10,623 1,992 220 56 8,355
disclosed after 2002, the year of 
Sarbane-Oxley (SOX) enactment 
less: Restatements without minimum data in COMPUSTATe (4,388) (766) (37) (6) (3,579)
less: Quarerly restatements (1,649) (347) (22) (4) (1,276)
Annual restatementsf 4,586 879 161 46 3,500
less: multiple firm-years g (93) (25) (14) (2) (52)
less: holding companies (229) (38) (7) (2) (182)
less: companies with foreign business address (557) (104) (13) (3) (437)
Reclassification of restatements that correct both 
unintentional erorr and intentional misstatement 39 (39)
Sample restatements, all years 1987 - 2012 h 3,707 751 127 0 2,829
less: Restatements pre-2002 (pre-SOX) (789) (151) (56) 0 (582)
less: Restatements without Auditor's SOX 404 reports (2,070) (357) (54) 0 (1,659)
Sample restatements with Auditor's SOX 404 Report i , j 848 243 17 0 588
 
a. Excludes restatements resulting from a change in accounting principle or adoption of a new standard.
b. I identified restatements that correct uninentional error using automated search of restatement annoucements for word(s) suggesting
lack of intent (e.g. "inadvertent", "calculation error") in the AuditAnalytics database. See Appendix A.  
c. I identified intentional misstatement by reading all SEC Accounting and Auditing Releases (AAERs) releases after December 31, 2002
searching for AAERs that reference a company with a restatement (overlapping the restatement time period) that alleges financial   
statement fraud or intentional misstatement.
d. Restatements that do not correct intentional misstatements or unintentional error as defined in b and c above. 
e. Sample inclusion requires both unrestated and restated fourth quarter Total Asset data and four quarters of both unrestated  
and restated quarterly Net Income data in the COMPUSTAT Unrestated Quarterly ("As First Reported" ) -US database. 
f. Annual restatements have restated periods containing one or more fiscal year-ends (based on the year-end month in AuditAnalytics).  
Restated periods of quarterly restatements do not include a fiscal year-end. When  the restated period extends  
beyond a single fiscal year, the first fiscal year in the restated period determines the restatement year.  
g. When firm-years are restated by more than one restatement, the order of preference in retaining is first to retain restatements that correct  
 intentional misstatements, next to retain restatements that correct unintentional erorr, and lastly to retain unclassified restatements. 
h. The "UEvsIM" sample is comprised of  751 restatements that correct unintentional error and 127 restatements that correct intentional 
misstatement. 
i. The "UEvsUN" sample is comprised of restatements with auditor's SOX 404  reports corresponding to the first year of the restated period:   
i.e., the 243 restatements that correct unintentional error and the 588 unclassified restatements.
j. The "UEvsOther" sample is comprised of restatements with auditor's SOX 404 reports, i.e., the 243 restatements that correct unintentional 
error, the 588 unclassified restatements, and the 17 restatements that correct intentional misstatements.
Restatement to correct:
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TABLE 2 Chapter 2 Variable Definitions 
a
 
Variable Definition Abbreviation Calculation As defined by:
Restatement Types: 
Restatement to correct 
intentional misstatement
IM a restatement is coded as correcting an intentional 
misstatement if the restatement period overlaps the 
period of an AAER for the company that alleges 
fraud or senior management intent 
Restatement to correct 
unintentional error
UE a restatement is coded as correcting unintentional 
error if the restatement annoucment in 
AuditAnalytics contains word(s) suggesting lack of 
intent (e.g. "inadvertent", "calculation error" -  see 
additional examples in Appendix A). Restatements 
that meet the definition of both correcting 
unintentional error and intentional misstatement are 
coded as unintentional error.
Unclassified Restatement UN an indicator variable equal to 1 if the Restatement 
is not coded as a restatements that corrects an 
intentional misstatement or a restatement that 
corrects an unintentional error; 0 otherwise.
UEindicator UEindicator an indicator variable used in tests that compare 
restatements that correct unintentional errors to 
either  restatements that correct intentional 
misstatements or  unclassified restatements, or  
restatements that correct intentional misstatements 
plus unclassified restatements, depending upon the 
test. The variable is equal to 1 if the restatement 
corrects unintentional error and 0 otherwise. The 
restatement groups being compared as described in 
the Model headings (i.e., UE vs. IM or UE vs. UN 
or UE vs. Other)
Return on assets roa
roalag
Total of four quarters of income before 
extraordinary items (ibqr), scaled by average total 
assets ((atqr + lagged atqr)/2); roalag  is roa  of the 
previous year
Dechow et al. 2011
Meet or beat analysts 
forecasts by a small amount
MeetBeat an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings per share 
meet or beat analysts average forecast by less than 
one penny and 0 otherwise. Both the actual EPS and 
the analyst's forecast nearest (and no more than 2 
months before) the EPS announcement date (or 
median forecast if more than one forecast on the 
nearest day) are from the I/B/E/S unadjusted daily 
history. 
Reichelt and Wang 2011
Dependent Variables in Mulitvariate Validation Tests
source: Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database unless stated otherwise
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TABLE 2 continued 
Variable Definition Abbreviation Calculation As defined by:
Total Assets Total Assets atqr - fourth quarter 
Receivables Receivables rectqr - fourth quarter 
Inventories Inventories invtqr - fourth quarter 
Capital Assets Capital Assets ppentqr - fourth quarter 
Market capitalization Market Capitaliz Common shares o/s (cshoq) X annual fiscal 
price close  (prcc_f): source Compustat
Dechow et al. 2011
Sales Sales saleqr - total of four quarters 
Sales growth salesgrowth [Total of four quarters of sales (saleqr) - total of 
four quarters of sales in the previous year] / total of 
four quarters of sales in the previous year
Capital intensity capitalintensity [Total of four quarters of depreciation and 
amortization (dpqr) + total of four quarters of 
interest and related expeses (xintqr)] / total of four 
quarters of sales (saleqr)
adapted from Lev 1983
Operating Income Operating Income oibdpqr - total of four quarters
Operating Cash Flow Op. Cash Flow oancfqr - 4th quarter
Income Before 
Extraordinary Item
Income Before 
Extra
ibqr - total of four quarters
Net Income Net Income niqr - total of four quarters
Return on assets roa
roalag
Total of four quarters of income before 
extraordinary items (ibqr), scaled by average total 
assets ((atqr + lagged atqr)/2); roalag  is roa  of the 
previous year
Dechow et al. 2011
Smoothing Net Income 
using accruals
smooth_NI median ratio of standard deviation of Net Income 
(total of four quarters of niqr, scaled by lagged 
total assets) divided by the standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations (fourth quarter oancfqr, 
scaled by lagged total assets). Require complete 
data in current and immediately preceding four 
years.  
variation on Leuz et al. 
2003
Smoothing operating 
earnings using accruals
smooth_opinc median ratio of standard deviation of operating 
earnings (total of four quarters of oibdpqr, scaled 
by lagged total assets) divided by the standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations (fourth 
quarter oancfqr,
 
scaled by lagged total assets). 
Require complete data in current and immediately 
preceding four years.  
Leuz et al. 2003 p. 514
Firm Characteristics listed in Table 3
source: Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database unless stated otherwise
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TABLE 2 continued 
Variable Definition Abbreviation Calculation As defined by:
Accruals Accruals [Total of four quarters of Income before 
extraordinary items (ibqr) - operating cash flow 
(oancfqr) / average assets]
Dechow and Dichev 2002
Working capital accruals WC_acc [[∆ Current Assets (actqr) – ΔCash and Short-term 
Investments (cheqr)]– [ΔCurrent Liabilities (lctqr) 
– ΔDebt in Current Liabilities (dlcqr) – ΔTaxes 
Payable (txpqr)] ⁄ Average
total  assets
Dechow et al. 2011
Performance- matched 
discretionary accruals
pmatch The difference between the modified Jones 
discretionary accruals for firm i in year t and the 
modified Jones discretionary accruals for the 
matched firm in year t, following Kothari et al. 
2005; each firm-year observation is matched with 
another firm from the same two- digit SIC code and 
year with the closest return on assets. Where the 
modified Jones is cross-sectionally estimated each 
year using all firm-year observations in the same 
two-digit SIC code (requiring a minimum of 10 
observations):  Accruals = α  + β(1 ⁄ Beginning 
assets) +γ(∆Sales-∆Rec) ⁄ Beginning assets + 
ρPPE ⁄ Beginning assets + ε. The residuals are used 
as the modified Jones model discretionary accruals.
Kothari et al. 2005 
modification of Jones as 
reported by Dechow et al. 
2011
Studentized DD residuals sresid The following regression is estimated for each two-
digit SIC industry:  ∆WC = b0+ b1*CFOt-1+ 
b2*CFOt  + b3*CFOt+1+ ε, where ∆WC and CFOs 
are deflated by average total assets. Scales each 
residual in the regression "by its standard error 
from the industry-level regression. This measure 
leaves the sign of the residual intact and provides 
information on how many standard deviations the 
residual is above or below the regression line" 
(p.39). Note: Stata can obtain scaled residuals using 
the predict with rstudent option after regression.
modification of Dechow 
and Dichev 2002 by 
Dechow et al. 2011
Accrual Measures Table 8 & 9
source: Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database unless stated otherwise
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TABLE 2 continued 
Variable Definition Abbreviation Calculation As defined by:
company size size company size proxied by the natural logarithm of 
total assets - fourth quarter atqr
company size indicator sizeind company size proxied by an indicator variable 
equalt to 1 for firm-years with total assets greater 
than the sample median and 0 otherwise
leverage leverage fourth quarter long term debt [dlttqr] scaled by total 
assets [atqr]  
BigN BigN an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company is 
audited by a Big 4/5/6/8 audit firm (depending on 
the year) and 0 otherwise.
market to book mb market value of the equity (csho*prcc_f) divided by 
the book value of equity (ceq): source Compustat
the inverse of Dechow et 
al. 2011's measure
loss loss 1 if net income (total of four quarters niqr) is <0 in 
either the current or previous year, and 0 otherwise.
litigation litigation an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company 
operates in a high litigation industry 
biotechnology (SIC 2833–2836 and 8731 - 8734); 
computers (SIC 3570–3577 and  7370–7370), 
electronics (SIC 3600–3674), and retail (SIC 
5200–5961), and 0 otherwise
following Johnstone et al. 
(2012) and Reichelt and 
Wang (2010)
Number of analysts Numestimates the logarithm of the number of analysts following 
the company (numest) for the restatement year: 
source I/B/E/S unadjusted daily history.
standard deviation of 
analysts forecasts
ơ(forecasts) the standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts 
for the restatement year (stdev): source I/B/E/S 
unadjusted daily history.
a The format of this table and many of the abbreviations and variable definitions are derived from 
   the end of year closing stock price, from COMPUSTAT. Variables in brackets are labels in the 
   Unrestated database. Four complete fiscal quarters of data are combined for income statement variables.
  The fourth quarter data is used for balance sheet and cash flow statement variables. 
   Dechow et al. 2011. All data is from the Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database except "prcc_f", 
Control Variables in Multivariate Regressions
source: Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database unless stated otherwise
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TABLE 3 Chapter 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the UEvsIM sample: firm-years with Unintentional Error Restatements vs. Intentional Misstatement Restatements 1987-2012
N mean median sd
skew-
ness N mean median sd
skew-
ness mean diff t med. diff z D
Total Assets 751  2664.49 300.27 13857.93 16.81 127     16685.49 525.17 84213.45 7.89 (14,021.00)  -3.38 ** (224.89)   -3.39 *** 0.19      ***
Receivables 749  744.28 32.90 5254.31 13.72 126     8243.73 74.42 66107.91 9.88 (7,499.44)    -2.42 * (41.51)    -3.60 *** 0.17      **
Inventories 742  136.80 6.24 618.21 12.50 127     300.87 12.36 1064.38 7.16 (164.07)       -1.94 (6.12)      -2.07 * 0.13      *
Capital Assets 737  567.47 32.61 2063.59 6.74 127     2053.84 57.24 6718.21 4.46 (1,486.37)    -3.96 *** (24.62)    -1.86 0.11      
Market Capitaliz. 664  1875.36 202.38 11909.14 14.27 118     8570.19 683.52 39690.86 8.42 (6,694.83)    -2.82 ** (481.15)   -5.63 *** 0.24      ***
Sales 751  1264.76 207.20 4015.25 7.49 127     4568.76 490.13 13911.19 6.07 (3,303.99)    -4.38 *** (282.93)   -3.95 *** 0.19      ***
Sales Growth 649  4.52 0.09 82.28 24.49 114     0.69 0.19 2.38 7.25 3.83           0.40 (0.10)      -2.75 ** 0.17      **
Capital Intensity 497  1.87 0.08 28.16 21.11 76       0.18 0.08 0.36 5.39 1.70           0.04 (0.00)      -0.71 0.10      
Operating Income 696  226.20 19.60 870.03 8.24 117     1236.40 87.16 4853.94 6.09 (1,010.20)    -4.17 *** (67.57)    -4.24 *** 0.24      ***
Op. Cash Flow 688  164.42 8.49 698.80 9.52 119     721.45 22.60 3384.35 7.60 (557.04)       -3.14 ** (14.12)    -1.48 0.15      *
Income Before Extra. 751  33.00 1.22 397.58 5.46 127     211.50 6.82 1527.04 6.39 (178.49)       -2.37 * (5.60)      -2.60 ** 0.18      **
Net Income 751  39.83 1.12 455.27 5.26 127     184.80 5.96 1508.42 6.04 (144.97)       -1.90 (4.84)      -2.23 * 0.17      **
Return on Assets 677  -0.38 0.01 3.16 -15.41 115     -0.15 0.02 0.63 -4.93 (0.22)          -0.74 (0.01)      -0.80 0.09      
smooth_NI 445  1.85 1.18 2.08 2.98 66       1.42 1.17 1.24 2.13 0.43           1.39 0.00       1.13 0.16      
smooth_opinc 370  1.25 0.98 1.14 3.51 54       1.46 1.15 1.26 2.08 (0.21)          -1.04 (0.17)      -1.14 0.14      
***, **, * significant at the two-tailed p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 levels respectively
t -statistics computed with robust standard errors clustered by company
Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variables used in this study are as follows:
 - Variables that use the fourth quarter unrestated data: Total Assets (atqr), Receivables (rectqr), Inventories (invtqr), 
    Capital Assets (ppentqr), and Operating Cash Flow (oancfqr)
 - Variables that use the total of four quarters of unrestated data: Sales (saleqr), Operating Income (oibdpqr),  Income Before Extraordinary Item (ibqr) 
   and Net income (niqr)   
 - Other variables are computed using more than one Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variable as defined in Table 2
 - The smoothness measures of net income (smooth_NI) and smoothness of operating income (smooth_opinc) are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
 - when continuous measures with significant mean differences (p <0.05) reported in this table are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers, 
   mean differences remain significant (p <0.1) with the exception of Panel A’s  Income Before Extraordinary Items (p<0.199).
    
Unintentional Error (UE) 
Restatement firm-years
Intentional Misstatement (IM) 
Restatement firm-years t -test
Wilcoxon ranksum 
test
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test
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TABLE 3 continued 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for UEvsUN sample: firm-years with SOX 404 Auditor Reports for Unintentional Error  vs. Unclassified Restatements 2004-2012
N mean median sd
skew-
ness N mean median sd
skew-
ness mean diff t med. diff z D
Total Assets 243  3342.29 777.44 12150.77 11.47 588     5145.98 767.33 31851.75 17.52 (1,803.69)    -0.76 10.11      0.25 0.04      
Receivables 243  1061.01 80.67 6969.23 12.98 584     1590.19 76.49 14090.06 16.61 (529.18)       -0.50 4.18       0.57 0.06      
Inventories 238  206.39 26.09 840.74 11.43 584     415.32 19.12 4390.92 22.87 (208.93)       -0.64 6.96       1.64 0.10      *
Capital Assets 236  739.64 101.58 2145.47 5.35 575     966.17 78.83 4254.12 14.06 (226.53)       -0.68 22.74      1.67 0.10      *
Market Capitaliz. 234  1454.59 471.17 3397.28 6.20 576     2086.92 481.01 6848.16 8.49 (632.34)       -1.18 (9.84)      0.52 0.08      
Sales 243  1439.59 497.63 2811.95 4.09 588     2451.44 420.93 11395.66 15.28 (1,011.85)    -1.19 76.70      1.11 0.09      
Sales Growth 239  0.14 0.07 0.40 2.91 575     0.23 0.07 1.53 17.49 (0.09)          -0.79 (0.00)      -0.07 0.05      
Capital Intensity 170  0.20 0.08 0.80 12.27 406     0.36 0.07 3.12 17.89 (0.16)          -0.57 0.00       1.04 0.07      
Operating Income 228  259.00 67.39 838.91 7.61 558     348.94 61.44 1788.34 13.56 (89.94)        -0.64 5.95       0.36 0.05      
Op. Cash Flow 220  202.87 45.75 865.09 10.99 526     154.32 42.00 1484.40 -5.57 48.55          0.40 3.75       0.76 0.08      
Income Before Extra. 243  11.76 10.10 251.66 -2.07 588     83.96 13.72 666.96 12.31 (72.20)        -1.44 (3.63)      -1.47 0.07      
Net Income 243  10.42 10.10 246.96 -2.39 588     84.80 13.75 671.79 12.09 (74.38)        -1.47 (3.65)      -1.50 0.08      
Return on Assets 240  -0.02 0.01 0.18 -0.84 584     -0.04 0.02 0.26 -4.30 0.01           0.62 (0.01)      -1.98 * 0.11      *
smooth_NI 189  1.80 1.25 1.81 2.79 450     1.70 1.09 2.03 3.12 0.09           0.50 0.16       1.76 0.14      **
smooth_opinc 163  1.24 1.00 1.09 3.46 387     1.18 0.98 0.97 3.11 0.05           0.53 0.02       0.34 0.07      
***, **, * significant at the two-tailed p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 levels respectively
t -statistics computed with robust standard errors clustered by company
Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variables used in this study are as follows:
 - Variables that use the fourth quarter unrestated data: Total Assets (atqr), Receivables (rectqr), Inventories (invtqr), 
    Capital Assets (ppentqr), and Operating Cash Flow (oancfqr)
 - Variables that use the total of four quarters of unrestated data: Sales (saleqr), Operating Income (oibdpqr),  Income Before Extraordinary Item (ibqr) 
   and Net income (niqr)   
 - Other variables are computed using more than one Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variable as defined in Table 2
 - The smoothness measures of net income (smooth_NI) and smoothness of operating income (smooth_opinc) are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
 - when continuous measures with significant mean differences (p <0.05) reported in this table are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers, 
   mean differences remain significant (p <0.1) with the exception of Panel A’s  Income Before Extraordinary Items (p<0.199).
    
Unintentional Error (UE)
Restatement firm-years
with Auditor's SOX 404 reports
Unclassified  (UN)
Restatement firm-years
with Auditor's SOX 404 reports t -test
Wilcoxon ranksum 
test
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test
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TABLE 3 continued 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for UEvsOther sample: firm-years with SOX 404 Auditor Reports for Unintentional Error  vs. 
             Unclassified and Intentional Misstatements 2004-2012
N mean median sd
skew-
ness N mean median sd
skew-
ness mean diff t med. diff z D
Total Assets 243  3342.29 777.44 12150.77 11.47 605     5381.87 754.03 31824.28 17.14 (2,039.57)    -0.86 23.42      0.26 0.05      
Receivables 243  1061.01 80.67 6969.23 12.98 601     1579.61 76.69 13895.86 16.83 (518.60)       -0.50 3.99       0.52 0.06      
Inventories 238  206.39 26.09 840.74 11.43 601     411.01 19.99 4329.47 23.19 (204.62)       -0.63 6.10       1.58 0.10      
Capital Assets 236  739.64 101.58 2145.47 5.35 592     980.03 78.05 4254.68 13.74 (240.39)       -0.72 23.53      1.81 0.11      *
Market Capitaliz. 234  1454.59 471.17 3397.28 6.20 593     2218.56 482.07 7649.26 8.37 (763.97)       -1.28 (10.90)    0.39 0.08      
Sales 243  1439.59 497.63 2811.95 4.09 605     2514.30 425.57 11403.20 14.89 (1,074.72)    -1.26 72.06      1.06 0.08      
Sales Growth 239  0.14 0.07 0.40 2.91 591     0.23 0.07 1.52 17.59 (0.09)          -0.81 (0.00)      -0.11 0.05      
Capital Intensity 170  0.20 0.08 0.80 12.27 418     0.36 0.07 3.07 18.11 (0.16)          -0.57 0.01       1.18 0.07      
Operating Income 228  259.00 67.39 838.91 7.61 575     374.23 62.72 1881.24 12.28 (115.22)       -0.78 4.67       0.29 0.05      
Op. Cash Flow 220  202.87 45.75 865.09 10.99 542     167.14 41.66 1490.13 -5.21 35.73          0.29 4.09       0.77 0.08      
Income Before Extra. 243  11.76 10.10 251.66 -2.07 605     78.27 13.74 702.10 9.86 (66.51)        -1.25 (3.64)      -1.48 0.07      
Net Income 243  10.42 10.10 246.96 -2.39 605     79.34 13.80 707.73 9.68 (68.92)        -1.29 (3.70)      -1.50 0.08      
Return on Assets 240  -0.02 0.01 0.18 -0.84 601     -0.04 0.02 0.26 -4.30 0.01           0.60 (0.01)      -2.06 * 0.11      *
smooth_NI 189  1.80 1.25 1.81 2.79 463     1.70 1.10 2.01 3.14 0.10           0.53 0.15       1.71 0.14      *
smooth_opinc 163  1.24 1.00 1.09 3.46 400     1.19 0.98 0.97 3.05 0.05           0.46 0.02       0.21 0.07      
***, **, * significant at the two-tailed p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 levels respectively
t -statistics computed with robust standard errors clustered by company
Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variables used in this study are as follows:
 - Variables that use the fourth quarter unrestated data: Total Assets (atqr), Receivables (rectqr), Inventories (invtqr), 
    Capital Assets (ppentqr), and Operating Cash Flow (oancfqr)
 - Variables that use the total of four quarters of unrestated data: Sales (saleqr), Operating Income (oibdpqr),  Income Before Extraordinary Item (ibqr) 
   and Net income (niqr)   
 - Other variables are computed using more than one Compustat Unrestated Quarterly - US database variable as defined in Table 2
 - The smoothness measures of net income (smooth_NI) and smoothness of operating income (smooth_opinc) are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
 - when continuous measures with significant mean differences (p <0.05) reported in this table are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers, 
   mean differences remain significant (p <0.1) with the exception of Panel A’s  Income Before Extraordinary Items (p<0.199).
    
Unintentional Error (UE)
Restatement firm-years 
with auditor's SOX 404 reports
Unclassified  (UN) and
Intentional Misstatement (IM)
Restatement firm-years
with Auditor's SOX 404 reports t -test
Wilcoxon ranksum 
test
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test
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TABLE 4 Restatement Frequency by Firm Size, Year, and Industry 
Panel A: Restatement Frequency by firm size (market capitalization deciles following Dechow et al. 2011)  
n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig
38 5.7% 28 23.7% -6.48 *** 10 4.3% 43 7.5% -1.67 46 7.8% -1.80
57 8.6% 17 14.4% -1.99 * 26 11.1% 61 10.6% 0.22 62 10.5% 0.28
91 13.7% 19 16.1% -0.69 47 20.1% 90 15.6% 1.53 93 15.7% 1.52
86 13.0% 14 11.9% 0.33 45 19.2% 103 17.9% 0.45 106 17.9% 0.45
78 11.7% 10 8.5% 1.04 46 19.7% 107 18.6% 0.36 111 18.7% 0.31
71 10.7% 10 8.5% 0.73 30 12.8% 90 15.6% -1.02 93 15.7% -1.04
76 11.4% 10 8.5% 0.95 22 9.4% 52 9.0% 0.17 52 8.8% 0.29
63 9.5% 6 5.1% 1.55 8 3.4% 18 3.1% d 18 3.0% d
52 7.8% 2 1.7% d 0 0.0% 10 1.8% d 10 1.7% d
52 7.8% 2 1.7% d 0 0.0% 2 0.3% d 2 0.3% d
664 100.0% 118 100.0% 234 100.0% 576 100.0% 593 100.0%
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 
a. Firm size is based on the decile rank of market value.  The closing price and number of common shares outstanding used to compute market value are
   available from COMPUSTAT for 664 of the 751 Unintentional Error  restatements and for 118 of the 127 Intentional Misstatement restatements 
   in the period 1989-2012,  and for 17 of the 17 Intentional Misstatement restatements, 234 of the 243 Unintetional Error restatements, 
   and for 576 of the 588 Unclassified restatements with SOX 404 auditor's opinions.
d. Insufficent counts for meaningful statistical test
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Other
(UN + IM) a
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs Other
3
2
8
7
6
5
4
1
Total
9
1987 - 2012
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE) a   
Unclassified 
(UN) a 
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs UN
2004 - 2012
 with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE) a 
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)  a 
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs IM
Decile rank a 
10
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TABLE 4 continued 
Panel B: Restatement Frequency by Restatement Year 
n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig
1 0.1% 0 0.0% d
0 0.0% 1 0.8% d
1 0.1% 0 0.0% d
1 0.1% 0 0.0% d
4 0.5% 0 0.0% d
2 0.3% 1 0.8% d
3 0.4% 3 2.4% d
11 1.5% 5 3.9% -1.93
14 1.9% 14 11.0% -5.43 ***
46 6.1% 15 11.8% -2.33 *
68 9.1% 17 13.4% -1.53
59 7.9% 23 18.1% -3.67 ***
71 9.5% 15 11.8% -0.96
100 13.3% 13 10.2% 1.57 31 12.8% 79 13.4% -0.26 85 14.0% -0.50
51 6.8% 4 3.1% d 25 10.3% 101 17.2% -2.52 * 103 17.0% -2.48 *
66 8.8% 9 7.1% 1.86 39 16.0% 87 14.8% 0.46 91 15.0% 0.37
74 9.9% 6 4.7% 3.30 ** 37 15.2% 60 10.2% 2.05 * 64 10.6% 1.89
60 8.0% 0 0.0% d 40 16.5% 81 13.8% 1.00 81 13.4% 1.16
55 7.3% 1 0.8% d 31 12.8% 70 11.9% 0.34 71 11.7% 0.41
48 6.4% 0 0.0% d 28 11.5% 67 11.4% 0.05 67 11.1% 0.19
16 2.1% 0 0.0% d 12 4.9% 38 6.5% -0.84 38 6.3% -0.75
0 0.0% 0 0.0% d 0 0.0% 5 0.8% d 5 0.8% d
751 100.0% 127 100.0% 243 100% 588 100.0% 605 100.0%
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 
b.  The year is the earliest fiscal year in the restated period when the restated period spans more than one year.
d. Insufficent counts for meaningful statistical test
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Other
(IM + UN) 
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs Other
2008
1997
1987 - 2012
1996
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE)  
Year b 
1987
1993
1994
1995
Total
1992
2004 - 2012
 with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE)  
Unclassified 
(UN)  
binomial 
proportion 
test
2012
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)  
binomial 
proportion test
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2009
2010
2011
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
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TABLE 4 continued 
Panel C: Restatement Frequency by Industry 
n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig
Agriculture 4 0.5% 0 0.0% d 2 0.8% 4 0.7% d 4 0.7% d
Mining & Construction 33 4.4% 3 2.4% d 15 6.2% 12 2.0% 3.06 ** 13 2.1% 2.97 **
Food & Tobacco 17 2.3% 1 0.8% d 3 1.2% 10 1.7% d 10 1.7% d
Textile & Apparel 9 1.2% 0 0.0% d 5 2.1% 5 0.9% d 5 0.8% d
Lumber, Furniture, & Printing 17 2.3% 0 0.0% d 5 2.1% 20 3.4% d 20 3.3% d
Chemicals 21 2.8% 1 0.8% d 8 3.3% 8 1.4% d 8 1.3% d
Refining & Extractive 31 4.1% 1 0.8% d 7 2.9% 33 5.6% d 33 5.5% d
Durable Manufacturers 125 16.6% 15 11.8% 1.38 43 17.7% 76 12.9% 1.79 81 13.4% 1.61
Computers 107 14.2% 38 29.9% -4.40 *** 33 13.6% 77 13.1% 0.19 78 12.9% 0.27
Transportation 49 6.5% 5 3.9% 1.12 18 7.4% 44 7.5% -0.04 45 7.4% -0.02
Utilities 22 2.9% 6 4.7% -1.06 7 2.9% 27 4.6% d 27 4.5% d
Retail 68 9.1% 18 14.2% -1.79 19 7.8% 51 8.7% -0.40 53 8.8% -0.44
Services 82 10.9% 19 15.0% -1.32 24 9.9% 53 9.0% 0.39 55 9.1% 0.36
Banks & Insurance 104 13.8% 12 9.4% 1.35 36 14.8% 116 19.7% -1.67 119 19.7% -1.65
Pharmaceuticals 62 8.3% 8 6.3% 0.75 18 0.073 52 8.8% -0.68 54 8.9% -0.72
Total 751 100.0% 127 100.0% 243 100.0% 588 100.0% 605 100.0%
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively p <0.001, p <0.01 and p <0.05 
d. Insufficent counts for meaningful statistical test
c. Industries are based on SIC codes Frankel, Johnson,  and Nelson (2002) as described by Dechow et al. (2011): 
    Agriculture:  0100–0999; Mining & Construction: 1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food  & Tobacco:  2000–2141;  Textiles and Apparel:  2200–2399;
    Lumber,  Furniture, & Printing:  2400–2796; Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & Extractive: 1300–1399, 2900–2999;
    Durable  Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–3669, 3680–3828, 3852-3999; Computers:  3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379; Transportation: 4000–4899; 
    Utilities: 4900–4999;Retail: 5000–5999; Services: 7000–7369, 7380–9999; Banks & Insurance: 6000–6999; Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 3829–3851.
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Other
(IM + UN) 
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs Other
1987 - 2012
2004 - 2012
 with SOX 404 auditor's reports
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE)  
Unclassified
(UN)
binomial 
proportion 
test
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM) 
binomial 
proportion test
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE)  
Industry c 
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TABLE 5 Accounts Corrected by Restatement 
Accounts corrected a
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE)  
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)    
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs IM
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE)    
Unclassified 
(UN)  
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs UN
Other
(UN + IM) 
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs Other
n=751 n=127 sig. n=243 n=588 sig. n=605 sig.
Intentional Misstatements proportionately greatest
  Revenue recognition 18.4% 44.1% *** 12.7% 11.4% 12.4%
  Derivatives and hedging 2.4% 7.9% ** 1.6% 3.7% 3.8%
  Acquisitons, mergers, disposals and reorganization 9.6% 16.5% * 3.3% 9.7% ** 9.6% **
  Capital Assets 19.0% 26.8% * 10.7% 10.5% 10.2%
  Consolidation 6.3% 10.2% 4.9% 6.8% 6.8%
  Inventory, vendor and cost of sales 10.5% 14.2% 8.2% 5.3% 5.1%
  Foreign, related party, subsidiary and intercompany 12.5% 15.7% 10.3% 7.7% 7.8%
  Accounts/loans receivable, investments and cash 9.1% 11.8% 6.6% 10.4% 10.2%
  Liabilities and contingency 22.6% 23.6% 12.3% 11.7% 11.9%
  Payroll, selling, general, administrative and other expenses 13.8% 14.2% 9.9% 8.7% 8.6%
  Other 6.5% 11.0%
Unintentional Error proportionately greatest
  Tax 20.2% 11.0% * 18.5% 18.9% 18.3%
  Misclassification 14.8% 7.1% * 19.3% 25.9% * 25.5%
  Debt and equity 13.7% 7.9% 5.3% 9.2% 9.1%
  Stock-based and executive compensation 13.3% 11.0% 7.8% 6.6% 6.6%
  Pension 2.7% 0.0% ^ 3.7% 1.5% ^ 1.5% ^
***, **, * , ^ indicates statistical difference at respectively p <0.001, p <0.01,  p <0.05, and counts insufficent for statistical comparison. 
a. Based on grouping AuditAnalytics'  coding of Accounting Rule (GAAP/FASB) Application Failures and Financial Fraud, Irregularities 
    and Misrepresentation Issues.
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports1987 - 2012
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
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TABLE 6 Income Correction and Restatement 
Panel A: Percentage of Restatements that Correct Income Overstatement and Understatement  
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE)  
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)    
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs IM
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE)    
Unclassified 
(UN)  
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs 
UN
Other
(UN + IM) 
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs 
Other
Net Income correction : n=751 n=127 z sig n=243 n=588 z sig n=605 z sig
Corrects income overstatement 22.1% 27.5% -1.353 26.3% 22.3% 1.256 22.5% 1.197
Income unchanged on restatement 67.7% 57.5% 2.266 * 63.4% 67.7% -1.198 67.1% -1.038
Corrects income understatement 10.2% 15.0% -1.574 10.3% 10.0% 0.111 10.4% -0.054
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Income before extraordinary items correction  n=751 n=127 n=243 n=588 n=605
Corrects income overstatement 24.3% 29.1% -1.146 29.2% 26.9% 0.689 26.9% 0.670
Income unchanged on restatement 60.0% 52.0% 1.625 52.7% 59.0% -1.680 58.7% -1.596
Corrects income understatement 15.7% 18.9% -0.902 18.1% 14.1% 1.455 14.4% 1.358
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Operating Income before Depreciation correction : n=675 n=114 n=220 n=544 n=558
Corrects income overstatement 27.8% 29.8% -0.452 33.6% 31.8% 0.491 32.3% 0.369
Income unchanged on restatement 50.8% 45.6% 1.027 40.0% 44.7% -1.179 44.6% -1.172
Corrects income understatement 21.4% 24.6% -0.751 26.4% 23.5% 0.827 23.1% 0.954
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
* indicates statistical two-tailed significance at p <0.05 
1987 - 2012
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports
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TABLE 6 Continued 
Panel B: Absolute Value of Income Correction Scaled by Restated Total Assets a 
Unintentional 
Error
 (UE)  
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)    
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs IM
Unintentional 
Error 
(UE)    
Unclassified 
(UN)  
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs 
UN
Other
(UN + IM) 
binomial 
proportion 
test
UE vs 
Other
Absolute Value of Net Income correction : n=243 n=54 t sig n=89 n=190 t sig n=199 t sig
Mean 0.133 0.077 0.28 0.008 0.020 -2.90 ** 0.020 -2.92 **
Standard Deviation 0.435 0.323 0.015 0.062 0.060
Absolute Value of Income before
 extraordinary items correction: n=301 n=61 n=115 n=241 n=250
Mean 0.115 0.070 0.98 0.010 0.019 -2.19 * 0.019 -2.17 *
Standard Deviation 0.414 0.309 0.024 0.055 0.054
Absolute Value of Operating Income before
 Depreciation correction : n=331 n=62 n=132 n=299 n=309
Mean 0.050 0.073 -0.78 0.013 0.015 -0.54 0.015 -0.59
Standard Deviation 0.177 0.217 0.030 0.033 0.030
**, * significant at the two-tailed p <0.01 and p <0.05 levels respectively 
t -statistics computed with robust standard errors adjusted by clustering on company
a. The absolute values of the net income, income before extraordinary items and operating income (respectively, b, c, and d above) restatement amounts are scaled by restated total 
   assets (atq ) and winsorized at 1% and 99% of observations to mitigate outliers. 
1987 - 2012
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 auditor's reports
2004 - 2012 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports
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TABLE 7 Earnings Persistence and Restatements 
                    roa = β0 + β1 roalag + β2 UEindicator + β3 roalag*UEindicator + β4 size + β5 capitalintensity + β6 salesgrowth + ε                           
UEindicator:
UE - Unintentional Error (=1)
IM - Intentional Misstatements (=0)
UN - Unclassified Misstatement (=0)
Restatement Sample
Predicted 
Sign Coeff
t -statistic/
F Coeff
t -statistic/
F Coeff
t -statistic/
F Coeff
t -statistic/
F
roalag  + 0.830 30.87 *** 0.882 3.98 *** 0.874 6.18 *** 0.873 6.22 ***
UEindicator ? 0.014 0.50 0.014 0.48 0.005 0.58 0.005 0.65
roalag*UEindicator - -0.164 -0.92 -0.721 -3.21 *** -0.712 -5.36 *** -0.710 -5.35 ***
size + 0.037 2.66 *** 0.161 1.71 ** 0.010 2.96 *** 0.010 2.79 ***
capitalintensity - -0.021 -4.17 *** -0.020 -0.50 0.000 -0.15 0.000 -0.17
salesgrowth - 0.010 2.42 *** 0.099 3.89 *** 0.028 2.08 ** 0.033 3.08 ***
Intercept -0.278 -1.92 ** -0.071 -2.39 ** -0.066 -1.20 -0.065 -1.15
Industry indicators yes yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes yes
F-test of UEindicator + roalag * UEindicator - -0.151 0.67 -0.706 12.41 *** -0.707 28.75 *** -0.705 28.54 ***
N 460 177 561 573
No. of clusters (company) 410 165 484 493
No. of clusters (year) 17 8 9 9
F 7.63 15.56 10.46 10.81
Prob>F <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Adjusted R-squared 0.575 0.225 0.573 0.570
 ***, **, * indicate one-tailed signifance at p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1 levels respectively.
   t -statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered two-ways by company and year.
  Variance inflation factors are less than 9 for all main variables.
OLS regression of return on asset - earnings before extraordinary items scaled by average assets (roa ) - as a function of: lagged return on assets (roalag );  
    an indicator of unintentional error (UEindicator ) equal to 1 if unintentional error and 0 if intentional misstatement; the interaction of lagged return   
    on assets and the unintentional error indicator (roalag*UEindicator ); company size (size ) proxied by  logged total assets;  capital intensity  (capitalintensity )     
    proxied following Lev (1983) as the ratio of depreciation, amortization and  interest  to sales (cost of sales not used as missing  for many observations);  
    sales growth (salesgrowth ) is measured by percentage change in sales; and  industry and year dummies.  Return on assets (roa ) and lagged return on  
    assets (roalag ) are winsorzied at 1% and 99% of observations (with and without restatement) to mitigate against outliers. 
Model 1 
UE vs. IM
1987-2012
Model 3 
UE vs. UN
with auditor's SOX opinions
Model 2 
UE vs. IM
with auditor's SOX opinions
Model 4 
UE vs. Other
with auditor's SOX opinions
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TABLE 8 Accrual Measures and Restatements 
Panel A: Associations between Accrual Measuresa and an Unintentional Error vs. Intentional Misstatement Indicator  
                   
                  UEindicator  = β 0  + β 1  AccrualMeasure  + β 2  size +   β 3  roa + β 4  leverage  + β 5  BigN + ε                    
Predicted Sign Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig
Accrual Measures:
  Accruals - -0.287
  WC_acc - -2.215 **
  pmatch - -0.985 ***
  sresid - -1.286 ***
size - -0.212 ** -0.118 -0.131 -0.247 **
roa - 0.040 0.044 ** 0.119 0.041
leverage + 0.708 0.731 0.759
BigN + 0.432 0.348 0.388
Intercept 15.486 *** 14.923 *** 15.806 *** 16.073 ***
Industry indicators yes yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes yes
N 568 514 453 441
No. of clusters (company) 489 443 392 382
No. of clusters (year) 13 13 13 12
Wald chi2 276.96 291.00 338.00 319.20
Prob> chi2 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.146 0.149 0.159
UEindicator variable comparisons:
 UE - Unintentional Errors (=1)
 IM - Intentional Misstatements (=0)
 UN - Unclassified Misstatements (=0)
Restatement Sample
Model 4 
UE vs. IM
 Indicator
1987-2012
Model 1 
UE vs. IM
 Indicator
1987 -2012
Model 2 
UE vs. IM
 Indicator
1987 -2012
Model 3 
UE vs. IM
 Indicator
1987-2012
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TABLE 8 Continued 
Panel B: Associations between Accrual Measuresa and Unintentional Error for Firm-years With Auditor's SOX 404 Reports 
Predicted Sign Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig Coeff z sig
Accrual Measures a :
  Accruals - -1.855 ** -1.938 ***
  WC_acc - 0.208 -0.151
  pmatch b -
  sresid - -0.455 *** -0.506 ***
size - -0.083 -0.048 -0.077 -0.088 -0.045 -0.080
roa - 1.238 ** 0.429 0.150 1.285 *** 0.442 0.158
leverage + 0.797 *** 0.511 * 0.432 0.848 *** 0.573 ** 0.487
BigN + 0.501 * 0.546 * 0.805 *** 0.495 ** 0.523 ** 0.788 ***
Intercept -0.941 -1.382 -1.492 *** -0.900 -1.391 -1.440 ***
Industry indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 731 633 575 747 646 589
No. of clusters (company) 625 547 502 635 555 510
No. of clusters (year) 8 8 8 8 8 8
Wald chi2 50.70 38.46 33.95 50.66 38.26 34.47
Prob> chi2 0.003 0.055 0.109 0.003 0.057 0.098
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.052 0.058 0.058 0.052 0.057
 ***, **, * indicate one-tailed signifance at p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1 levels respectively.
   z -statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered two-ways by company and year.
  Logistic regression of an indicator of unintentional error (UEindicator) equal to 1 if unintentional error and 0 otherwise as a function of total accruals (Accruals - Models 1, 5 and 8), 
  working capital accruals (WC_acc  - Models 2, 6, and 9), performance matched discretionary accruals (pmatch  - Model 3), and studentized residuals (sresid), company size (size) 
  proxied by logged total assets, return on asset (roa ) proxied by earnings before extraordinary items scaled by average assets, leverage (leverage) equal to long term debt  
  scaled by total assets, and Big N (Big N), an indicator vairable equal to 1 if the company is audite by a Big 4/5/6/8 audit firm (depending on the year). 
  Accrual measures (Accruals, WC_acc, pmatch,  and sresid ) winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers.  Variables are defined in Table 2.
 a. Accrual measures are defined in Table 2 and further explained in Appendix C.
 b. Results are not reported for the pmatch accrual model as the overall model fit was not significant (p >0.2) for both the UEvsUN and the UEvsOther samples. 
     
UEindicator variable comparisons:
 UE - Unintentional Errors (=1)
 IM - Intentional Misstatements (=0)
 UN - Unclassified Misstatements (=0)
Restatement Sample
Model 5 
UE vs. UN
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
Model 6 
UE vs. UN
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
Model 7 
UE vs. UN
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
Model 8 
UE vs. Other
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
Model 9 
UE vs. Other
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
Model 10 
UE vs. Other
 Indicator
with SOX opinions
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TABLE 9 Meeting or Beating Analysts' Forecasts by One Penny 
a 
and Restatements 
        MeetBeat = β 0 +  β 1 UEindicator + β 2  size  + β3 leverage + β4 mb +
                                     + β5 litigation + β6 roa + β7 Accruals + β8BigN  +  β9Numestimates 
Predicted 
Sign Coeff
z -
statistic Coeff
z -
statistic Coeff
z -
statistic
UEindicator - -0.381 -1.78 ** -0.546 -0.63 -0.522 -0.60
size + -1.468 -2.24 ** -0.893 -1.04 -0.932 -1.02
leverage - 1.292 1.32 2.625 3.69 *** 2.686 3.91 ***
mb + -0.468 -2.28 ** -0.292 -0.79 -0.277 -0.65
litigation + 1.338 1.60 * 3.334 2.80 *** 3.628 3.35 ***
roa + 3.351 1.56 * 4.479 3.92 *** 4.124 3.82 ***
Accruals - 1.568 0.68 -1.436 -0.73 -0.604 -0.48
BigN + 0.934 1.60 * 0.145 0.12 0.351 0.28
Numestimates + 0.579 1.87 ** 0.917 4.54 *** 0.944 4.93 ***
ơ(forecasts) - -6.313 -2.28 ** -11.248 -2.65 *** -11.696 -2.72 ***
Intercept -15.759 -20.14 *** -19.615 -10.85 *** -18.840 -10.32 ***
Industry indicators yes yes yes
Year indicators yes yes yes
N 270 215 219
No. of clusters (company) 237 200 204
No. of clusters (year) 12 8 8
Wald chi2 367.71 193.57 201.27
Prob> chi2 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Pseudo R2 0.183 0.224 0.234
 ***, **, * indicate one-tailed signifance at p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1 levels respectively.
   z -statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered two-ways by company and year.
a The "meet or beat" binary variable (equal to 1 if earnings per share meet or beat analysts' forecast by less than one  
   penny and 0 otherwise) is the dependent variable in the logistic regressions.  Both the actual EPS and the  analyst's 
   forecast nearest the EPS announcement date (or median forecast if more than one on the nearest day) are from the 
   I/B/E/S unadjusted daily history following Reichelt and Wang (2010). The "meet or beat" binary variable is regressed 
   on an indicator of unintentional error (UEindicator ) equal to 1 if unintentional error and 0 for the other group
   in the sample (i.e. in Model 1 intentional misstatement; Model 2 unclassified; and Model 3 intentional misstatement 
   and unclassified restatements); company size (size ) proxied by logged total assets;  the number 
  of analysts' forecasts (Numestimates );  standard deviation of forecasts (ơ(forecasts)) ; and other variables  
   as defined in Table 2. Return on assets (roa ) and total  accruals scaled by average assets (Accruals ) are  
   winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
   
                                     + β10ơ(forecasts)  +  Industry and Year fixed effects +ε 
Model 3 
UE vs. UN
for firm-years 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports
forecasts within 2 
mths of earnings 
announcement
Model 2 
UE vs. UN
for firm-years 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports
forecasts within 2 
mths of earnings 
announcement
 UEindicator:
 UE - Unintentional Errors
 IM - Intentional Misstatements
 UN - Unclassified Misstatements
Restatement Sample
Model 1 
UE vs. IM
forecasts within 6 
mths of earnings 
announcement for 
overall model fit
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TABLE 10 Proxy Validation Test Summary 
Validation test
Directionally 
consistent sig
Directionally 
consistent sig
Directionally 
consistent sig
Directionally 
consistent sig
V1 Proportion of revenue recognition issues (see Table 5) √ ***
- - 
√ ***
V2 Proportion of net income corrections (see Table 6) √ **
- - 
√
V3 Association with earnings persistence (see Table 7) √ d √ *** √ *** √ ***
V4 Less positive accruals: (see Table 8)
- total accruals √ √ *** √ *** √ ***
-working capital accruals √ ** - √ √ **
- performance matched Jones discretionary accruals √ *** a a a
 - studentized residuals from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) √ *** √ *** √ *** a
V5 less income smoothness: (see Table 3)
- net income smoothness √ √ ** √ ** √ ***
- operating income smoothness - √ √ √ ***
V6 meet or beat analysts' forecasts by a small amount (see Table 9) √ ** √ √ a
 ***, **, * indicate one-tailed signifance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 levels respectively.
√ directionally as predicted.
- 
not as predicted directionally.
a results not reported as poor overall model fit for the statistical test
b The subsample of restatements to be used for Chapter 3 tests (subject to data availability). 
This subsample of the UEvsOther sample includes only one restated firm-year per Company. The first year of the earliest restatement is retained for 
companies with more than one restatement. This restriction, together with a further restriction for unclassified restatements (see c below), creates 
a subsample of the UEvsOther sample comprised of 121 UE restatements, 6 IM restatements and 98 unclassified restatements 
with sufficient data for Chapter 3 tests.
c  Only unclassified restatements with a scaled score greater than or equal to 0.5 are retained in the subsample. Scores are constructed  such that 
 restatements with higher scores have more characterisitcs predicted to be associated with  intentional misstatements than other unclassified 
 restatements. Each restatement in the group of unclassified restatements with an auditor's SOX 404 opinions is scored one point (maximum 9) 
 if it corrects revenue recognition (1 point); corrects net income (1 point); meets or beats the latest analyst forecasts by one penny or less (1 point); 
 or exceeds the group accruals or smoothness medians  (maximum 6 points) and the total score is scaled by the number of non missing values. 
d p <0.001 when comparison is limited to restatements with Auditor's SOX 404 reports
Chapter 3 Sample
UE vs. Other
 subsample  b, c
with auditor's
SOX 404 reports
N: UE=121; Other=104
UE vs. Other 
i.e., IM & UN
with auditor's
SOX 404 reports
N: UE=243; Other=605
UE vs. UN
with auditor's 
SOX 404 reports
N: UE=243; UN=588
UEindicator:
 UE - Unintentional Errors
 IM - Intentional Misstatements
 UN - Unclassified Misstatements
Restatement Sample
Sample size
UE vs. IM
1987 -2012
N : UE=751; IM=127
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TABLE 11 Chapter 3 Sample Selection 
All Restatements 
with SOX 404 
auditor's reports
Restatements 
that correct 
Unintentional 
Error
UE
Restatements 
that correct 
Intentional 
Misstatement
IM
Unclassified 
Restatements
 UN
Restatements with SOX 404 auditor's reports a 848 243 17 588
less: multiple firm-years per Company (364) (105) (10) (249)
 - the earliest firm-year is retained
   for companies with more than
  one firm-year with SOX 404
 auditor's reports
484 138 7 339
less: restatements for which CFO, CEO, (214) (214)
and Director biographical and compensation
data is not collected from proxy statementsb.
270 138 7 125
less: firm-years without Chapter 3 data availability (45) (17) (1) (27)
Chapter 3 Sample 225 121 6 98
a  Table 1 details the sample selection criteria for restatements with SOX 404 auditor's reports.
b  Unclassified restatements with a scaled score less than 0.5 are dropped from the sample to reduce data collection costs. 
 Scores are constructed  such that restatements with higher scores have more characterisitcs predicted to be
 associated with  intentional misstatements than other unclassified restatements. Each restatement in the group of 
 unclassified restatements with an auditor's SOX 404 opinions is scored one point (maximum 9) if it corrects 
 revenue recognition (1 point); corrects net income (1 point); meets or beats the latest analyst forecasts by 
 one penny or less (1 point); or exceeds the group accruals or smoothness medians  (maximum 6 points) 
 and the total score is scaled by the number of non missing values. 
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TABLE 12 Chapter 3 Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variable Definition Reference 
ICWEAK Two measures of internal control quality are used:  
ICWeakORIGINAL An indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor’s SOX 
404 report as originally filed reported controls over 
financial reporting were ineffective in year t; 0 
otherwise [AuditAnalytics]; and 
 
ICWeakAMENDED An indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor’s 
amended SOX 404 report reported controls over 
financial reporting were ineffective in year t; 0 
otherwise [AuditAnalytics] 
 
 
ERROR An indicator variable equal to 1 if non-technical 
annual restatement announcement indicates 
correction of unintentional error, and 0 if no 
restatement (see Chapter 2). 
 
 
INTENT An indicator variable equal to 1 if non-technical 
annual restatement proxies for restatement that 
corrects intentional misstatement, and 0 if non-
technical annual restatement announcement 
indicates correction of unintentional error (see 
Chapter 2). 
 
 
INTENTvsNORESTATE An indicator variable equal to 1 if non-technical 
annual restatement proxies for restatement that 
corrects intentional misstatement, and 0 if no 
restatement. 
 
 
ORGCHANGE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm engaged 
in restructuring in year t (COMPUSTAT data items 
RCP, RCA, RCEPS, or RCD); reports sales from 
mergers and acquisitions (COMPUSTAT data item 
ACQSC); or reports foreign pretax income in year t 
but not in year t-1 (COMPUSTAT data item PIFO); 
0 otherwise. 
Restructuring: e.g. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al. 2007, Cohen 
et al. 2014; 
Acquisition e.g. 
Cohen et al. 2014  
  
  
147 
 
TABLE 12 Continued   
Test Variable Definition Reference 
CFOEXP Six alternative measures of CFO financial expertise 
are discussed: 
 
 
CFO_BIG4PARTNER An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has been 
a partner of a Big 4 or national firm, and 0 
otherwise; 
 
 
CFOBIG4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has audit 
experience at a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise; 
 
 
CFOMBA An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has an 
MBA; 0 otherwise; 
 
Aier et al. 2005 
CFOCPA An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has a 
CPA or CA designation; 0 otherwise; 
 
Aier et al. 2005 
CFOPREVIOUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CFO has 
previous CFO experience at another company; and 0 
otherwise; and 
 
Aier et al. 2005 
CFOTENURE The square root of the number of years with the 
company. The number of years with the company is 
reported in the descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Collins et al. 2009 
(without 
transformation) 
CFOPOWER The natural log of the ratio of the CFO’s to the 
CEO’s total compensation. Total compensation 
computed is the sum of salary, bonus, restricted 
stock granted, total value of stock options granted 
(using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, 
and other miscellaneous compensation amounts. 
[Proxy statements]. Both the ratio of the CFO’s to 
the CEO’s total compensation and the logarithm of 
the ratio is reported in descriptive statistics.  
Compensation 
computations 
following Hoitash 
et al. (2012); ratio 
to CEO pay 
adapted from Feng 
et al. (2011) 
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TABLE 12 Continued   
Test Variable Definition Reference 
ACEXP Four alternative measures of audit committee 
financial expertise are discussed: 
 
 
ACAFE The proportion of audit committee members where 
biographical data indicates financial expertise 
gained through accounting-related experience (i.e., 
CPA, certified public accountant, CFO, chief 
financial officer, principal financial officer, chief 
accounting officer, principal accounting officer, 
treasurer, auditor, vice president-finance, controller, 
vice president of finance, or experience working at a 
Big 4/5/6/8 audit firm). (proxy statements 
supplemented by manually searching CapitalIQ, 
Businessweek, Zoominfo, company websites, etc.) 
 
e.g., Cohen et al. 
(2014); Hoitash et 
al. (2009) 
 
The three 
alternative 
measures defined 
below are 
components of this 
measure. 
ACBIG4 An indicator variable equal to 1 if a member of the 
Audit Committee has audit experience at a Big 4 
firm, and 0 otherwise; 
 
   
ACCPA An indicator variable equal to 1 if a member of the 
Audit Committee has a CPA or CA qualification, 
and 0 otherwise; 
 
 
     ACMBA The proportion of audit committee members with 
an MBA degree (proxy statements supplemented 
by manually searching CapitalIQ, Businessweek, 
Zoominfo, company websites, etc.)  
 
 
 
AUDITORQUAL 
 
  
Two alternative measures of auditor size are used 
to proxy for auditor quality in tests: 
 
 
OFFICESIZE Natural logarithm of total office-specific audit fees 
in year t [AuditAnalytics]  
 
e.g. Francis and Yu 
2009 and Francis 
and Michas 2013 
 
BIG4 An indicator variable equal to 1 for a Big 4/5/6/8 
auditor depending on the year (i.e., Deloitte, EY, 
KPMG, PwC today) and 0 otherwise 
[AuditAnalytics] 
 
e.g. Cohen et al. 
2014, Lobo and 
Zhao 2013, Rice 
and Weber 2012 
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TABLE 12 Continued   
Control Variable Definition Reference 
Other auditor variables:   
AUDITFEE Natural logarithm of the audit fees paid in year t. 
[AuditAnalytics]  
 
e.g. Cohen et al. 
2014, Lobo and 
Zhao 2013, Keune 
and Johnstone 
2012  
 
AUDITINF Total client audit and nonaudit fees divided by the 
total office fees in year t [AuditAnalytics] 
 
e.g. Francis and Yu 
2009, Francis and 
Michas 2013 
 
AUDITORTENURE Natural logarithm of the number of years the 
auditor has been engaged by the client 
[AuditAnalytics]. The number of years the auditor 
has been engaged by the client is reported in the 
descriptive statistics. 
 
e.g., Balsam et al. 
2014, Carcello et 
al. 2011, lobo and 
Zhao 2013 
 
AUDITORCHANGE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the restated year 
is the first year of an auditor’s engagement; 0 
otherwise. 
e.g., Balsam et al. 
2014 
Other management and governance variables:  
CFO_EQUITY_PAY The natural log of value of stock options (using 
Black-Scholes) and restricted stock granted to the 
CFO scaled by the CFO’s total compensation.  
Equal to 0 if neither stock options nor restricted 
stock awards were granted in the restated year. 
 
Adapted from: 
Balsam et al.’s  
2014 additional 
analysis and 
Hoitash et al. 2012  
 
CFOCHANGE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the restated 
year is the year the CFO is appointed CFO; 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
GOVERNANCE 
 
The following two alternative measures of 
corporate governance are used in tests: 
 
 
CEOINDEP equals 1 if the CEO is not also the board chair; 0 
otherwise (proxy statements). 
 
e.g. Cohen et al. 
2013, Keune and 
Johnstone 2012 
 
GOV The sum of five variables that assigns higher value 
to firms where the CEO is not the board chair 
(CEOINDEP), the CEO is not a founder of the 
company (CEONOTFOUNDER), the number of 
directors is less than the sample median 
(SMALLER_BOARD), the percentage of directors 
who are independent is greater than the sample 
median (BOARD_INDEP), and the percentage of 
independent board members with tenure longer 
than the CEO’s tenure is greater than the sample 
median. (proxy statements) 
Adapted from 
Carcello et al. 2006, 
DeFond et al. 2005, 
Hoitash et al. 2012 
and Lisic et al. 2014. 
Cohen et al. 2013 
includes measures of 
the five variables 
included in this 
composite. 
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TABLE 12 Continued   
Control Variable Definition Reference 
        CEONOTFOUNDER An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is not 
also a company founder; 0 otherwise (proxy 
statements). 
 
 
        SMALLER_BOARD An indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of 
board of director members is less than the sample 
median; 0 otherwise (proxy statements). 
 
 
        BOARD_INDEP An indicator variable equal to 1 if the percentage of 
independent directors is greater than the sample 
median; 0 otherwise (proxy statements). 
 
 
       BOARD_TENURE An indicator variable equal to 1 if the percentage of 
independent board members with board tenure 
longer than CEO tenure is greater than the sample 
median (proxy statements). 
 
 
Other firm characteristics associated with internal control strength and restatement 
IAF An indicator variable equal to 1 if either the Audit 
Committee charter or the DEF 14A proxy 
statement filed with the SEC refers to an Internal 
Audit function; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
FIRMSIZE Natural logarithm of firm’s market value of equity 
(share price x number of shares outstanding) 
[COMPUSTAT data item PRCC x CSHO]. The 
firm’s market value of equity is reported in the 
descriptive statistics. 
 
e.g., Doyle et al. 
2007b 
AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm 
has CRSP data. The number of years the firm has 
CRSP data is reported in the descriptive statistics. 
 
e.g. Balsam et al. 
2014, Cohen et al. 
2014, Doyle et al. 
2007b 
 
LOSS  
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t and t-1 sum to less 
than zero, and 0 otherwise (COMPUSTAT data 
item NI) 
e.g. Bedard et al. 
2014, Cohen et al. 
2014, Doyle et al. 
2007b 
 
COMPLEXITY 
 
Natural logarithm of the sum of the number of 
geographic and operating segments in year t 
[COMPUSTAT]. 
 
e.g., Balsam et al. 
2014, Bedard et al. 
2014, Doyle et al. 
2007b, Ettredge et 
al. 2014 
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TABLE 12 Continued   
Control Variable Definition Reference 
LEVERAGE Total liabilities divided by total assets in year t  
 
e.g., Bedard et al. 
2014, Cohen et al. 
2014, Ettredge et 
al. 2014 
 
MTB Market to book ratio [CEQ divided by (CSHO * 
PRCC_F)] at the end of year t 
 
e.g., Carcello et al. 
2011, Cohen et al. 
2014, Ettredge et 
al. 2014 
 
   
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of Sales calculated over a period 
of no less than three years (12 quarters) and no more 
than five years (20 quarters) 
 
e.g., Balsam et al. 
2014, Cohen et al. 
2014 
ANALYSTFOLLOW An indicator variable equal to 1 if the number of 
analysts who issued earnings forecasts within the six 
months preceding the earnings announcement date is 
greater than or equal to the sample median [adapted 
from Bedard et al. 2014].  
 
Bedard et al. 2014 
LITIGIOUS An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is in a 
litigious industry – SIC codes 2833 to 2836; 3570-
3577; 3600-3674; 5200-5961 and 7370; O 
otherwise. 
 
e.g. Cohen et al. 
2014, Ettredge et al. 
2014, Bedard et al. 
2014 
∑tYEARt  A vector of year-specific indicator variables  
 
 
∑tINDUSTRYt A vector of industry-specific indicator variables  
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TABLE 13 Chapter 3 Samples 
a,b,c
 Restatement Frequency by Firm Size, Year, and Industry  
Panel A: Frequency by firm size (market capitalization deciles following Dechow et al. 2011)  
 
n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig z sig
11 9.1% 12 9.9% -0.22 0.827 11 10.6% 0.16 0.871 -0.37 0.708
6 5.0% 19 15.7% -2.75 0.006 ** 10 9.6% -1.36 0.174 -1.36 0.175
15 12.4% 12 9.9% 0.61 0.540 7 6.7% -0.86 0.391 1.43 0.154
15 12.4% 9 7.4% 1.29 0.197 11 10.6% 0.82 0.409 0.43 0.670
14 11.6% 13 10.7% 0.20 0.838 8 7.7% -0.78 0.433 0.98 0.329
14 11.6% 10 8.3% 0.86 0.390 10 9.6% 0.36 0.723 0.47 0.636
12 9.9% 14 11.6% -0.42 0.678 9 8.7% -0.72 0.472 0.32 0.745
10 8.3% 14 11.6% -0.86 0.390 10 9.6% -0.47 0.636 -0.36 0.723
12 9.9% 9 7.4% 0.69 0.493 14 13.5% 1.49 0.137 -0.83 0.407
12 9.9% 9 7.4% 0.69 0.493 14 13.5% 1.49 0.137 -0.83 0.407
121 100.0% 121 100.0% 104 100.0%
a. The ERROR sample is comprised of restatements that correct unintentional error and a control group of firm-years without restatement. I chose firm-years
     in the control group that are the nearest in asset size to the firm-years of companies that restate to correct unintentional error that have all necessary data 
     and are within the same two digit SIC  code (per COMPUSTAT) and year.
b. The INTENTvsNORESTATE sample is comprised of restatements that proxy for restatements that correct intentional misstatement and the 
     control group of firm-years without restatement described in (e) above.
c. The INTENT sample is comprised of restatements that correct unintentional error and the intentional misstatement correcting restatement proxy.
d. Firm size is based on the decile rank of market value (closing price * number of common shares outstanding).
INTENTc
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs IM
3
2
1
Total
8
7
6
5
4
9
ERRORa  
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)   
binomial 
proportion test
IM vs 
NORESTATE
Unintentional 
Error
(UE) 
Without 
restatement
(NORESTATE)   
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs  
NORESTATE
Decile rank d 
10
INTENTvsNORESTATEb
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TABLE 13 Continued 
Panel B: Frequency by Year 
 
n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig z sig
12 9.9% 12 9.9% 18 17.3% 1.63 0.104 -1.63 0.104
12 9.9% 12 9.9% 18 17.3% 1.63 0.104 -1.63 0.104
21 17.4% 21 17.4% 16 15.4% -0.40 0.691 0.40 0.691
19 15.7% 19 15.7% 14 13.5% -0.47 0.636 0.47 0.636
24 19.8% 24 19.8% 13 12.5% -1.48 0.139 1.48 0.139
16 13.2% 16 13.2% 7 6.7% -1.60 0.109 1.60 0.109
13 10.7% 13 10.7% 14 13.5% 0.63 0.532 -0.63 0.532
4 3.3% 4 3.3% 3 2.9% d d
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 1.0% d d
121 100.0% 121 100.0% 104 100.0%
a. The ERROR sample is comprised of restatements that correct unintentional error and a control group of firm-years without restatement. I chose firm-years
     in the control group that are the nearest in asset size to the firm-years of companies that restate to correct unintentional error that have all necessary data 
     and are within the same two digit SIC  code (per COMPUSTAT) and year.
b. The INTENTvsNORESTATE sample is comprised of restatements that proxy for restatements that correct intentional misstatement and the 
     control group of firm-years without restatement described in (e) above.
c. The INTENT sample is comprised of restatements that correct unintentional error and the intentional misstatement correcting restatement proxy.
d. Insufficent counts for meaningful statistical test
e.  The year is the earliest fiscal year in the restated period when the restated period spans more than one year. 
INTENTc
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs IM
ERRORa  
n/a matched on year
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)    
binomial 
proportion test
IM vs 
NORESTATE
2012
Without 
restatement
(NORESTATE)   
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs  
NORESTATE
2009
2010
2011
2008
Unintentional 
Error
(UE) 
Year e 
Total
2004
2005
2006
2007
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
INTENTvsNORESTATEb
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
n/a matched on year
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TABLE 13 Continued 
Panel C: Frequency by Industry 
Industry e n Percent n Percent z sig n Percent z sig z sig
Agriculture 0 0.0% 0 0.0% d 0 0.0% d d
Mining & Construction 4 3.3% 7 5.8% d 4 3.8% d d
Food & Tobacco 2 1.7% 1 0.8% d 1 1.0% d d
Textile & Apparel 3 2.5% 3 2.5% d 1 1.0% d d
Lumber, Furniture, & Printing 2 1.7% 1 0.8% d 6 5.8% d d
Chemicals 3 2.5% 2 1.7% d 3 2.9% d d
Refining & Extractive 5 4.1% 5 4.1% 0.00 1.000 4 3.8% d d
Durable Manufacturers 24 19.8% 27 22.3% -0.31 0.754 14 13.5% -1.72 0.086 1.42 0.155
Computers 16 13.2% 12 9.9% 0.80 0.422 6 5.8% -1.14 0.253 1.88 0.061
Transportation 7 5.8% 5 4.1% 0.59 0.554 3 2.9% d d
Utilities 5 4.1% 4 3.3% d 4 3.8% d d
Retail 6 5.0% 7 5.8% -0.29 0.776 8 7.7% 0.57 0.568 -0.85 0.397
Services 13 10.7% 15 12.4% -0.40 0.688 17 16.3% 0.84 0.398 -1.23 0.218
Banks & Insurance 21 17.4% 20 16.5% 0.17 0.864 23 22.1% 1.06 0.288 -0.90 0.369
Pharmaceuticals 10 8.3% 12 9.9% -0.45 0.655 10 7.3% -0.08 0.939 -0.36 0.723
Total 121 100.0% 121 100.0% 104 100.0%
**, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively  p <0.01 and p <0.05 
a., b., and c. See Panels A and B for sample descriptions.
d. Insufficent counts for meaningful statistical test
INTENTc
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs IM
Unintentional 
Error
(UE) 
e. Industries are based on SIC codes Frankel, Johnson,  and Nelson (2002) as described by Dechow et al. (2011): 
     Agriculture:  0100–0999; Mining & Construction: 1000–1299, 1400–1999; Food  & Tobacco:  2000–2141; Textiles and Apparel:  2200–2399;  
     Lumber,  Furniture, & Printing:  2400–2796; Chemicals: 2800–2824, 2840–2899; Refining & Extractive: 1300–1399, 2900–2999;  
     Durable  Manufacturers: 3000–3569, 3580–3669, 3680–3828, 3852-3999; Computers:  3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379; 
     Transportation: 4000–4899; Utilities: 4900–4999;Retail: 5000–5999; Services: 7000–7369, 7380–9999; Banks & Insurance: 6000–6999;
     Pharmaceuticals: 2830–2836, 3829–3851. 
INTENTvsNORESTATEbERRORa  
Intentional 
Misstatement 
(IM)   
binomial 
proportion test
IM vs 
NORESTATE
Without 
restatement
(NORESTATE)   
binomial 
proportion test
UE vs  
NORESTATE
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TABLE 14 Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Associations with Internal Control Weaknesses using the ERRORa Sample (N=242) 
 
N mean p50 sd skewness N mean p50 sd skewness
z or 
Chi2 p sig
ORGCHANGE 21 0.476 0 0.512 0.095 221 0.267 0 0.443 1.054 4.12 0.042 **
CFOBIG4 21 0.571 1 0.507 -0.289 221 0.421 0 0.495 0.321 1.77 0.183
CFOPOWER 21 -0.620 -0.712 0.512 0.760 221 -0.867 -0.855 0.661 0.157 1.64 0.101
ACBIG4 21 0.381 0 0.498 0.490 221 0.430 0 0.496 0.283 -0.19 0.665
OFFICESIZE 21 16.599 17.042 2.011 -0.377 221 17.047 17.266 1.577 -0.489 -0.85 0.396
BIG4 21 0.762 1 0.436 -1.230 221 0.801 1 0.400 -1.507 -0.18 0.671
AUDITFEE 21 13.910 13.817 0.829 0.705 221 13.845 13.918 0.843 0.018 -0.01 0.995
AUDITINF 21 0.223 0.086 0.307 1.611 221 0.096 0.039 0.144 3.063 1.23 0.219
AUDITORTENURE 21 1.784 1.792 0.971 -0.150 221 1.896 1.946 0.820 -0.402 -0.56 0.574
AUDITORCHANGE 21 0.095 0 0.301 2.758 221 0.054 0 0.227 3.934 0.59 0.443
CFOCHANGE 21 0.238 0 0.436 1.230 221 0.140 0 0.348 2.072 1.45 0.229
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 21 0.100 0.000 0.216 1.704 221 0.193 0.000 0.265 0.992 -1.80 0.075 *
CEOINDEP 21 0.476 0 0.512 0.095 221 0.525 1 0.501 -0.100 -0.18 0.670
IAF 21 0.762 1 0.436 -1.230 221 0.842 1 0.366 -1.871 -0.88 0.347
FIRMSIZE (ln of $M) 21 5.612 5.261 1.277 1.574 221 6.433 6.426 1.310 0.201 -3.09 0.002 ***
AGE (ln of years) 21 2.581 2.639 0.864 -0.015 221 2.614 2.639 0.769 -0.244 -0.17 0.864
LOSS 21 0.571 1 0.507 -0.289 221 0.335 0 0.473 0.700 4.69 0.030 **
COMPLEXITY 21 1.086 1.099 0.800 -0.128 221 1.007 1.099 0.776 -0.069 0.54 0.587
LEVERAGE 21 0.612 0.593 0.395 0.588 221 0.558 0.534 0.291 0.627 0.42 0.674
MTB 21 22.477 2.235 51.109 2.542 221 6.845 2.005 21.045 5.498 1.00 0.316
VOLATILITY 21 48.282 10.710 104.357 3.592 221 60.917 23.418 105.589 3.269 -1.27 0.204
ANALYSTFOLLOW 21 0.476 0 0.512 0.095 221 0.615 1 0.488 -0.474 -1.55 0.213
LITIGIOUS 21 0.143 0 0.359 2.041 221 0.199 0 0.400 1.507 -0.39 0.534
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables are z-statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
    all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
ICWeakAMENDED==1 ICWeakAMENDED==0 Comparison
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel B: Associations with Internal Control Weaknesses using the INTENTvsNORESTATEa sample (N=225) 
 
N mean p50 sd skewness N mean p50 sd skewness
z or 
Chi2 p sig
ORGCHANGE 35 0.257 0 0.443 1.111 190 0.247 0 0.433 1.171 0.02 0.902
CFOBIG4 35 0.400 0 0.497 0.408 190 0.368 0 0.484 0.546 0.13 0.723
CFOPOWER 35 -0.746 -0.679 0.563 -1.298 190 -0.884 -0.860 0.627 0.172 2.00 0.045 **
ACBIG4 35 0.200 0 0.406 1.500 190 0.400 0 0.491 0.408 -5.08 0.024 **
OFFICESIZE 35 16.374 16.417 2.050 -0.096 190 16.971 17.248 1.565 -0.589 -1.64 0.102
BIG4 35 0.571 1 0.502 -0.289 190 0.800 1 0.401 -1.500 -8.58 0.003 ***
AUDITFEE 35 13.354 13.358 0.921 0.134 190 13.809 13.814 0.859 0.094 -2.61 0.009 ***
AUDITINF 35 0.164 0.064 0.254 2.230 190 0.104 0.042 0.161 2.921 0.45 0.651
AUDITORTENURE 35 1.686 1.946 0.911 -0.564 190 1.947 2.079 0.854 -0.347 -1.35 0.177
AUDITORCHANGE 35 0.143 0 0.355 2.041 190 0.053 0 0.224 4.007 3.87 0.049 **
CFOCHANGE 35 0.086 0 0.284 2.960 190 0.126 0 0.333 2.250 -0.46 0.497
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 35 0.085 0.000 0.193 2.121 190 0.153 0.000 0.234 1.272 -1.83 0.066 *
CEOINDEP 35 0.571 1 0.502 -0.289 190 0.463 0 0.500 0.148 1.39 0.239
IAF 35 0.800 1 0.406 -1.500 190 0.847 1 0.361 -1.932 -0.49 0.482
FIRMSIZE (ln of $M) 35 5.578 5.424 1.378 0.407 190 6.452 6.295 1.324 0.204 -3.34 <0.001 ***
AGE (ln of years) 35 2.282 2.398 0.797 -0.661 190 2.629 2.639 0.800 -0.296 -1.97 0.048 **
LOSS 35 0.514 1 0.507 -0.057 190 0.247 0 0.433 1.171 10.25 0.001 ***
COMPLEXITY 35 0.737 0.693 0.742 0.348 190 0.977 1.099 0.766 -0.057 -1.62 0.106
LEVERAGE 35 0.571 0.564 0.321 -0.155 190 0.544 0.532 0.292 1.091 0.77 0.442
MTB 35 5.936 2.039 11.942 3.444 190 6.450 2.072 23.979 6.464 -0.13 0.894
VOLATILITY 35 42.391 10.172 120.766 5.207 190 67.244 21.665 123.398 3.299 -2.41 0.016 **
ANALYSTFOLLOW 35 0.229 0 0.426 1.293 190 0.605 1 0.490 -0.431 -16.92 <0.001 ***
LITIGIOUS 35 0.143 0 0.355 2.041 190 0.168 0 0.375 1.772 -0.14 0.708
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables are z-statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
    all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
ICWeakAMENDED==1 ICWeakAMENDED==0 Comparison
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel C: Differences between firm-years with and without restatement using the ERRORa sample (N=242) 
N mean p50 sd skewness N mean p50 sd skewness
z or 
Chi2 p sig
ICWeakAMENDED 121 0.165 0 0.373 1.802 121 0.008 0 0.091 10.863 18.82 <0.001 ***
ICWeakORIGINAL 121 0.083 0 0.276 3.032 121 0.008 0 0.091 10.863 7.71 0.005 ***
ORGCHANGE 121 0.347 0 0.478 0.642 121 0.223 0 0.418 1.330 4.56 0.033 **
CFOBIG4 121 0.463 0 0.501 0.149 121 0.405 0 0.493 0.387 0.82 0.364
CFOPOWER 121 -0.791 -0.784 0.684 -0.039 121 -0.899 -0.873 0.617 0.332 1.54 0.123
ACBIG4 121 0.430 0 0.497 0.284 121 0.421 0 0.496 0.318 0.02 0.897
OFFICESIZE 121 17.073 17.347 1.705 -0.499 121 16.943 17.248 1.534 -0.545 0.75 0.455
BIG4 121 0.810 1 0.394 -1.580 121 0.785 1 0.412 -1.388 0.23 0.631
AUDITFEE 121 13.904 14.014 0.850 0.002 121 13.798 13.827 0.831 0.134 1.02 0.310
AUDITINF 121 0.119 0.037 0.194 2.873 121 0.095 0.044 0.136 2.928 -0.18 0.858
AUDITORTENURE 121 1.898 1.946 0.797 -0.405 121 1.875 1.946 0.870 -0.353 0.18 0.855
AUDITORCHANGE 121 0.050 0 0.218 4.150 121 0.066 0 0.250 3.492 -0.30 0.582
CFOCHANGE 121 0.182 0 0.387 1.650 121 0.116 0 0.321 2.403 2.09 0.148
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 121 0.182 0.000 0.267 1.065 121 0.187 0.000 0.258 1.020 -0.42 0.672
CEOINDEP 121 0.579 1 0.496 -0.318 121 0.463 0 0.501 0.149 3.25 0.072 *
IAF 121 0.835 1 0.373 -1.802 121 0.835 1 0.373 -1.802 0.00 1.000
FIRMSIZE (ln of $M) 121 6.253 6.155 1.330 0.344 121 6.470 6.308 1.317 0.243 -1.17 0.240
AGE (ln of years) 121 2.572 2.639 0.804 -0.217 121 2.651 2.639 0.747 -0.201 -0.64 0.525
LOSS 121 0.471 0 0.501 0.116 121 0.240 0 0.429 1.220 14.15 <0.001 ***
COMPLEXITY 121 1.045 1.099 0.754 -0.167 121 0.984 1.099 0.800 0.017 0.65 0.518
LEVERAGE 121 0.586 0.605 0.308 0.313 121 0.539 0.509 0.293 1.044 1.39 0.164
MTB 121 10.707 2.005 29.634 4.106 121 5.696 2.048 19.889 6.989 -0.56 0.578
VOLATILITY 121 59.421 20.514 101.807 3.027 121 60.221 23.177 109.159 3.493 -0.29 0.770
ANALYSTFOLLOW 121 0.570 1 0.497 -0.284 121 0.636 1 0.483 -0.567 -1.11 0.293
LITIGIOUS 121 0.198 0 0.400 1.513 121 0.190 0 0.394 1.580 0.03 0.871
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables are z-statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
    all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
ERROR==1 ERROR==0 
ERROR sample 
comparison
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel D: Differences between firm-years with and without restatement using the INTENTvsNORESTATEa sample (N=225) 
N mean p50 sd skewness N mean p50 sd skewness
z or 
Chi2 p sig
ICWeakAMENDED 104 0.327 0 0.471 0.738 121 0.008 0 0.091 10.863 43.23 <0.001 ***
ICWeakORIGINAL 104 0.106 0 0.309 2.564 121 0.008 0 0.091 10.863 10.53 <0.001 ***
ORGCHANGE 104 0.279 0 0.451 0.986 121 0.223 0 0.418 1.330 0.93 0.335
CFOBIG4 104 0.337 0 0.475 0.692 121 0.405 0 0.493 0.387 -1.12 0.290
CFOPOWER 104 -0.819 -0.734 0.620 -0.414 121 -0.899 -0.873 0.617 0.332 1.75 0.080 *
ACBIG4 104 0.308 0 0.464 0.833 121 0.421 0 0.496 0.318 -3.11 0.078 *
OFFICESIZE 104 16.803 16.983 1.798 -0.485 121 16.943 17.248 1.534 -0.545 -0.36 0.722
BIG4 104 0.740 1 0.441 -1.097 121 0.785 1 0.412 -1.388 -0.62 0.430
AUDITFEE 104 13.669 13.670 0.938 0.047 121 13.798 13.827 0.831 0.134 -1.02 0.310
AUDITINF 104 0.134 0.043 0.219 2.495 121 0.095 0.044 0.136 2.928 -0.14 0.891
AUDITORTENURE 104 1.944 2.079 0.864 -0.443 121 1.875 1.946 0.870 -0.353 0.70 0.482
AUDITORCHANGE 104 0.067 0 0.252 3.454 121 0.066 0 0.250 3.492 0.00 0.971
CFOCHANGE 104 0.125 0 0.332 2.268 121 0.116 0 0.321 2.403 0.05 0.831
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 104 0.091 0.000 0.179 1.816 121 0.187 0.000 0.258 1.020 -3.00 0.003
CEOINDEP 104 0.500 1 0.502 0.000 121 0.463 0 0.501 0.149 0.31 0.578
IAF 104 0.846 1 0.363 -1.919 121 0.835 1 0.373 -1.802 0.05 0.815
FIRMSIZE (ln of $M) 104 6.137 6.040 1.408 0.178 121 6.470 6.308 1.317 0.243 -1.69 0.091 *
AGE (ln of years) 104 2.487 2.485 0.867 -0.370 121 2.651 2.639 0.747 -0.201 -1.23 0.217
LOSS 104 0.346 0 0.478 0.647 121 0.240 0 0.429 1.220 3.09 0.079 *
COMPLEXITY 104 0.888 1.099 0.724 -0.055 121 0.984 1.099 0.800 0.017 -0.84 0.399
LEVERAGE 104 0.560 0.554 0.301 0.657 121 0.539 0.509 0.293 1.044 0.85 0.394
MTB 104 7.155 2.066 25.303 6.255 121 5.696 2.048 19.889 6.989 -0.40 0.689
VOLATILITY 104 67.052 15.438 137.930 3.445 121 60.221 23.177 109.159 3.493 -1.46 0.143
ANALYSTFOLLOW 104 0.442 0 0.499 0.232 121 0.636 1 0.483 -0.567 -8.50 0.004 ***
LITIGIOUS 104 0.135 0 0.343 2.141 121 0.190 0 0.394 1.580 -1.25 0.263
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables are z-statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
    all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
INTENT==1 ERROR==0 
INTENTvsNORESTATE 
sample comparison
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TABLE 14 Continued 
Panel E: Differences between firm-years with restatements using the INTENTa sample (N=225) 
N mean p50 sd skewness N mean p50 sd skewness
z or 
Chi2 p sig
ICWeakAMENDED 104 0.327 0 0.471 0.738 121 0.165 0 0.373 1.802 8.01 0.005 ***
ICWeakORIGINAL 104 0.106 0 0.309 2.564 121 0.083 0 0.276 3.032 0.35 0.552
ORGCHANGE 104 0.279 0 0.451 0.986 121 0.347 0 0.478 0.642 -1.01 0.272
CFOBIG4 104 0.337 0 0.475 0.692 121 0.463 0 0.501 0.149 -3.70 0.054 *
CFOPOWER 104 -0.819 -0.734 0.620 -0.414 121 -0.791 -0.784 0.684 -0.039 0.54 0.957
ACBIG4 104 0.308 0 0.464 0.833 121 0.430 0 0.497 0.284 -3.56 0.059 *
OFFICESIZE 104 16.803 16.983 1.798 -0.485 121 17.073 17.347 1.705 -0.499 -1.11 0.265
BIG4 104 0.740 1 0.441 -1.097 121 0.810 1 0.394 -1.580 -1.56 0.211
AUDITFEE 104 13.669 13.670 0.938 0.047 121 13.904 14.014 0.850 0.002 -1.87 0.062 *
AUDITINF 104 0.134 0.043 0.219 2.495 121 0.119 0.037 0.194 2.873 -0.04 0.971
AUDITORTENURE 104 1.944 2.079 0.864 -0.443 121 1.898 1.946 0.797 -0.405 0.45 0.651
AUDITORCHANGE 104 0.067 0 0.252 3.454 121 0.050 0 0.218 4.150 0.32 0.570
CFOCHANGE 104 0.125 0 0.332 2.268 121 0.182 0 0.387 1.650 -1.37 0.241
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 104 0.091 0.000 0.179 1.816 121 0.182 0.000 0.267 1.065 -2.46 0.014 **
CEOINDEP 104 0.500 1 0.502 0.000 121 0.579 1 0.496 -0.318 -1.39 0.239
IAF 104 0.846 1 0.363 -1.919 121 0.835 1 0.373 -1.802 0.05 0.815
FIRMSIZE (ln of $M) 104 6.137 6.040 1.408 0.178 121 6.253 6.155 1.330 0.344 -0.68 0.499
AGE (ln of years) 104 2.487 2.485 0.867 -0.370 121 2.572 2.639 0.804 -0.217 -0.62 0.537
LOSS 104 0.346 0 0.478 0.647 121 0.471 0 0.501 0.116 -3.60 0.058 *
COMPLEXITY 104 0.888 1.099 0.724 -0.055 121 1.045 1.099 0.754 -0.167 -1.56 0.118
LEVERAGE 104 0.560 0.554 0.301 0.657 121 0.586 0.605 0.308 0.313 -0.82 0.414
MTB 104 7.155 2.066 25.303 6.255 121 10.707 2.005 29.634 4.106 0.17 0.865
VOLATILITY 104 67.052 15.438 137.930 3.445 121 59.421 20.514 101.807 3.027 -1.22 0.221
ANALYSTFOLLOW 104 0.442 0 0.499 0.232 121 0.570 1 0.497 -0.284 -3.66 0.056 *
LITIGIOUS 104 0.135 0 0.343 2.141 121 0.198 0 0.400 1.513 -1.62 0.203
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables are z-statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
    all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
INTENT==1 INTENT = 0 (& ERROR==1) 
INTENT sample 
comparison
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TABLE 15 Chapter 3 Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Measures 
 
Organizational Change: N mean p50 N mean p50
z or 
Chi2 p sig N mean p50
z or 
Chi2 p sig
z or 
Chi2 p sig
  ORGCHANGE 104 0.279 0 121 0.339 0 -1.21 0.272 121 0.23 0 1.85 0.064 * 0.93 0.335
CFO Expertise
 (CFOEXP) - one of :
  CFO_BIG4PARTNER 104 0.067 0 121 0.050 0 0.32 0.570 121 0.066 0 -0.30 0.582 0.00 0.971
  CFOBIG4 104 0.337 0 121 0.463 0 -3.70 0.054 * 121 0.405 0 0.91 0.364 -1.12 0.290
  CFOCPA 104 0.529 1 121 0.612 1 -1.56 0.211 121 0.562 1 0.78 0.434 -0.25 0.619
  CFOMBA 104 0.462 0 121 0.372 0 1.85 0.173 121 0.380 0 -0.13 0.894 1.23 0.268
  CFOPREVIOUS 104 0.644 1 121 0.653 1 -0.02 0.892 121 0.636 1 0.27 0.788 0.00 0.995
  CFOTENURE 104 8.519 7 121 8.736 6 0.10 0.918 121 9.760 8 -1.95 0.051 * -1.90 0.057 *
CFO Influence:
  CFOPOWER 104 0.582 0.480 121 0.588 0.457 0.06 0.953 121 0.514 0.418 1.54 0.123 1.75 0.080 *
Audit Committee 
Expertise 
(ACEXP) - one of:
  ACAFE 104 0.298 0.333 121 0.349 0.333 -1.65 0.099 * 121 0.314 0.333 1.24 0.216 -0.31 0.756
  ACBIG4 104 0.308 0 121 0.430 0 -3.56 0.059 * 121 0.421 0 0.02 0.897 -3.11 0.078 *
  ACCPA 104 0.500 1 121 0.636 1 -4.25 0.039 ** 121 0.537 1 2.45 0.117 -0.31 0.578
  ACMBA 104 0.326 0.333 121 0.317 0.333 0.11 0.914 121 0.337 0.333 -0.29 0.770 -0.16 0.875
Auditor Size
 (AUDITORQUAL) one of :
  OFFICESIZE 104 16.793 16.983 121 17.080 17.347 -1.12 0.263 121 16.943 17.248 0.75 0.455 -0.36 0.722
  BIG4 104 0.740 1 121 0.810 1 -1.56 0.211 121 0.785 1 0.23 0.631 -0.62 0.430
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables comparisons are z -statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
   Continuous variables are not winsorized
   Variables are described in Table 12.
INTENTvsNORESTATE
 sampleERROR=0INTENT==1 INTENT=0 (& ERROR=1)
INTENT 
sample
ERROR
 sample
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TABLE 15 Continued 
 
N mean p50 N mean p50
z or 
Chi2 p sig N mean p50
z or 
Chi2 p sig
z or 
Chi2 p sig
AUDITFEE 104 13.657 13.67 121 13.911 14.014 -1.87 0.062 * 121 13.804 13.827 1.02 0.309 -1.02 0.309
AUDITINF 104 0.134 0.043 121 0.124 0.037 -0.04 0.969 121 0.095 0.044 -0.18 0.858 -0.14 0.891
AUDITORTENURE 104 9.712 8 121 8.818 7 0.45 0.651 121 9.107 7 0.23 0.822 0.71 0.480
AUDITORCHANGE 104 0.067 0 121 0.050 0 0.33 0.570 121 0.066 0 0.18 0.855 0.00 0.971
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 104 0.091 0 121 0.182 0 -2.46 0.014 ** 121 0.187 0 -0.43 0.671 -3.00 0.003 ***
CFOCHANGE 104 0.125 0 121 0.182 0 -1.37 0.241 121 0.116 0 2.09 0.148 0.05 0.831
GOVERNANCE - one of:
  CEOINDEP 104 0.500 0.500 121 0.579 1 -1.39 0.239 121 0.463 0 3.25 0.072 * 0.31 0.578
  GOV 104 2.654 3 121 2.727 3 -0.39 0.700 121 2.678 3 0.24 0.811 -0.15 0.884
     CEONOTFOUNDER 104 0.817 1 121 0.777 1 0.56 0.453 121 0.86 1 -2.78 0.096 * -0.74 0.389
     SMALLER_BOARD 104 0.404 0 121 0.455 0 -0.59 0.444 121 0.355 0 2.47 0.116 0.56 0.455
     BOARD_INDEP 104 0.471 0 121 0.405 0 1.00 0.318 121 0.479 0 -1.36 0.244 -0.02 0.902
     BOARD_TENURE 104 0.462 0 121 0.512 1 -0.58 0.447 121 0.521 1 -0.02 0.898 -0.78 0.376
IAF 104 0.846 1 121 0.835 1 0.05 0.815 121 0.835 1 0.00 1.000 0.05 0.815
Firm Characteristics
ICWeakORIGINAL 104 0.106 0 121 0.083 0 0.35 0.552 121 0.008 0 7.71 0.005 *** 10.53 0.001 ***
ICWeakAMENDED 104 0.327 0 121 0.165 0 8.01 0.005 *** 121 0.008 0 18.82 <0.001 *** 43.23 <0.001 ***
FIRMSIZE $M 104 1190.442 420.300 121 1557.804 471.247 -0.68 0.499 121 1591.588 549.149 -1.17 0.241 -1.69 0.091 *
AGE (years) 104 16.981 12.000 121 17.752 14.000 -0.63 0.532 121 18.314 14.000 -0.64 0.525 -1.24 0.215
LOSS 104 0.346 0 121 0.471 0 -3.60 0.058 * 121 0.240 0 14.14 <0.001 *** 3.09 0.079 *
ROA 104 -0.012 0.030 121 -0.029 0.010 3.08 0.002 *** 121 0.014 0.047 -4.94 <0.001 *** -1.61 0.107
COMPLEXITY 104 0.888 1.099 121 1.045 1.099 -1.70 0.089 * 121 0.986 1.099 0.65 0.519 -0.84 0.399
LEVERAGE 104 0.596 0.554 121 0.587 0.605 -0.82 0.414 121 0.541 0.509 1.39 0.165 0.85 0.395
MTB 104 3.584 1.896 121 4.156 1.790 1.18 0.240 121 1.885 2.003 -1.22 0.222 -0.25 0.804
VOLATILITY 104 67.534 15.438 121 59.421 20.514 -1.22 0.221 121 62.424 23.177 -0.29 0.770 -1.47 0.143
ANALYSTFOLLOW 104 0.231 0 121 0.438 0 -10.67 0.001 *** 121 0.364 0 1.39 0.238 -4.68 0.030 **
LITIGIOUS 104 0.135 0 121 0.198 0 -1.62 0.203 121 0.190 0 0.03 0.871 -1.25 0.263
*, **, *** p <0.1, p <0.05 & p <0.01 two-tailed. Continuous variables comparisons are z -statistics from Wilcoxon ranksum tests. 
   Continuous variables are not winsorized
   Variables are described in Table 12.
Other Auditor Characteristics:
Other Management/Governance Characterisitcs:
INTENTvsNORESTATE
 sampleINTENT==1 INTENT=0 (& ERROR=1)
INTENT 
sample ERROR=0
ERROR
 sample
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TABLE 16 Correlations of Test and Control Variables 
Panel A: Pearson correlations of test and control variables using the ERROR sample (N=242) 
ORGCHANGE 1.000
CFOBIG4 0.186 ** 1.000
CFOPOWER
-0.116 -0.037 1.000
ACBIG4 0.086 0.073 0.045 1.000
OFFICESIZE 0.165 * -0.046 -0.119 0.034 1.000
BIG4 0.136 * 0.026 -0.138 * 0.101 0.669 ***
AUDITFEE 0.297 *** 0.064 -0.285 *** -0.001 0.453 *** 1.000
AUDITINF
-0.004 0.107 0.046 -0.114 -0.708 *** -0.057
AUDITORTENURE 0.111 0.027 -0.098 0.118 0.290 *** 0.270 *** 1.000
AUDITORCHANGE 0.040 0.033 0.021 -0.070 -0.144 * -0.093 -0.563 *** 1.000
CFOCHANGE
-0.007 0.032 0.033 0.086 -0.078 0.043 -0.039 -0.054 1.000
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.095 -0.117 -0.090 -0.068 0.109 0.265 *** -0.034 0.002 0.052 1.000
CEOINDEP 0.020 0.006 0.073 -0.011 -0.078 -0.024 -0.115 0.202 ** 0.145 * 0.016
IAF -0.040 -0.037 -0.127 * 0.136 * 0.042 0.217 *** 0.015 -0.033 -0.127 * 0.061
FIRMSIZE 0.046 -0.101 -0.250 *** -0.089 0.289 *** 0.587 *** 0.121 -0.077 -0.065 0.272 ***
AGE 0.098 -0.010 -0.081 0.022 0.071 0.181 ** 0.258 *** -0.057 -0.085 0.030
LOSS 0.220 *** 0.082 0.052 0.059 -0.011 -0.067 0.054 -0.036 0.126 * 0.019
ROA
-0.057 0.018 -0.049 -0.016 -0.014 0.133 * -0.008 0.002 -0.031 -0.049
COMPLEXITY 0.260 *** 0.021 -0.107 -0.021 0.236 *** 0.542 *** 0.208 ** 0.031 -0.016 0.122
LEVERAGE -0.054 0.039 -0.073 0.008 -0.136 * -0.027 -0.017 0.020 0.066 0.003
MTB 0.123 0.074 0.054 -0.033 -0.022 -0.066 0.173 ** -0.059 -0.002 -0.083
VOLATILITY 0.113 -0.063 -0.216 *** -0.069 0.209 ** 0.563 *** 0.103 -0.003 -0.056 0.284 ***
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.082 -0.006 -0.060 0.049 0.159 * 0.294 *** 0.016 -0.016 -0.017 0.173 **
LITIGIOUS 0.037 -0.072 0.090 0.021 0.139 * -0.093 0.066 0.013 -0.029 -0.038
*, **, *** p <0.05, p <0.01 & p <0.001
all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
AUDIT
FEE
AUDITOR
TENURE
AUDITOR
CHANGE
CFO
CHANGE
CFO
EQUITY
PAY
ORG
CHANGE 
CFO
BIG4
CFO
POWER
AC
BIG4
OFFICE
SIZE
 
  
163 
 
TABLE 16 Panel A Continued 
ORGCHANGE 
CFOBIG4
CFOPOWER
ACBIG4
OFFICESIZE
BIG4
AUDITFEE
AUDITINF
AUDITORTENURE
AUDITORCHANGE
CFOCHANGE
CFO_EQUITY_PAY
CEOINDEP 1.000
IAF -0.004 1.000
FIRMSIZE -0.081 0.242 *** 1.000
AGE -0.095 0.174 ** 0.191 ** 1.000
LOSS 0.056 -0.088 -0.322 *** -0.081 1.000
COMPLEXITY -0.069 0.043 0.295 *** 0.337***-0.015 1.000
LEVERAGE 0.080 0.071 -0.091 -0.006 0.160 -0.237 *** 1.000
MTB 0.048 -0.202 ** -0.135 * 0.006 0.234 *** -0.062 0.516 *** 1.000
VOLATILITY -0.048 0.169 ** 0.524 *** 0.057 0.047 0.265 *** 0.066 -0.074 1.000
ANALYSTFOLLOW -0.034 0.003 0.424 *** -0.082 -0.016 0.087 -0.068 -0.086 0.277 *** 1.000
LITIGIOUS 0.053 -0.063 -0.106 -0.128 * 0.181 ** -0.045 -0.126 0.230 *** -0.054 0.014 1.000
*, **, *** p <0.05, p <0.01 & p <0.001
all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
ANALYST
FOLLOW
LEVER
AGE MTB 
VOL
ATILITY
COMP
LEXITY
CEO
INDEP IAF
FIRM
SIZE AGE LOSS LITIGIOUS
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TABLE 16 Continued 
Panel B: Pearson correlations of test and control variables using the INTENT sample (N=242) 
ORGCHANGE 1.000
CFOBIG4 0.123 1.000
CFOPOWER -0.173 ** -0.110 1.000
ACBIG4 0.049 0.001 0.059 1.000
OFFICESIZE 0.098 -0.024 -0.166 * 0.051 1.000
BIG4 0.156 * 0.048 -0.176 ** 0.081 0.693 ***
AUDITFEE 0.299 *** 0.144 * -0.317 *** 0.026 0.453 * 1.000
AUDITINF 0.008 0.040 0.084 -0.109 -0.720 *** -0.076
AUDITORTENURE 0.067 -0.041 -0.189 ** 0.024 0.282 *** 0.298 *** 1.000
AUDITORCHANGE 0.037 0.029 0.023 -0.034 -0.200 ** -0.143 * -0.576 *** 1.000
CFOCHANGE 0.052 -0.004 -0.055 -0.002 0.035 0.089 0.042 -0.106 1.000
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.014 -0.005 -0.105 -0.056 0.116 0.222 *** -0.005 -0.039 0.047 1.000
CEOINDEP
-0.067 -0.115 0.030 -0.102 -0.027 -0.079 -0.010 0.036 0.124 -0.005
IAF
-0.095 0.014 -0.174 ** 0.011 0.020 0.152 * 0.027 -0.048 -0.047 0.025
FIRMSIZE 0.071 0.045 -0.288 *** 0.023 0.353 *** 0.604 *** 0.252 *** -0.105 0.050 0.240 ***
AGE 0.036 -0.081 -0.234 *** 0.019 0.128 0.226 *** 0.317 *** -0.040 -0.033 0.089
LOSS 0.110 0.044 0.164 * -0.013 -0.092 -0.165 * -0.058 0.024 0.013 -0.011
ROA 0.035 0.090 -0.031 0.054 -0.011 0.171 * -0.023 0.036 0.002 0.040
COMPLEXITY 0.240 *** 0.030 -0.183 ** 0.042 0.297 *** 0.489 *** 0.347 *** -0.071 0.053 0.127
LEVERAGE -0.061 0.006 -0.130 0.018 -0.137 * 0.056 0.055 -0.089 0.088 -0.029
MTB 0.154 * 0.040 0.029 -0.049 -0.053 -0.082 0.120 -0.058 0.005 -0.087
VOLATILITY 0.005 -0.001 -0.236 *** -0.051 0.209 ** 0.524 *** 0.135 * -0.062 -0.079 0.169 *
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.128 0.009 0.025 0.056 0.179 ** 0.309 *** 0.126 -0.063 0.052 0.071
LITIGIOUS 0.153 * -0.106 0.127 -0.054 0.141 * -0.077 0.066 -0.010 -0.063 -0.007
*, **, *** p <0.05, p <0.01 & p <0.001
all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
CFO
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TABLE 16 Panel B Continued 
ORGCHANGE 
CFOBIG4
CFOPOWER
ACBIG4
OFFICESIZE
BIG4
AUDITFEE
AUDITINF
AUDITORTENURE
AUDITORCHANGE
CFOCHANGE
CFO_EQUITY_PAY
CEOINDEP 1.000
IAF 0.086 1.000
FIRMSIZE
-0.062 0.208 ** 1.000
AGE 
-0.136 * 0.160 * 0.259 *** 1.000
LOSS
-0.008 -0.151 * -0.390 *** -0.124 1.000
COMPLEXITY
-0.186 ** 0.016 0.265 *** 0.270***-0.042 1.000
LEVERAGE 0.089 0.125 -0.056 0.084 0.108 -0.144 * 1.000
MTB -0.010 -0.160 * -0.130 0.017 0.257 *** -0.064 0.510 *** 1.000
VOLATILITY -0.002 0.152 * 0.503 *** 0.152 * -0.125 0.166 * 0.051 -0.091 1.000
ANALYSTFOLLOW -0.006 -0.039 0.433 *** 0.001 -0.136 * 0.156 * -0.106 -0.070 0.303 *** 1.000
LITIGIOUS 0.057 -0.127 -0.016 -0.122 0.224 *** -0.100 -0.119 0.221 *** 0.065 0.132 * 1.000
*, **, *** p <0.05, p <0.01 & p <0.001
all continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate against outliers.
CEO
INDEP IAF
FIRM
SIZE AGE LOSS LITIGIOUS
COMP
LEXITY
LEVER
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TABLE 17 Chapter 3 Model Tests  
Panel A: Test Results of Logit Regressions for Model 1, 2 and 3 (results reported in log odds, the logit metric) 
Dependent Variable
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
ORGCHANGE 1.67 1.57 0.61 0.87 0.93 1.34 0.15 0.20
CFOBIG4 0.53 0.65 0.62 1.68 * -0.18 -0.45 -0.91 -2.16 *
CFOPOWER 1.10 1.66 * 0.60 1.95 * 0.20 0.52 -0.19 -0.61
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE -1.17 -1.00 -1.63 -2.38 ** -0.74 -0.92 0.69 0.98
CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE -0.43 -0.46 -0.82 -1.50 -0.26 -0.44 0.43 0.79
ACBIG4 -0.58 -0.99 0.00 0.01 -0.59 -1.68 * -0.84 -2.29 *
OFFICESIZE -0.35 -1.34 0.04 0.39 -0.05 -0.39 -0.05 -0.44
AUDITFEE 1.14 2.19 * 0.37 1.25 0.06 0.21 -0.13 -0.48
AUDITORTENURE -0.12 -0.35 0.02 0.08 0.36 1.67 * 0.34 1.52
CFO_EQUITY_PAY -1.35 -1.04 -0.16 -0.25 -2.02 -2.62 ** -1.92 -2.59 **
CEOINDEP -0.62 -0.89 0.48 1.58 0.14 0.43 -0.81 -2.32 *
FIRMSIZE -0.85 -2.42 ** -0.09 -0.57 -0.04 -0.19 0.08 0.42
AGE 0.06 0.12 -0.16 -0.72 -0.35 -1.51 -0.39 -1.81 *
LOSS 1.30 1.52 1.15 3.12 ** 0.49 1.24 -0.61 -1.70 *
COMPLEXITY -0.52 -1.04 0.21 0.74 0.40 1.40 0.01 0.02
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.01 0.01 -0.42 -1.25 -0.77 -1.84 * -0.49 -1.19
_cons -20.53 -3.40 *** -5.99 -1.66 * 12.14 3.17 ** 16.47 4.28 ***
N 218 242 225 225
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.12 0.18 0.18
log liklihood -46.08 -147.12 -127.99 -127.67
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 2.87 9.40 4.61 3.20
Prob > chi2 0.9422 0.3099 0.7982 0.9209
Area under ROC curve 0.8929 0.7288 0.7702 0.7719
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively p < 0.001, p < 0.01, and p <0.05 one-tailed with robust standard errors
a. ICWeakAMENDED equal to 1 if auditor SOX 404 report of ineffective control; 0 otherwise in a logit regression using the 
    ERROR sample (see b. Below) except for observations in industries that predict effective control perfectly.
b. ERROR = 1 for the 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s); 0 for 121 matched firm-years without restatement.
c. INTENTvsNORESTATE = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years without restatement.
d. INTENT = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ICWeakAMENDEDa ERRORb INTENTvsNORESTATEc INTENTd
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TABLE 17 Continued 
Panel B: Internal Control Associations - Model 1using the ERRORa sample  
ICWeakAMENDED
Odds
 Ratio b
Robust
 Std. Err. z P>z sig prediction
ORGCHANGE 5.33 5.68 1.57 0.116 0.93 30.73
CFOBIG4 1.70 1.38 0.65 0.513 0.45 6.47
CFOPOWER 3.01 2.00 1.66 0.098 1.01 8.98 *
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 0.31 0.36 -1.00 0.318 0.05 2.12 significant H6
CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE 0.65 0.60 -0.46 0.644 0.14 2.99 significant H7
ACBIG4 0.56 0.33 -0.99 0.324 0.21 1.47 <1 H9
OFFICESIZE 0.70 0.18 -1.34 0.182 0.46 1.08 ?
AUDITFEE 3.12 1.62 2.19 0.028 1.33 7.32 * >1
AUDITORTENURE 0.89 0.30 -0.35 0.727 0.51 1.54 ?
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.26 0.34 -1.04 0.299 0.03 2.20 ?
CEOINDEP 0.54 0.38 -0.89 0.373 0.17 1.69 <1
FIRMSIZE 0.43 0.15 -2.42 0.016 0.24 0.76 * <1
AGE 1.06 0.54 0.12 0.903 0.46 2.47 <1
LOSS 3.68 3.16 1.52 0.129 0.90 15.11 >1
COMPLEXITY 0.60 0.30 -1.04 0.300 0.26 1.35 >1
ANALYSTFOLLOW 1.01 0.88 0.01 0.993 0.24 4.22 ?
_cons 1.22E-09 7.34E-09 -3.40 0.001 5.98E-14 2.5E-05
year fixed effects yes
industry fixed effects yes
ORGCHANGE X  CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE X  CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE -1.82 3.49  >1 H1 
CFOBIG4 X  CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE b -2.46 1.22 <1 H2
CFOPOWER X  CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE  b -2.08 1.13 <1 H4
N 218
Pseudo R2 0.33
log likelihood -46.08
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 2.87
Prob > chi2 0.9422
Area under ROC curve 0.8929
* indicates one is not included in the 90% confidence interval and that 
   results are significant for one-sided preditions at the 95% level
a. The ERROR sample is comprised of 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error (ERROR=1) 
    and 121 firm-years without restatement matched by nearest asset size within the same year 
    and two-digit SIC code (ERROR=0). 
b. When results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly positive (negative) if the confidence interval 
    for that variable is greater (less) than 1.0 and insignificant if the confidence interval includes 1.0. 
    Interactions expressed as odds ratios operate multiplicatively. Accordingly, the test of the overall significance 
    of a variable with a significant interaction is whether or not the confidence interval of the product of the main 
    and interaction effects contains 1.0. 
90% Confidence
 Interval
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TABLE 17 Continued 
Panel C: Unintentional Error Associations - Model 2 using the ERRORa sample  
ERROR
Odds
 Ratio b
Robust
 Std. Err. z P>z sig prediction
ORGCHANGE 1.83 1.28 0.87 0.383 0.58 5.77
CFOBIG4 1.85 0.68 1.68 0.093 1.01 3.39 *
CFOPOWER 1.82 0.56 1.95 0.051 1.10 3.00 *
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 0.20 0.13 -2.38 0.017 0.06 0.60 *
CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE 0.44 0.24 -1.50 0.134 0.18 1.08
ACBIG4 1.00 0.32 0.01 0.996 0.60 1.68 <1 H10
OFFICESIZE 1.04 0.11 0.39 0.699 0.88 1.24 <1 H12
AUDITFEE 1.45 0.43 1.25 0.210 0.89 2.35 >1
AUDITORTENURE 1.02 0.22 0.08 0.932 0.71 1.45 ?
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.85 0.54 -0.25 0.800 0.30 2.42 ?
CEOINDEP 1.61 0.49 1.58 0.114 0.98 2.64 <1
FIRMSIZE 0.91 0.15 -0.57 0.569 0.70 1.19 <1
AGE 0.85 0.19 -0.72 0.473 0.59 1.23 <1
LOSS 3.14 1.16 3.12 0.002 1.72 5.76 * >1
COMPLEXITY 1.23 0.34 0.74 0.462 0.78 1.95 >1
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.66 0.22 -1.25 0.210 0.38 1.14 ?
_cons 0.00 0.01 -1.66 0.097 6.67E-06 0.94 *
year fixed effects yes
industry fixed effects yes
CFOBIG4 X  CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE  b -2.49 0.47 * <1 H3
CFOPOWER X  CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE b -1.32 0.34 * <1 H5
N 242
Pseudo R2 0.12
log likelihood -147.12
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 9.40
Prob > chi2 0.3099
Area under ROC curve 0.7288
* indicates one is not included in the 90% confidence interval and that 
   results are significant for one-sided preditions at the 95% level
a. The ERROR sample is comprised of 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error and 
    121 firm-years without restatement matched by nearest asset size within the same year 
    and two-digit SIC code.
b. When results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly positive (negative) if the confidence interval 
    for that variable is greater (less) than 1.0 and insignificant if the confidence interval includes 1.0. 
    Interactions expressed as odds ratios operate multiplicatively. Accordingly, the test of the overall significance 
    of a variable with a significant interaction is whether or not the confidence interval of the product of the main 
    and interaction effects contains 1.0. 
90% Confidence
 Interval
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TABLE 17 Continued 
Panel D: Intentional Misstatement Associations - Model 2 using the INTENTvsNORESTATEa sample  
INENTvsNORESTATE
Odds
 Ratio b
Robust
 Std. Err. z P>z sig
ORGCHANGE 2.53 1.74 1.34 0.179 0.81 7.85
CFOBIG4 0.83 0.34 -0.45 0.655 0.43 1.63
CFOPOWER 1.22 0.46 0.52 0.600 0.65 2.28
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 0.48 0.38 -0.92 0.356 0.13 1.78
CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE 0.77 0.45 -0.44 0.658 0.30 2.02
ACBIG4 0.55 0.19 -1.68 0.093 0.31 0.99 *
OFFICESIZE 0.95 0.12 -0.39 0.700 0.78 1.17
AUDITFEE 1.07 0.33 0.21 0.835 0.64 1.76
AUDITORTENURE 1.43 0.31 1.67 0.094 1.01 2.04 *
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.13 0.10 -2.62 0.009 0.04 0.47 *
CEOINDEP 1.15 0.38 0.43 0.666 0.67 1.97
FIRMSIZE 0.96 0.18 -0.19 0.850 0.71 1.32
AGE 0.70 0.16 -1.51 0.130 0.48 1.03
LOSS 1.64 0.65 1.24 0.216 0.85 3.15
COMPLEXITY 1.49 0.42 1.40 0.162 0.93 2.37
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.46 0.19 -1.84 0.065 0.23 0.92 *
_cons 1.87E+05 7.18E+05 3.17 0.002 341.60 1.03E+08
year fixed effects yes
industry fixed effects yes
N 225
Pseudo R2 0.18
log likelihood -127.99
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 4.61
Prob > chi2 0.7982
Area under ROC curve 0.7702
* indicates one is not included in the 90% confidence interval and that 
   results are significant for one-sided preditions at the 95% level
a. The INTENTvsNORESTATE sample is comprised of 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional 
    misstatement (INTENTvsNORESTATE = 1) and 121 firm-years without restatement
    INTENTvsNORESTATE = 0)
b. When results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly positive (negative) if the confidence interval 
    for that variable is greater (less) than 1.0 and insignificant if the confidence interval includes 1.0. 
    Interactions expressed as odds ratios operate multiplicatively. Accordingly, the test of the overall significance 
    of a variable with a significant interaction is whether or not the confidence interval of the product of the main 
    and interaction effects contains 1.0. 
90% Confidence
 Interval
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TABLE 17 Continued 
Panel E: Comparison of Restatement Associations - Model 3 using the INTENTa sample  
INTENT
Odds
 Ratio c
Robust
 Std. Err. z P>z sig prediction
ORGCHANGE 1.17 0.89 0.20 0.840 0.33 4.10
CFOBIG4 0.40 0.17 -2.16 0.030 0.20 0.80 *
CFOPOWER 0.82 0.26 -0.61 0.540 0.49 1.39 >H8 b
CFOBIG4*ORGCHANGE 2.00 1.42 0.98 0.329 0.62 6.44
CFOPOWER*ORGCHANGE 1.53 0.83 0.79 0.430 0.63 3.74
ACBIG4 0.43 0.16 -2.29 0.022 0.24 0.79 * < H11  b
OFFICESIZE 0.96 0.10 -0.44 0.661 0.80 1.13 < H13 b
AUDITFEE 0.88 0.24 -0.48 0.634 0.56 1.37
AUDITORTENURE 1.40 0.31 1.52 0.127 0.97 2.02
CFO_EQUITY_PAY 0.15 0.11 -2.59 0.010 0.04 0.50 *
CEOINDEP 0.44 0.16 -2.32 0.020 0.25 0.79 *
FIRMSIZE 1.08 0.20 0.42 0.674 0.80 1.47
AGE 0.68 0.15 -1.81 0.071 0.47 0.97 *
LOSS 0.54 0.20 -1.70 0.090 0.30 0.98 *
COMPLEXITY 1.01 0.27 0.02 0.984 0.65 1.56
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.61 0.25 -1.19 0.234 0.31 1.21
_cons 1.42E+07 5.47E+07 4.28 0.000 2.54E+04 7.95E+09
year fixed effects yes
industry fixed effects yes
N 225
Pseudo R2 0.18
log likelihood -127.67
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 3.20
Prob > chi2 0.9209
Area under ROC curve 0.7719
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively  p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1 one-tailed
a. The INTENT sample is comprised of 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement
    (INTENT=1) and 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error (INTENT=0). 
b. The direction of the prediction is predicated on the assumption that restatement likelihood is 
    decreasing in the test variable and that any significant association between the test variable 
    is in the same direction for both types of restatement. 
c. When results are reported as odds ratios, an association is significantly positive (negative) if the confidence interval 
    for that variable is greater (less) than 1.0 and insignificant if the confidence interval includes 1.0. 
    Interactions expressed as odds ratios operate multiplicatively. Accordingly, the test of the overall significance 
    of a variable with a significant interaction is whether or not the confidence interval of the product of the main 
    and interaction effects contains 1.0. 
90% Confidence
 Interval
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TABLE 17 Continued 
Panel F: Model 1, 2 & 3 tests with all control variables (results reported in log odds, the logit metric) 
Dependent Variable
coef. z coef. z coef. z coef. z
ORGCHANGE 1.63 0.96 0.62 0.85 0.94 1.32 0.53 0.69
CFOBIG4 0.51 0.58 0.56 1.48 -0.30 -0.70 -0.96 -2.24 *
CFOPOWER 0.98 1.07 0.58 1.85 * 0.25 0.59 -0.23 -0.65
CFOBIG4
  *ORGCHANGE -1.08 -0.92 -1.64 -2.34 ** -0.66 -0.76 0.75 1.05
CFOPOWER
  *ORGCHANGE -0.40 -0.28 -0.81 -1.41 -0.31 -0.47 0.72 1.18
ACBIG4 -0.39 -0.59 -0.02 -0.06 -0.47 -1.23 -0.90 -2.45 **
OFFICESIZE -0.28 -1.07 0.06 0.51 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.16
AUDITFEE 0.96 1.73 * 0.45 1.42 0.03 0.08 -0.28 -0.94
AUDITORTENURE -0.21 -0.54 -0.12 -0.50 0.53 1.93 * 0.68 2.39 **
AUDITORCHANGE 0.05 0.03 -0.57 -0.62 0.78 0.92 1.24 1.39
CFOCHANGE 0.66 0.86 0.16 0.33 0.33 0.63 -0.12 -0.25
CFO_EQUITY_PAY -1.20 -0.95 -0.14 -0.21 -2.29 -2.87 ** -1.96 -2.60 **
CEOINDEP -0.62 -0.72 0.49 1.53 0.03 0.08 -0.80 -2.17 *
IAF -0.41 -0.43 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.45 0.07 0.14
FIRMSIZE -0.87 -1.72 * -0.05 -0.28 -0.21 -0.90 0.01 0.05
AGE 0.06 0.12 -0.18 -0.80 -0.36 -1.42 -0.45 -1.90 *
LOSS 0.88 1.17 1.21 3.10 ** 0.45 1.04 -0.48 -1.28
COMPLEXITY -0.40 -0.72 0.23 0.81 0.31 1.01 -0.19 -0.66
LEVERAGE -1.30 -0.52 -0.18 -0.22 -1.23 -1.34 -0.72 -0.79
MTB 0.02 1.19 0.01 0.82 0.01 1.42 0.00 -0.24
VOLATILITY 0.00 0.70 0.00 -0.88 0.00 1.70 * 0.00 2.34 *
ANALYSTFOLLOW 0.00 0.00 -0.42 -1.24 -0.77 -1.82 * -0.58 -1.33
LITIGIOUS 0.67 0.64 -0.39 -0.75 -0.94 -1.79 * -0.70 -1.14
_cons -18.60 -2.58 ** -7.01 -1.86 * 14.51 3.62 *** 16.81 3.96 ***
year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
N 218 242 225 225
Wald chi2 626.39 41.07 270.79 210.31
Prob > Wald chi2 <0.0001 0.56 <0.0001 <0.0001
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.13 0.20 0.20
log likelihood -44.86 -145.61 -123.72 -123.56
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 3.56 16.48 3.89 14.62
Prob > HL chi2 0.8943 0.0360 0.8672 0.0669
Area under ROC curve 0.8939 0.7329 0.7864 0.7889
***, **, * indicates a statitical difference at respectively p<0.001, p< 0.01, and p<0.05 one-tailed with robust std. errors
a. ICWeakAMENDED equal to 1 if auditor SOX 404 report of ineffective control; 0 otherwise in a logit regression using the 
    ERROR sample (see b. Below) except for observations in industries that predict effective control perfectly.
b. ERROR = 1 for the 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s); 0 for 121 matched firm-years without restatement.
c. INTENTvsNORESTATE = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years without restatement.
d. INTENT = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ICWeakAMENDEDa ERRORb INTENTvsNORESTATEc INTENTd
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TABLE 18 Internal Control Mediation 
Panel A: Model 2 and 3 results when the models are modified to include internal control qualitya  
Dependent Variable
Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
ICWeakAMENDED 3.25 2.94 *** 4.57 4.41 *** 1.06 2.39 ***
ORGCHANGE 0.52 0.74 0.58 0.79 0.03 0.04
CFOBIG4 0.62 1.64 * -0.38 -0.85 -0.93 -2.30 **
CFOPOWER 0.52 1.66 ** 0.19 0.45 -0.22 -0.69
CFOBIG4_ORGCHANGE -1.72 -2.39 *** -0.94 -1.08 0.63 0.89
CFOPOWER_ORGCHANGE -0.78 -1.45 * -0.34 -0.58 0.42 0.76
ACBIG4 0.03 0.10 -0.43 -1.06 -0.81 -2.21 **
OFFICESIZE 0.09 0.77 -0.05 -0.36 -0.02 -0.18
AUDITFEE 0.26 0.85 0.14 0.40 -0.18 -0.65
AUDITORTENURE 0.05 0.23 0.52 1.98 ** 0.32 1.38 *
CFO_EQUITY_PAY -0.05 -0.07 -2.24 -2.47 *** -1.93 -2.64 ***
CEOINDEP 0.60 1.87 ** -0.14 -0.37 -0.78 -2.28 **
FIRMSIZE 0.02 0.10 -0.05 -0.27 0.16 0.86
AGE -0.14 -0.60 -0.32 -1.18 -0.37 -1.67 **
LOSS 1.13 2.98 *** 0.37 0.81 -0.64 -1.71 **
COMPLEXITY 0.23 0.82 0.49 1.50 * 0.04 0.14
ANALYSTFOLLOW -0.41 -1.17 -0.33 -0.70 -0.43 -1.03
_cons -6.00 -1.63 * 6.95 1.42 * 14.93 3.71 ***
N 242 225 225
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.32 0.20
log liklihood -138.41 -106.13 -124.23
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 2.78 8.82 3.04
Prob > chi2 0.9476 0.3573 0.9318
Area under ROC curve 0.7609 0.8374 0.7847
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively p < 0.01, p < 0.05, and p <0.1 one-tailed with robust standard errors
a. ICWeakAMENDED equal to 1 if auditor SOX 404 report of ineffective control; 0 otherwise 
b. ERROR = 1 for the 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s); 0 for 121 matched firm-years without restatement.
c. INTENTvsNORESTATE = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years without restatement.
d. INTENT = 1 for 104 firm-years restated to correct intentional misstatement; 0 for 121 firm-years restated to correct unintentional error(s).
ERRORb INTENTvsNORESTATEc INTENTd
Model 2 Model 3
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TABLE 18 Continued 
Panel B: Proportion of audit committee financial expertise effect mediated by internal control quality 
DV
Coef. z P>|z| Coef. z P>|z| Coef. z P>|z|
ICWeakAMENDED 1.07 2.60 0.009 ***
ACBIG4 -0.57 -1.42 0.156 -0.79 -2.31 0.021 ** -0.77 -2.21 0.027 **
ORGCHANGE 0.61 1.27 0.205 0.08 0.18 0.856 -0.06 -0.15 0.881
CFOBIG4 0.14 0.36 0.719 -0.69 -2.07 0.038 ** -0.74 -2.16 0.031 **
CFOPOWER 0.16 0.46 0.649 -0.08 -0.30 0.762 -0.12 -0.43 0.671
OFFICESIZE -0.09 -0.82 0.412 -0.05 -0.46 0.644 -0.02 -0.21 0.837
AUDITFEE 0.19 0.59 0.555 -0.12 -0.44 0.658 -0.17 -0.61 0.543
AUDITORTENURE 0.22 0.87 0.385 0.33 1.45 0.147 0.31 1.35 0.178
CFO_EQUITY_PAY -0.48 -0.51 0.612 -1.87 -2.43 0.015 ** -1.87 -2.40 0.016 **
CEOINDEP -0.36 -0.92 0.360 -0.81 -2.36 0.018 ** -0.79 -2.27 0.023 **
FIRMSIZE -0.46 -2.03 0.042 ** 0.06 0.30 0.765 0.14 0.72 0.469
AGE -0.26 -1.01 0.311 -0.35 -1.58 0.115 -0.33 -1.46 0.144
LOSS 0.09 0.22 0.827 -0.61 -1.61 0.107 -0.64 -1.66 0.097 *
COMPLEXITY -0.26 -0.82 0.412 -0.01 -0.03 0.973 0.03 0.10 0.923
ANALYSTFOLLOW -0.53 -1.19 0.234 -0.48 -1.22 0.222 -0.41 -1.05 0.295
_cons 1.65 0.41 0.680 4.75356 1.37 0.171 4.2294 1.18 0.238
year fixed effects yes yes yes
industry fixed effects yes yes yes
N 215 224 224
LR chi2 41.640 52.420 59.500
Prob > chi2 0.118 0.023 0.006
Pseudo R2 0.173 0.170 0.193
Log likelihood -99.251 -128.329 -124.793
***, **, * indicates a statistical difference at respectively  p <0.01, p <0.05, and p <0.1
total indirect effect  = -.0336326
direct effect   = -.1941759
total effect  = -.22780851
c_path   = -.21475045
proportion of total effect mediated = 0.148
ratio of indirect to direct effect = 0.173
ratio of total to direct effect = 1.173
ICWeakAMENDED INTENT INTENT
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Appendix A  
Words and Phrases Used in Text Searches of Restatement Announcements  
 
AuditAnlytics44 manually codes less than 5% of restatement announcements in its database as 
“errors – accounting and clerical applications” (i.e., 515 of 10,623 restatements announced in years after 
2002, the year of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) enactment). I used a sample comprised of 361 of these 
restatement announcements (those with the restatement period ending after Dec 1, 2004 at a time when 
SOX 404 is in effect) to develop a list of words and phrases with which to construct a language-based 
proxy for restatements that correct unintentional error. First I sorted these 361 restatements alphabetically. 
Next, I read these restatements looking for the words and phrases that indicate lack of misstatement 
intent. For example, I added the word “inadvertent” to the list after reading Airtran Holdings Inc.’s 
August, 2006 announcement that it was amending its 10-K to “correct inadvertent errors in accounting for 
fuel expense”. Similarly, I added the word “duplicate” to the list after reading Energy Source’s November 
2007 announcement that it was restating its 2005 and 2006 annual financial statements “to reverse the 
duplicate recognition of the liabilities as both accounts payable and long term debt”. As I progressed 
through the sample selected for list creation, I found fewer and fewer new words and phrases to add to the 
list. After reading the first 180 restatement announcements in the sample, I chose to limit reading of the 
remaining 181 restatement announcements to the 48 restatements not containing words already on the list. 
After making each list addition based on words and phrases in the AuditAnalytics-error-coded-
restatement announcements, I supplemented the list with synonyms and variants of the listed words and 
phrases. I conducted quick searches using the AuditAnalytics text search tool to confirm any synonyms 
and variants I suspected may be used in restatement announcements to indicate unintentional error are 
                                                   
44
 Scholtz (2008) in a report on restatements between 1997 and 2006 prepared for the US Treasury, finds Audit 
Analytics includes “nearly all restatements captured in the GAO lists and Lexis-Nexis searches, and some that are 
not identified through these methods”. 
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contained in one or more restatement announcements in the AuditAnalytics database. For example, I 
added to the list two phrases (i.e., “recorded twice” and “double recorded”) that I reasoned have similar 
meanings to “duplicate” in the context of financial restatements after finding these two phrases are each 
used in several restatement announcements.   
The final list of words and phrases is presented at the end of this Appendix. To format the list for 
use with the AuditAnalytics text search tool, phrases are enclosed in quotation marks, the Boolean 
operator “OR” is added, and the number of words/phrases displayed per line is limited to fit in the search 
tool. For presentation purposes, I grouped words and phrases searches into nine categories of errors 
(calculation, unintentional errors (explicitly stated), information system, immaterial, clerical, 
administrative, reconciliation, recording, and classification). The words and phrases in all groups except 
the classification group are used in text searches to construct the proxy for restatements that correct 
unintentional error validated in the paper. I found one or more of these words and phrases in 2,048 post-
2002 restatements announcements when I searched using AuditAnalytics text search tool. The words and 
phrases in the classification group are used to test the robustness of validation tests when using a broader 
search for restatements that correct unintentional error. The words and phrases in both the recording 
group and the classification group are ignored in a narrower search for error correcting restatements in 
other robustness tests of validation test results.  
The list of words and phrases also shows the proportion of restatement announcements that 
contain the words/phrases on each line of the list and in each group of (i) the 10,623 post-2002 
restatements; (ii) the 2,048 restatements identified as correcting unintentional error; and (iii) the 515 post-
2002 restatements coded as “Errors – accounting and clerical applications” by AuditAnalytics. It is 
noteworthy that text searches identify only 76.3% (77.7%) of restatements coded by AuditAnalytics as 
“Errors – accounting and clerical applications” when classification error indicators are excluded 
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(included). There are several possible reasons for this discrepancy between AuditAnalytics’ manual 
coding and the automated text search results. Firstly, I was unable to find appropriate words or phrases 
that would have identified some of the AuditAnalytics error-coded restatements.  For example, 
AuditAnalytics codes Gran Tierra Energy Inc.’s February, 2010 announcement as an error. However, I did 
not determine in the section of the restatement announcement that describes the error (i.e., in the text 
“determining the valuation of the warrant modification was inconsistent with the inputs used in the Black-
Scholes option pricing model to determine the fair value of the Company’s stock based compensation 
awards” an appropriate  word or phrase that could be used in automated text searches to identify 
unintentional error. Secondly, as described above, I did not read 133 (181-48) of the restatements coded 
by AuditAnalytics as errors and it is possible words and phrases that would be useful for the identification 
of unintentional error are not included in the list. Words such as inadvertent, unintentional, and mistake 
that explicitly state restatements correct unintentional error are contained in 17.4% (18.6%) of 
restatements identified by text searches of all 10,623 post-2002 restatements (the 515 AuditAnalytics 
coded post-2002 restatements). Words and phrases that suggest restatements correct calculation errors 
correct are contained in 28.3% (25.8%) of all 10,623 post-2002 restatements (the 515 AuditAnalytics 
coded post-2002 restatements). The proportions of restatements identified by text searches of all 10,623 
post-2002 restatements and of the 515 AuditAnalytics coded post-2002 restatements are similar except for 
the clerical error correcting group (respectively, 9.6% and 21.6%) and the recording error correcting 
group (respectively, 38.6% and 14.8%).  
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Appendix A continued 
Words and phrases used in text searches of restatement announcements 
n
% of 10,623 
restatements 
announced 
since 2002
% of 2,048 text 
search identified 
error-correcting 
restatements n
% of 515 
AuditAnalytics 
coded
Restatements that correct unintentional error as identified by text searches 2048 19.3% 100.0% 393 76.3%
 (excluding restatements with only classification errors)
calculation group 579 5.5% 28.3% 133 25.8%
"error in the calculation" OR "errors in the calculation" OR "errors in the calculations" 141 1.3% 6.9% 28 5.4%
"incorrectly calculated" 65 0.6% 3.2% 12 2.3%
"calculation error" OR "calculation errors" 60 0.6% 2.9% 17 3.3%
miscalculat* 53 0.5% 2.6% 7 1.4%
"computational error" OR "computational errors" 47 0.4% 2.3% 26 5.0%
"mathematical error" OR "mathematical errors" 46 0.4% 2.2% 22 4.3%
"recalculating" OR "recalculation" 39 0.4% 1.9% 3 0.6%
"error in calculating" OR "errors in calculating" 35 0.3% 1.7% 1 0.2%
"incorrect calculation" OR "incorrect calculations" 26 0.2% 1.3% 3 0.6%
"properly calculate" OR "properly calculated" 25 0.2% 1.2% 3 0.6%
"error in the computation" OR "errors in the computation" OR "errors in the computations" 24 0.2% 1.2% 7 1.4%
"did not properly calculate" OR "improperly calculated" 15 0.1% 0.7% 1 0.2%
numerical OR arithmetical 11 0.1% 0.5% 6 1.2%
"error in calculation" OR "errors in calculation" OR "errors in calculations" 9 0.1% 0.4% 1 0.2%
"incorrectly computed" 9 0.1% 0.4% 1 0.2%
"mechanical error" OR "mechanical errors" 8 0.1% 0.4% 2 0.4%
"error in computing" OR "errors in computing" 7 0.1% 0.3% 0 0.0%
"footing error" OR "footing errors" OR "summation error" OR "summation errors" 6 0.1% 0.3% 6 1.2%
arithmetic 6 0.1% 0.3% 3 0.6%
"error in its calculation" OR "errors in its calculations" OR "errors in its calculations" 6 0.1% 0.3% 3 0.6%
"inaccurate calculation" OR "inaccurate calculations" 5 0.0% 0.2% 1 0.2%
"error in its computation" OR "errors in its computation" OR "errors in its computations" 3 0.0% 0.1% 0 0.0%
"misstatement in computing" OR "misstatements in computing" 2 0.0% 0.1% 2 0.4%
unintentional error (explicitly stated) group 357 3.4% 17.4% 96 18.6%
"inadvertent" OR "inadvertently" 264 2.5% 12.9% 71 13.8%
"mistake" OR "mistakenly" OR "mistakes" 74 0.7% 3.6% 19 3.7%
"unintentional" OR "unintentionally" 47 0.4% 2.3% 9 1.7%
information system group 203 1.9% 9.9% 69 13.4%
"accounting system" OR "accounting systems" 40 0.4% 2.0% 9 1.7%
"spreadsheet" OR "spread-sheet" OR "spread sheet" OR "spreadsheets" OR "spread-sheets" 30 0.3% 1.5% 10 1.9%
"bookkeeping" OR "book-keeping" 30 0.3% 1.5% 12 2.3%
"information system" OR "information systems" 23 0.2% 1.1% 6 1.2%
"software system" OR "installed software" OR "accounting software" 18 0.2% 0.9% 8 1.6%
legacy 17 0.2% 0.8% 1 0.2%
"new accouting system" OR "new software" OR "new system" OR "new systems" 15 0.1% 0.7% 5 1.0%
"ERP" OR "Enterprise Resource Planning" OR "enterprise resource planning" 15 0.1% 0.7% 5 1.0%
"software error" OR "software errors" OR "logic error" OR "logic errors" OR "programmatic error" 8 0.1% 0.4% 7 1.4%
"accounting software" 8 0.1% 0.4% 2 0.4%
"conversion error" OR  "conversion errors" OR "error in the conversion" OR "errors in the conversion" 7 0.1% 0.3% 3 0.6%
"software program" OR "software version" 6 0.1% 0.3% 5 1.0%
"system interface failure" OR "interface" 6 0.1% 0.3% 1 0.2%
"programming error" OR "programming errors" OR "program change" OR "program change" 3 0.0% 0.1% 1 0.2%
"automated system" OR "automated systems" 2 0.0% 0.1% 1 0.2%
Restatements announced post-2002
 in the AuditAnalytics database at 
time of November, 2012 search 
(N=10,623)
coded by 
AuditAnalytics  as  
error-correcting
 (N=515)
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Appendix A continued 
Words and phrases used in text searches of restatement announcements 
n
% of 10,623 
restatements 
announced 
since 2002
% of 2,048 text 
search identified 
error-correcting 
restatements n
% of 515 
AuditAnalytics 
coded
clerical group 196 1.8% 9.6% 111 21.6%
"clerical error" OR "clerical errors" 117 1.1% 5.7% 88 17.1%
"typographic error" OR "typographical error" OR "typographic errors" OR "typographical errors" 54 0.5% 2.6% 10 1.9%
"transposed" OR "transposition" OR "transpositions" 8 0.1% 0.4% 4 0.8%
"rounding error" OR "rounding errors" 6 0.1% 0.3% 3 0.6%
transcription* 4 0.0% 0.2% 2 0.4%
"filing error" OR "filing errors" 4 0.0% 0.2% 1 0.2%
"clerical accounting error" OR "clerical accounting errors" or "clerical in nature" 3 0.0% 0.1% 3 0.6%
reconciliation group 51 0.5% 2.5% 9 1.7%
"account reconciliation" OR "account reconciliations" 38 0.4% 1.9% 3 0.6%
"reconciliation error" OR "reconciliation errors" 10 0.1% 0.5% 3 0.6%
"error in its reconciliation" OR "errors in its reconciliation" OR "errors in its reconciliations" 4 0.0% 0.2% 3 0.6%
"error in the reconciliation" OR "errors in the reconciliation" OR "errors in the reconciliations" 3 0.0% 0.1% 1 0.2%
administrative group 18 0.2% 0.9% 4 0.8%
"administrative error" OR "administrative errors" 15 0.1% 0.7% 3 0.6%
"administrative oversight" 3 0.0% 0.1% 1 0.2%
immaterial  group 202 1.9% 9.9% 14 2.7%
"immaterial error" OR "immaterial errors" 182 1.7% 8.9% 10 1.9%
"immaterial correction of an error" OR "immaterial correction of errors" 11 0.1% 0.5% 1 0.2%
"miscellaneous corrections" 8 0.1% 0.4% 2 0.4%
"not deemed material" 6 0.1% 0.3% 1 0.2%
recording group 790 7.4% 38.6% 76 14.8%
"not recorded" 202 1.9% 9.9% 7 1.4%
"incorrectly recorded" 138 1.3% 6.7% 10 1.9%
"did not record" 104 1.0% 5.1% 7 1.4%
"failed to include" OR "failed to record" 70 0.7% 3.4% 4 0.8%
"improperly recorded" 68 0.6% 3.3% 6 1.2%
"error in recording" OR  "inaccurate recording" OR "errors in recording" 58 0.5% 2.8% 11 2.1%
"not previously recorded" 52 0.5% 2.5% 2 0.4%
"cut-off" OR "cutoff" 52 0.5% 2.5% 4 0.8%
"posted" OR "posting" OR "postings" 45 0.4% 2.2% 11 2.1%
"failure to record" 25 0.2% 1.2% 2 0.4%
"recorded twice" OR "double recorded" OR "duplicate" 24 0.2% 1.2% 9 1.7%
"converting data" OR "coding" OR "data entry" OR "data input" OR "data inputs" 20 0.2% 1.0% 14 2.7%
"recorded incorrectly" 19 0.2% 0.9% 2 0.4%
"but not recorded" 10 0.1% 0.5% 1 0.2%
"recording error" OR "recording errors" 8 0.1% 0.4% 1 0.2%
"mis-posted" OR "misposting" OR "mispostings" OR "mis-postings" 4 0.0% 0.2% 1 0.2%
classification group (used only in Chapter 2 robustness tests) 
*classifi* (in restatements where text searches detect other errors) 266 2.5% 13.0% 33 6.4%
*classifi* (in restatements where text searches do not detect other errors) 1316 12.4% n/a 7 1.4%
Restatements announced post-2002
 in the AuditAnalytics database at 
time of November, 2012 search 
(N=10,623)
coded by 
AuditAnalytics  as 
error-correcting
 (N=515)
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Appendix B 
Restatement Classification and Determination of Restated Years Used in Statistical Tests 
 
Definitions: 
Restatement year: the earliest fiscal year in the restated period. Only restatement year data is used in statistical tests.  
Intentional Misstatement: a restatement is classified as correcting an intentional misstatement if the restated period 
overlaps the period discussed in an AAER that alleges fraud or intentional misstatement. 
Unintentional Error: a restatement is classified as correcting an unintentional error if an automated search of the 
restatement announcement in AuditAnalytics identifies a word or phrase that suggests lack of intent. 
Appendix A lists the words and phrases used in the automated searches and describes the method used to 
construct the list.  
Classification when companies have multiple restatements: 
The sample contains at most one restatement per firm-year per company. The following example shows how 
restatements are classified for a company with three restatements with overlapping restatement periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Restatement 1: restated period July 1 – Sept. 30, 2006 (restatement disclosed Mar. 20, 2007) 
- Since this restatement is a quarterly restatement (does not include a fiscal year-end) it is not included in any sample. 
Only annual restatements are used in validation tests. 
Restatement 2: restated period Jan. 1, 2005 – Dec. 31, 2006 (restatement disclosed May 20, 2008) 
and Restatement 3: restated period June 1, 2005 – Mar. 1, 2007 (restatement disclosed July 15, 2008) 
- When a company announces restatement of the same annual financial statement in more than one restatement 
disclosure (e.g. 2005 is restated by both Restatement 2 and Restatement 3), the restatement correcting any intentional 
misstatement is included in the sample 
- The restatement that corrects intentional misstatement with the restatement period with the earliest “begin date” is 
chosen if there is more than one misstatement correcting restatements announced for the same firm-year.  
-If all the restatements correct unintentional error in the same annual financial statements, the restatement with the 
earliest “begin date” is included in the sample.  
- If two restatements considered for sample inclusion have the same earliest “begin date”, the restatement announced 
first is selected.  
- In the example depicted above, Restatement 3 would be used in validation tests if it corrects an intentional 
misstatement whereas Restatement 2 would be used if both Restatement 2 and 3 correct unintentional error since 
Restatement 2’s restated period begins earlier. 
- The 2006 firm-year would not be included in the sample used in validation tests. When the restated period extends 
past a single fiscal year, only the earliest year is included the sample for statistical tests.  
Restatement 1 – disclosed March 20, 2007 
Restatement 2 - disclosed May 20, 2008 
Restatement 3 – disclosed July 15, 2008    
Dec. 31, 2004 
year-end 
Dec. 31, 2005 
year-end 
Dec. 31, 2006 
year-end 
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Appendix C  
Accrual Measures 
 
The accrual measures are described briefly in Table 2, however this Appendix provides a more 
complete description.  
 
Accruals: The total accrual measure (Accruals) is income before extraordinary items (total of four 
quarters of ibqr) less operating cash flow (oancfqr), scaled by average assets (atqr).  
 
WC_acc: The working capital accrual metric (WC_acc) is the change in working capital items (as defined 
in Table 2) scaled by average assets.  
 
pmatch: To compute Kothari et al.’s (2005) performance matched residual (pmatch), I first estimated 
cross-sectional coefficients of the modified Jones model for each year for the same two-digit SIC code, 
using all observations available in the Unrestated COMPUSTAT database (with a minimum of 10 
observations): 
 
Accrualsit = α + β(1 ⁄ ATit-1)+γ(∆Salesit-∆Recit) ⁄ ATit-1+ ρPPEit ⁄ ATit-1 + ε      (1) 
 
Where Accruals are defined as above, AT is total assets (atqr), ∆Sales is the change in sales (total of four 
quarters of saleqr) from year t-1 to t, ∆Rec is the change in accounts receivable (recchqr) from year t-1 to 
t, and PPE (ppentqr) is property plant and equipment. Discretionary accruals are the residuals from 
equation (1) computed using the cross-sectionally computed coefficients. A firm-year’s performance 
matched discretionary accrual (pmatch) is the difference between its discretionary accrual and the 
discretionary accrual of the firm-year from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest current 
year return on assets (total of four quarters income before extraordinary items (ibqr) scaled by total assets 
(atqr) for year t-1).  
 
sresid: While the performance matched discretionary accrual measure (pmatch) is used frequently in 
financial reporting quality research, Jones et al. (2008, 500) find that “only the accrual estimation errors 
estimated from cross-sectional models of working capital changes on past, present, and future cash 
flows… have explanatory power for fraud beyond total accruals”. Accordingly, Table 8 includes a second 
discretionary accrual measure, the studentized residuals (sresid) from the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, estimated cross-sectionally for the same two-digit SIC code, using all observations available in the 
Unrestated COMPUSTAT database (except for industries with five or fewer observations). The model 
regresses the change in working capital (WC_acc as defined in Table 2) on cash flow from operations 
(oancfqr) for year t, t-1 and t+1, where all variables are deflated by average assets. The sresid metric is 
the residual, scaled by the standard error from the industry-level regression (Dechow et al. 2011, 39) 
using Stata’s predict function with the rstudent option after regression. Dechow et al. (2011) find both the 
pmatch and sresid measures are significantly different for misstating (identified using AAERs) and 
COMPUSTAT firm-years in the 1979 – 2002 time period.  
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